


Social and Historical Change

An Islamic Perspective

by

AYATULLAH MURTAZA MUTAHHARI

Translated from the Persian by R. CAMPBELL





In these two essays, the late Muslim scholar Murtaza Mutahhari examines society and history. His discussion demonstrates clearly his wide-ranging knowledge of Western as well as Eastern thought through the ages.

One of Mutahhari's principal aims is to refute historical materialism. To his mind, the theory is both invalid and incompatible with Islam, despite published views of some Muslim intellectuals who cite sacred texts to support it. Mutahhari explains exactly where they misread the Qur'an and refers

to numerous other verses as he argues that Marxism, dialectical materialism, and historical materialism are Western theories totally at odds with virtually every facet of Islamic thought.

The book has been carefully translated by R. Campbell and provided with a foreword by Dr. Hamid Algar. Extensively annotated by the author, the Persian publisher of the original edition, and the translator, this work is a valuable addition to any collection of Islamic thought in English.





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AYATULLAH MURTAZA MUTAHHARI

Translated from the Persian by R. CAMPBELL Introduction by HAMID ALGAR





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Foreword

The Islamic Revolution of Iran was preceded by important intellectual as well as political and social developments, and it might even be argued that the intellectual prehistory of the revolution has been crucial to the course it has taken. While an important segment of the religious scholars was awakening to a new sense of political commitment and social responsibility under the guidance of Imam Khomeini, certain secular intellectuals were attempting to evolve varieties of Islamic ideology that were attuned to their own preferences and influenced by Western modes of thought. Disputes and tensions arose between the two currents of thought, but they remained generally in the background until the overthrow of the Pahlavi regime. After the establishment of the Islamic Republic, however, these differences emerged as one of the factors hindering the stabilization of the new order and its institutions. The stability now enjoyed by the Islamic Republic, six years after the revolution, is an indication of the ideological as well as political triumph of the Islamic understanding propounded by the religious scholars, one based on a coherent and comprehensive view of the Qur'an and other authoritative sources.

Among the most important issues discussed in the ideological writings of the pre-revolutionary period are those dealt with in this volume, society and history: the nature of society and of societal change, the relationship of ideology to social and economic factors, determinism or accident as the prime characteristic of historical change, and so forth. The late Ayatullah Mutahhari was among those few persons who were able to delineate a coherent Islamic position on these subjects and to demonstrate the potentialities of Islam as a motive for revolution without falling into the glorification of revolution per seand making of it the supreme and exclusive goal of Islam. It has been well said that a whole world of differences separated

"Islamic revolution" from "revolutionary Islam"; the former expression means a comprehensive process of transformation that is conducted in accordance with Islam but does not exhaust the entire content of Islam, whereas the latter means an Islam reduced to being the instrument of revolution and defined completely in terms of socio-economic processes.² Mutahhari was the most articulate defender of "Islamic revolution" against the encroachments of "revolutionary Islam."

One of the benefits of Mutahhari's philosophical training and mode of thought was that it made him an excellent polemicist, in the best sense of the word. He took the opponent's argument seriously and stated it as fully and coherently as possible (sometimes, indeed, more persuasively than the opponent himself) before proceeding to a reasoned and systematic refutation, in a language almost entirely devoid of anger or scorn. But it was in the nature of "revolutionary Islam" to spurn all reasoned debate and to override objections through the spectacular application of force. It was thus that Mutahhari attained the goal of martyrdom.

That the present book is in a sense a document of combat is confirmed by its abrupt ending; Mutahhari was assassinated before he was able to complete it. But the book should be read as more than a record of ideological struggles; it has lasting value as a statement of essential Islamic doctrine on the twin topics of society and history, and thus serves to complement perfectly the first volume of Mutahhari's writings published by Mizan Press, Fundamentals of Islamic Thought.


Hamid Algar

1. For a biography and fuller analysis of the career of Mutahhari, see my introduction to Mutahhari, Fundamentals of Islamic Thought, Mizan Press: Berkeley, 1985, pp. 9-20.

2. See Sayyid Husayn Ta'ib, Tahlili az Tirur-i Mutafakkir-i Shahid Ustad Mutahhari, Tehran, n.d., p. 2.







A school's understanding of society and of history, or the manner in which it conceives of them, helps determine that school's ideology. Accordingly, we must understand how Islam regards society and history.

Plainly, Islam is neither a school of sociology nor a philosophy of history. In the Islamic scripture, no social or historical topic is addressed in the usual languages of sociology or history. Likewise, no other topic, such as morals, jurisprudence, or philosophy, is addressed in conventional language, couched in current terminology, or elaborated according to customary classificatory schemes. Nonetheless, many of the questions these sciences deal with can be fully deduced and derived from the Qur'an.

Because the subjects of society and history are related, and because I wish to discuss them concisely, I have combined the subjects in one volume. Islamic thought concerning these topics takes on a special importance and is well worth study and research. Like so many other topics in Islam, they illustrate the depth and breadth of its teachings. I will discuss questions of society and history to the extent I feel is essential to an understanding of Islamic theology.

The Nature of Society

A collection of human individuals who have grown interlinked through special arrangements, norms, manners, and laws and have a collective life constitutes a society. A collective life is not constituted by a group of persons living alongside one another in a single locale with a single climate and food supply. The trees of a garden live alongside one another and share a climate and food supply, and the gazelles of a herd graze, gambol, and migrate together, but neither trees nor gazelles have any sort of social life; they do not constitute a society.

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That man's life is social means that he has a social identity. On the one hand, needs, benefits, and undertakings have a social identity and are unfeasible except by division of labor, division of benefits, and division of need-fulfillment within a series of norms and arrangements. On the other hand, some kinds of thoughts, ideas, and temperaments govern the population and unify its members. To put it differently: A society is a collection of persons who, impelled by a range of needs and influenced by a range of beliefs, ideas, and aspirations, have combined and plunged into a shared life.

Shared social needs and the special relationships of human life so interconnect persons and confer such a unity on their lives as to make them like travelers journeying toward a destination in a single car, airplane, or ship who all reach a stage together, all fail to advance together, or all face a danger or share a fate together.

What a beautiful parable the Most Noble Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him and his family) advanced in expounding the philosophy of enjoining good and forbidding evil:

A number of people boarded a ship. The ship cleft the heart of the sea and sailed on. Each of the passengers was seated in his assigned place. One of the travelers, on the pretext, "Where I sit is my place and belongs to myself alone," and by a means he had at his disposal, proceeded to bore a line at that point. If the rest of the passengers had seized his hands and prevented him from that act, they would not have been drowned, and they would have prevented that unfortunate one from drowning as well.

THE SOCIAL NATURE OF MAN

This question has been asked from ancient times: Under the influence of what factors has man's social life come into being? Was man created social? That is, was he created as a part of the whole by nature, and is there a tendency innate in man to join with his "whole"? Or was he not created social, but did external necessity compel the imposition of social existence upon him? That is, does man by his first nature incline to be free and to reject all the bonds and impositions that social life entails, and has he learned through experience that he is incapable of continuing his life in solitude and of necessity submitted to the limitations of social life? Or was man not created social, but was the factor that impelled him to social life

not necessity, or at least was necessity not the sole factor? Did man, through his primordial reason and evaluative power, conclude that he might better avail himself of the gifts of creation through cooperation and social life and so choose to share? So the question can be set as follows: Is man's social life natural, necessitated, or elective?

According to the first theory, that social life is natural, it is like the domestic life of husband and wife, wherein each marital partner has been created as a "part" of a "whole" by natural disposition, and each has within a tendency to join with his or her whole. According to the second theory, that social life is necessitated, it is like the cooperation and alliance of two nations that see themselves as incapable of confronting a common enemy alone and so of necessity establish a kind of association. According to the third theory, that social life is elective, it is like the partnership of two capitalists who bring a single commercial, agricultural, or industrial entity into being for the sake of greater profits.

According to the first theory, the primary factor is the innate nature of man; according to the second, it is some phenomenon external to man's being; and according to the third, it is the human rational and evaluative faculty. According to the first theory, sociality is a universal end to which man's nature innately courses; according to the second theory, it is an accidental and adventitious phenomenon (in the language of philosophy, a secondary end, not a primary end); and according to the third theory, it is an intellectual, not a natural, end.

The noble verses of the Qur'an teach us that man's sociality has been embedded within his natural disposition. It is said in the blessed sura Hujurat, verse 13: "O people! We created you from a male and a female and made you into nations and tribes, so that you might know one another [not that you engage in boasting matches with one another]. Truly, the dearest among you to God is the most pious among you" (49:13). Here, in the course of a moral commandment, the social philosophy of the special creation of man is referred to: It is explained that man has been created so as to emerge in the form of various national and tribal groupings. Through this assignation to nations and tribes, the mutual recognition happens that is the inseparable condition of social life. If these lines of descent, which constitute from one standpoint the shared feature of individuals and from

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another the feature dividing individuals, did not exist, this recognition would be impossible. Consequently, social life, based on the mutual relationships of human beings, would be impossible. These and like phenomena, such as divergencies in stature, shape, and color, give each individual the basis for his own personal identity card. Suppose all individuals were the same in stature, shape, and color; suppose no disparity of relationships and descents governed them. Individuals vis-à-vis one another would then be just like the uniform products of a factory. Distinguishing each other, recognizing each other, and basing their social life on the relationships and transactions of thought, work, and goods would be impossible. Therefore, assignation to nations and tribes has a natural wisdom and providence, which is the differentiation and mutual recognition of individuals, the inseparable condition of social life. It properly implies this differentiation and recognition, not boasting matches and feelings of superiority, because the basis of honor and nobility is piety.

In the sura Furqan, verse 54, it is said, "It is He Who has created a man from water and arrayed him in descent relationships and affinal relationships" (25:54). This noble verse, too, advances the descent relationships and the affinal relationships that constitute the basis for bonds among individuals and for their mutual recognition as a design set in the text of the creation according to a universal wisdom and providence.

In the blessed sura Zukhruf, verse 32, it is said:

Do they apportion the mercy of the Lord? [Have the workings of the creation been entrusted to them, that they give whatever they please to whomever they please, and take it back from whomever they please?] It is We who portion out among them their livelihood in the life of this world, and we raise some of them above others [from the standpoints of possibilities and capacities] in degrees, so that some might obtain labor of others [so that by this means, and reciprocally, some might "tame" others (and in consequence all might be "tamed" to one another)] But the mercy of your Lord [the gift of prophethood] is better than what they amass" (43:32).

I have discussed the purport of this noble verse elsewhere and I will not repeat that discussion here. It suggests that people are not created alike in their possibilities and capacities; if they had been so created, each would have just what another had and lack just what

another lacked. There naturally would be no question of reciprocal need or of transactive relationship and service. God has created people various and dissimilar from the standpoints of physical, spiritual, intellectual, and emotional capacities and possibilities. He has made some superior in one way and others superior in another way. He thus has made all need each other and disposed to cleave to one another by nature. By this means, He has provided the basis for the interconnected life of society. This noble verse likewise indicates that man's social life is a natural phenomenon, neither sheerly contractual and elective nor necessitated and imposed.

SOCIETY'S SUBSTANTIVE, OBJECTIVE EXISTENCE

Society is a synthesis of individuals. If there were no individuals, there would be no society. There are several theories concerning this synthesis and the relationship between the individual and society.

One theory is that society is a merely nominal synthesis. A real synthesis takes place when a series of phenomena so interact that, when appropriate conditions are present, a new phenomenon with its own special characteristics appears, such as in chemical syntheses. For instance, when the gases hydrogen and oxygen act upon each other, a new phenomenon with a new identity and emergent properties and effects, called water, comes into being. A real synthesis requires that the constituents, after combining, give up their identity, characteristics, and effects and become resolved into the being of the compound.

People never become that integrated in social life, to become dissolved in a "man of the whole" in society. Therefore, society has no substantive, objective, real existence; it has a nominal, abstract existence. Only the individual has a substantive, objective, and real existence. Therefore, although human life in society has a social form and identity, the individuals in society do not assume the form of a real compound, called "society."

Another theory is that society is not a real compound in the sense that natural compounds are real, but a compound of art. Although not a natural compound, it has a reality of sorts. A compound of art is like a machine that has an organized structure. In a natural compound, the parts give up their identity and their independent effects,

and they are dissolved in a whole. In compounds of art, however, the parts do not give up their identity but do give up their independent effects. The components become interrelated in a special manner, and their effects likewise become interrelated; in consequence, the compound exhibits effects that differ from the aggregative effects of the parts in their independent state. For instance, an automobile transports objects or persons from place to place at a given speed. This effect neither stems from a particular part nor is the summation of the effects of the parts in their independent, unrelated state. There is in the synthesis of the machine a determinate cooperation, relation, and connection among the parts, but there is no effacement of the identity of the parts in the identity of the whole. Rather, the whole has no existence apart from the parts; the whole is composed of the sum of the parts, plus the special relationship among them.

Society, too, is like this. Society is composed of primary and secondary structures and institutions. The structures and the individuals upon whom they depend are all interconnected and interdependent. A change in any structure, whether cultural, religious, economic, political, judicial, or educational, occasions changes in the other structures. Social life then appears as an emergent property of the machine (society) without individuals' giving up their identity within the whole (society) or structures giving up theirs within the overall form of society.

A third theory holds that society is a real compound, like a natural compound, but a compound of spirits, ideas, emotions, desires, and wills. In the final analysis, it is a cultural synthesis, not a synthesis of bodies and members. Just as the material elements, through their interaction, pave the way for the appearance of a new phenomenon (or, in the language of philosophy, the material parts, after reciprocal act and affection, fractioning and being fractioned, find the disposition for a new form, and thus a new compound occurs), and just as the parts continue their existence with a new identity, human individuals, each with an innate resource and a resource acquired from nature, enter into social life, grow integrated in spirit, and find a new spirit (the "collective spirit"). This compound is itself a natural compound sui generis; one can find nothing else like it. Because the constituents of this compound have an objective influence on and can change one another, such that the constituent parts take on a new

identity, it is a natural and objective compound. However, because the whole, the compound itself, does not exist as a real unity, it differs from all other natural compounds. That is, in other natural compounds, the synthesis is real because the parts have a real interaction, the individuals' identities become different, and the compound itself is a real unity. A single identity exists without qualification; the plurality of the parts has been superseded by the unity of the whole.

In the synthesis of society and individual, which is a real synthesis, because a real interaction occurs and the compound parts (the individuals of the society) find a new identity and form, plurality is in no way superseded by unity, and no man of the whole exists as a real unity in whom pluralities are resolved. The man of the whole is that selfsame collection of individuals and has a nominal and abstract existence.

Another theory is that society is a real compound of a higher order than natural compounds. In natural compounds, prior to synthesis, the parts have their own identities and effects. Through their interaction, the conditions for a new phenomenon appear. But human individuals, at the stage prior to their social existence, have no human identity; they are empty vessels having only the potential to receive the collective spirit. Apart from social existence, human beings are mere animals with only the potential for humanity—the humanity of man, that is, the sense of the human "I," human thoughts, human emotions, and those feelings, inclinations, beliefs, ideas, and sentiments associated with humanity, appear only in the light of the collective spirit. This collective spirit fills this empty vessel and forms the individual into a person. The collective spirit has always been with man and will always remain so, with its effects and manifestations: morals, religion, science, philosophy, and art. Individuals' spiritual and cultural interactions occur through the collective spirit and in its light, not prior to it, at the stage previous to it. In truth, man's sociology is prior to his psychology. Here this theory contrasts with the previous one, which professes a psychology for man at the stage prior to his social existence and a sociology for him at this next stage. According to the theory that society is a real compound, if man had no social existence, no sociology, he would have no individual human psyche or psychology.

The first theory is purely individualistic. According to it, society

has no real existence, no law, no destiny, nothing knowable. Only individuals objectively exist as objects of cognition. Each individual's fate is independent of other individuals' fates.

The second theory is likewise individualistic; it does not uphold any substantive or objective reality for society as a whole or for the synthesis of individuals as a real synthesis. However, this theory regards the relationship of individuals as substantive and objective, like a physical relationship. According to this theory, while society has no existence independent of individuals (only individuals having a real, objective existence), individuals do have a shared fate, since the individual members of society, like the parts of a machine or a factory, are interdependent and interlinked in a mechanistic, causeand-effect relationship of their effects and movements. And society, meaning this organized assemblage of parts, considering the peculiar mechanistic cause and effect relationship that obtains among its parts, can be known independent of its parts taken severally.

The third theory regards both individual and society as substantive. From the standpoint that it does not regard the existence of the parts of society (individuals) as dissolved in the being of society and does not uphold for society a unitive existence like that of chemical compounds, it is individualistic. But from the standpoint that it envisions a kind of synthesis of individuals like a chemical synthesis in respect to questions of spirit, thought, and sentiment, this theory is "socialist." Individuals find a new identity in society, which is the identity of the society itself, although this identity is not unitive. According to this theory, in consequence of the interaction of the parts, a new, living reality emerges: A new spirit, a new intelligence, conscience, intent, and will appear, additional to and prevailing over individuals' private intelligence, conscience, will, and thought.

The fourth theory is pure "socialism." According to it, only the collective spirit, conscience, intelligence, will, and "I" exist. The individual conscience is no more than a manifestation of the collective intelligence and conscience.

The noble verses of the Our'an support the third theory. It does not address questions in the manner of a scientific or philosophical book of human origin, but it maintains that "peoples" [ummatha] (societies) have collective fates, dossiers, understanding and intelligence, works, and obedience and rebellion.2 Clearly, if "peoples" had no objective existence, to speak of their fate, understanding, intelligence, obedience, and rebellion would be meaningless. This point shows that the Qur'an posits a kind of life that is collective and social. "Collective life" is not just a simile and allegory; it is a reality. Likewise "collective death" is a reality.

It is said in the *sura* A'raf, verse 34, "For every people there is a term. When their term arrives, they cannot retard or advance it an hour" (7:34). In this verse, a life is spoken of with a final moment that is inevitable. It can be neither hastened nor postponed. This life belongs to a people, not to individuals. Clearly, the individuals composing the people do not yield up their individual lives all at once together, but in turn, dispersedly.

It is said in the blessed sura Jathiya, verse 28, "Every people will be called to its book" (45:28). Every people, every society, is being called to its book, its fate, for examination. Thus, not only do individuals have each a special book or dossier; societies, too, in being living, intelligent, and responsible beings that can be addressed, and in having will and choice, have dossiers and are called to account for them.

It is said in the sura An'am, verse 108, "We have adorned for each people their own acts" (6:108). This verse indicates that a people will find a single intelligence, special standards, and a special way of thinking. Each people's understanding, intelligence, and perception are unique to it. Every people judges according to special standards (at least on questions pertaining to functional perceptions). Every people has a particular perceptual taste and aesthetic. How many works are beautiful in the eyes of one people and otherwise in the eyes of another! It is the special ethos of a people that so shapes its individual members' perceptual values.

In the sura Ghafir, verse 5, it is said: "And every people purposed to seize their prophet and disputed with him in falsehood, so as to refute the truth. So I seized them, and how terrible was My punishment!" (40:5). This verse speaks of an inappropriate resolve and intent on the part of a society, a societal resolve upon senseless disputation with the truth. It speaks of how the retribution for such a resolve and intent is general and societywide torment.

Here and there in the Noble Qur'an, instances are seen where the actions of one individual member of a society are ascribed to the

whole of that society or the work of one generation, to following generations.³ These attributions occur when a people share a societal idea, will, and collective spirit. For instance, in the story of the Thamud people, the act of hamstringing Salih's camel, committed by one individual, is ascribed to the whole people: "And they hamstrung her" (11:68). The Qur'an holds the whole people responsible for the commission of the crime, as it holds it collectively deserving of punishment for it. It says, "So their Lord obliterated all trace of them" (91:15).

'Ali (upon whom be peace), in one of the discourses in the Nahi al-Balagha, says in explication of this matter: "O people! Truly what unites the people and imparts to them a common destiny consists in approval and disapproval." Whenever a people collectively approves or disapproves an act that is committed, even by a single individual, all share a judgment and a fate: "Truly a single individual hamstrung Thamud's camel, but then God encompassed them with torment after they encompassed him with approval, and He said, 'But they hamstrung her, and then they grew penitent" (26:157). God made His torment descend in a collective form on the people at large of Thamud because they approved one individual's resolve. When that resolve emerged onto the stage of action, it was in reality the resolve of the people at large. Although the hamstringing had taken place by the instrumentality of one individual, God in His speech ascribed it to the collectivity, saying, "That people hamstrung [it]." He did not say that one from among the people hamstrung it.

Approval of a sin, so long as it remains mere approval and is not conceived of as amounting to participation in that sin, is not accounted a sin. For example, an individual commits a sin, and another becomes aware of that sin before or after its commission and approves of it. Even if that approval reaches the level of a resolution, if it does not reach the stage of action, it is not conceived of as a sin. It is as if the individual himself had resolved upon a sin but did not in fact carry it out.

Approval is conceived of as a sin when it is conceived of as one individual's participation in the sin of another and as influential upon his resolution and action. A society's sins are of this kind. The ethos and the collective spirit approve the commission of a sin and shadow forth the intention underlying it. Any one of the individuals of the society, whose approval is part of the collective approval and

whose resolution is part of the collective resolution, commits that sin. It is here that the individual's sin is the collectivity's sin. 'Ali's discourse in the *Nahj al-Balagha*, which likewise refers to the import of the Qur'anic verse, has in view such a reality, not approval and disapproval as such, which in no way are accounted participation in the resolution and action of the individual who commits the sin.

In the Qur'an, the acts of a generation are at times ascribed to later generations. Thus, it attributes the past acts of the Israelites to the [Jewish] people of the Prophet's time, stating that, because they wrongfully kill the prophets, they are deserving of abasement and poverty. This is in view of the fact that, according to the Qur'an, they are a continuation and extension of their ancestors, or rather, from the standpoint of the collective spirit, they are those very ancestors, still living on. This is the idea when it is said, "Human society has more dead than living members" (that is, that the dead, the ancestors, have a greater share in forming the elements of the humanity of any age than do those alive in that age) or when it is said, "The dead have more effective governance of the living than they had of themselves when they were alive."

The Tafsir al-Mizan discusses how, if a society comes to have a single societal mode of thought, it takes on the character of a single human individual. Its individual members become like the faculties and members of a person and are essentially and in practice absorbed into the personality of this "person." Their pleasures and pains grow identical to "his" pleasures and pains; their happiness and miseries grow identical to "his" happiness and miseries. The work continues:

The Qur'an, in rendering judgment on peoples and societies that have had a single, collective mode of thought owing to religious or nationalistic solidarity, has so adjudged as to hold later generations accountable for the acts of former generations and to blame and reprove present contemporaries for the deeds of the absent and the dead. When a people have a collective mode of thought and a collective morale, there could be no other correct judgment than this.⁵

SOCIETY AND TRADITION

If society has a real existence, it must necessarily have laws and traditions peculiar to itself. If we accept the first of the theories concerning the identity of society and deny that society has an

objective existence, we must perforce regard society as lacking traditions and law. If we accept the second theory and regard society's synthesis as a kind of mechanical synthesis of art, we shall see society as having law and tradition. However, all its laws and traditions will be subsumed into a mechanical cause-and-effect relationship and a mechanical interaction of the social sectors. There will be no sign of a life and influence peculiar to society itself. If we accept the third theory—that society has a life independent of the life of the individual—although this collective life has no separate existence and has been dispersed and incarnated in individuals, it has laws and traditions independent of the individuals composing it that must be recognized. Contrary to the mechanistic theory, the third theory holds that the parts of the society, these human individuals, have their own independence of identity, even though they may have relinquished it to an extent to attain an organized state. But the individual's relative independence is meanwhile preserved because individual life, primordial nature, and acquisitions from nature are not wholly dissolved in the collective life. According to this theory, man lives two lives, with two spirits and two selves: the primordial human life, spirit, and self that are an outgrowth of the essential movements of nature and the collective life, spirit, and self that are an outgrowth of social life and incarnated in the individual self. Therefore, both the laws of psychology and the norms of sociology govern man. According to the fourth theory, only one kind of norm and law, that of sociology, governs man qua man.

Among the scholars of Islam, perhaps the first person to speak explicitly of the norms and laws governing society, apart from those governing individuals, and consequently to uphold a "character," a "nature," and a "reality" for society, was 'Abd ar-Rahman ibn Khaldun of Tunis, who discussed the historical process at length in his famous *Muqaddima*. Among modern scholars, the first person to investigate the norms governing societies was Montesquieu, the French scholar of the eighteenth Christian century. Raymond Aron says of Montesquieu:

His purpose was to make history intelligible. He sought to understand historical truth. But historical truth appeared to him in the form of an almost limitless diversity of morals, customs, ideas, laws, and institutions. His inquiry's point of departure was precisely this seemingly incoherent

diversity by a conceptual order. One might say that Montesquieu, exactly like Max Weber, wanted to proceed from the meaningless fact to an intelligible order. This attitude is precisely the one peculiar to the sociologist.6

Beyond the profusion of forms of social phenomena that exhibit them as mutually alien, the sociologist discovers a unity of which he recognizes all the varieties to be manifestations.

Likewise, concerning the fact that similar social phenomena spring from similar causes, Aron quotes Montesquieu's Considerations on the Causes of the Grandeur and Decadence of the Romans:

It is not fortune which rules the world. We can ask the Romans, who had a constant series of successes when they followed a certain plan, and an uninterrupted sequence of disasters when they followed another. There are general causes, whether moral or physical... which operate in every monarchy, to bring about its rise, its duration, and its fall. All accidents are subject to these causes, and if the outcome of a single battle, that is, a particular cause, was the ruin of a State, there was a general cause which decreed that that State was destined to perish through a single battle. In short, the main impulse carries all the particular accidents along with it.?

The Noble Qur'an states explicitly that peoples and societies as such (and not just the individuals composing them) have norms and laws, and grandeurs and decadences in accordance with them. To have a shared destiny means to have a tradition as a society. The Qur'an says concerning the Israelites:

And We decreed for the Israelites in the Scripture [one of the scriptures], "Twice you will work great corruption and tyranny in the land." When the time came for revenge of you for the first rebellion, We incited powerful and warlike servants of Ours against you who penetrated into the inner sanctums of your homes, and this pledge was fulfilled. Then We gave you your turn over them [as a result of your repentance and return to the right path] and aided you with fortunes and troops, and We gave you numerical superiority over them. If you did good, you did good to yourselves, and if you did evil, you did evil to yourselves. [That is, Our norm and law is fixed and immutable, that under certain conditions We give a people strength, power, glory, and independence, and under certain conditions We abase them and subject them to others.] When the time came for the second revenge of you [in consequence of another reversion by you to corruption], [We caused other strong and warlike servants to dominate you,] to

deject your faces, to enter your Temple as they did before, and to lay waste all they conquered. It may be that your Lord will have mercy on you, but if you revert [to corruption], We will revert [to punishment]." (17:4-8)

The final clause, "if you revert, We will revert," in addressing a people, not an individual, suggests the universality and normative character of the laws governing societies.

DETERMINISM OR FREE WILL

Among the basic questions discussed by scholars, especially over the last century, is that of determinism versus free will for the individual vis-à-vis society, in other words, determinism versus free will for the individual spirit vis-à-vis the collective spirit. If we accept the first theory as to the synthesis of society and consider that synthesis a purely nominal one, if we think as perfect individualists, there will be no room to conceive of any sort of social determinism because nothing one could call the "power of the collective" will exist alongside the power of the individual, that could govern him and give rise to the impression of a social determination. If such a determination should come into being, it would be a determination of individual by individual or individuals, not a determination of individual by society in the sense that the social determinists intend. Correspondingly, if we accept the fourth theory, if we regard the individual from the standpoint of human character as amounting to raw material or an empty vessel and regard his human character—his private reason and will, the bases of his power of choice—as a ray of the collective reason and the collective will, if we accept that the collective spirit has deceptively manifested itself in the individual to arrive at its collective ends, and if we think in terms of pure "socialism," no place will remain for any conception of individual freedom and choice in social matters.

Emile Durkheim, the French sociologist who thinks in terms of "socialism" to this extent, says that social phenomena—in effect human phenomena—by contrast with phenomena such as eating and sleeping, which pertain to man's animal side and biological nature, are the product of society, not of the individual's thought and will. They have three properties: externality, determinateness, and generality. They are called external in that they are imposed upon the individual from without, that is, by society, and exist in society prior

to the individual's existence. The individual has accepted them under the influence of society. The individual's acceptance of manners, moral and social customs, religion, and the like is of this sort. They are called determinate in that they impose themselves upon the individual and mold the individual's conscience, judgment, feeling, thought, and sentiment in their own image. Their determinateness implies their generality.

If we accept the third theory, however, we regard both individual and society as substantive. Although society has a power predominant over that of individuals, this fact does not entail individuals' being determined in human and social questions. Durkheimian determinism arises from a neglect of the primordial human substantive reality that springs from man's essential evolution within nature. This primordial nature gives man a kind of freedom and a range of possibilities that empower him to rebel against society's impositions. Thus, an intermediate order governs the relation between individual and society.

The Noble Qur'an, while upholding for society a nature, character, objective being, power, life, death, appointed time, conscience, obedience, and rebellion, explicitly regards the individual as capable of rebellion against the order of society. The Qur'an bases its case on what it calls "the primordial nature [fitra] of God." The sura Nisa', verse 97, speaks of the section of Meccan society that called themselves the "oppressed" and powerless and thought their condition excused them for abandoning their innate responsibilities. They were actually determining and defining themselves vis-à-vis their society. It says that their excuse will by no means be accepted because they could at least have emigrated from that ethos to another one.

The Qur'an says elsewhere, "O you who believe! You have charge of your own souls. He who strays cannot harm you if you are rightly guided" (5:105).

The familiar verse Zarr, which refers to the human primordial nature, having said that God has implanted His message of tauhid within the hearts of the people, says, "So that you may not say later, 'Indeed our forefathers were mushriks, and we had no recourse; we were compelled to remain true to the traditions of our forefathers'" With such a God-given primordial nature, there is no question of any sort of compulsion.

The teachings of the Qur'an are founded wholly on responsibility,

one's own responsibility and that of society. The command to enjoin good and forbid evil is a command to the individual to rebel against the corruption of society. The narratives of the Qur'an mostly include the element of an individual's rebellion against a corrupt environment and ethos. The stories of Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus, the Most Noble Prophet, the Companions of the Cave, and the believers among Pharaoh's people all include this element.

The supposition that individuals are determined vis-à-vis the society and social environment is rooted in the conception that a real synthesis entails the integration of the parts and the dissolution of their plurality in the unity of the whole, the genesis of a new reality: Either one must accept the personhood, freedom, and autonomy of the individual and deny the reality of the synthesis and the objective existence of society, as do the first and second theories on socialism versus individualism, or one must accept the reality of the synthesis and the objective existence of society and deny the personhood, freedom, and autonomy of the individual, as the Durkheimian theory requires. To combine the two possibilities is impossible. And because all the evidence and reasoning of sociology support the objective existence of society, one must consider the contrary point refuted.

As philosophy has shown, all real syntheses cannot be equated. At the lower levels of nature (that is, in inorganic forms and inanimate beings, which in the language of the philosophers are governed each by only one "pure, simple faculty" and act uniformly), the parts and faculties are wholly integrated, and their existence is dissolved in the existence of the whole. This is what we see, for instance, in the synthesis of water from the two elements, hydrogen and oxygen. But the higher the level of the synthesis, the greater the relative independence of the parts relative to the whole. A kind of plurality in unity and unity in plurality appears. Thus, we see in man that amid this unity he enjoys an amazing degree of plurality: Not only have his functional faculties and powers preserved their plurality to an extent, but a kind of perpetual contradiction and conflict exist among them. Society is the most highly developed being in nature, and the relative independence of its constituent parts is by far the greatest.

Therefore, given that human individuals, the constituent parts of society, enjoy an innate reason and will, in their individual and natural beings, that are prior to social existence, and that, in addition, the relative independence of the parts is preserved in the higher-level syntheses of nature, human individuals—the individual spirit—are not determined and denied choice vis-à-vis society—the collective spirit.

Social Divisions and Polarizations

Some societies, while enjoying a kind of unity, are divided into various, sometimes opposed, groups, classes, and occupational categories. Therefore, society has a unity amid plurality and a plurality amid unity. In the language of the *hukama*, of Islam, unity in

multiplicity and multiplicity in unity govern societies.

There are two well-known theories on the nature of the plurality of society. One is based on historical materialism and dialectical contradiction. According to this theory, this plurality is a function of the principle of ownership. In societies in which private ownership does not exist, such as the primitive communal society or the communal societies that will be realized in the future, society is basically unipolar, but societies governed by private ownership are necessarily bipolar. Accordingly, societies are either unipolar or bipolar; there is no third alternative. In bipolar societies, people are divided into exploiters and exploited, rulers and ruled. The remaining phases of society, such as philosophy, morality, religion, and art, take on this same complexion; two kinds of philosophy, morality, religion, and art dominate society, each of which has the complexion of its own particular economic class. The dominant philosophy, religion, or morality will have the complexion of one of these two classes. A philosophy, art, religion, or morality above economic class and without such a complexion cannot possibly exist.

The other theory holds that the unipolarity versus multipolarity of society is not based on the principle of ownership; cultural, social, racial, and ideological factors can also cause societies to become multipolar. Cultural and ideological factors in particular can play a central rôle in fragmenting societies into not two, but several, sometimes mutually opposed, poles. They can also render society unipolar, without the principle of ownership necessarily being nullified.

Does the Qur'an admit plurality and diversity? If it does, does it envision a bipolarity of society, one based on ownership and exploitation, or something else? To isolate the social terms of the Qur'an and to pinpoint the Qur'anic perspective through a study of their meaning would be a good way to arrive at an answer.

The social terms of the Our'an are of two kinds: Some are related to a social phenomenon, such as milla (nation), shari'a, shar'a (revealed law), minhaj (way), and sunna (tradition, norm). These terms are beyond the purview of my discussion, but a number of other terms count as social terms applicable to all people or to some groups of people. These are terms that can clarify the Qur'anic perspective, such as gawn, umma, nas (people), shu'ub, gaba'il (nations, tribes), rasul, nabi (prophet), imam (leader), wali (saint), mu'min (believer), kafir (unbeliever), munafig (hypocrite), mushrik (polytheist), mudhabdhab (swayed), muhajir (emigrant), mujahid (striver, fighter), siddig (most veracious), shahid (martyr), mufsid (worker of corruption), 'amir bi'l-ma'ruf (enjoiner of good), nasih (advisor), zalim (unjust, oppressor), khalifa (deputy), rabbani (godly), kahin (soothsayer), ruhban (monks), ahbar (doctors of law), jabbar (tyrant), 'ali (lofty), musta'li (superior), mustakbir (arrogant), mustaz'af (oppressed), musrif (prodigal), mutraf (affluent), taghut (overrunner of bounds), mala' (grandees), muluk (kings), ghani (wealthy), fagir (poor), mamluk (chattel), hurr (freeman), 'abd (slave), and rabb (lord).

Other terms such as musalli (worshipper), mukhlis (sincerely devoted), sadiq (sincere), munfiq (ready to spend), mustaghfir (praying for forgiveness), ta'ib (repentant), 'abid (worshipful), and hamid (praising) resemble these on the face of it, but they are used solely to designate a range of acts, not a series of groups. Accordingly, it is unlikely that these terms serve to denote social groupings, divisions, and poles.

We must study closely the verses that include members of the former group of terms, especially those that relate to social orientations, to learn whether we can sort these terms into two groups or must sort them into many. Assuming we can sort them into two groups, what is the primary characteristic of each group? For instance, could we sort them all into believers and unbelievers, which comprehend the credal orientation, or into wealthy and poor, which manifest the economic situation? In other words, we must see if

these divisions in the final analysis revert to one primary division, the remaining divisions all being secondary ramifications.

If they do so revert, what is this primary division? Some maintain that the Our'anic conception is bipolar and that, according to the Our'an, society is divisible above all into the pole of the subjugators, the arrogant, the exploiters and that of the captivated, the dominated, the exploited. The dominant pole consists of those the Qur'an terms the "arrogant." and the pole of the dominated consists of those it terms the "oppressed." The remaining divisions, such as those between believer and unbeliever, muwahhid and mushrik, or virtuous and corrupt, have a secondary character. That is, arrogance and exploitation lead to unbelief, shirk, hypocrisy, and the like. Being oppressed leads to faith, bearing exile, jihad, virtue, reform, and the like. In other words, the origin of those things the Qur'an calls deviations in belief, morality, or practice is a special circumstance in economic relationships, that is, the fact of being an exploiter; and the origin of those things the Qur'an affirms in belief, morality, and practice is the fact of being exploited.

Man's conscience is naturally and determinately a function of the state of his material life. Unless this changes, a people's spiritual, psychological, or moral condition cannot change. Accordingly, the Qur'an accounts social struggle, in the form of class struggle, correct and fundamental. That is, it maintains a higher priority and greater substantive reality for social struggle than for economic or moral struggle. According to the Qur'an, the unbelievers, hypocrites, mushriks, corrupters, libertines, and oppressors must arise from among those groups the Qur'an designates prodigal, grandees, kings, the arrogant, and the like. Likewise, the prophets, messengers, imams, veracious, martyrs, warriors, exiles, and believers must arise from the class of the oppressed. Therefore, it is relations of arrogance and oppression that form the social conscience, that give orientation. All other aspects of society are manifestations of oppression or being oppressed. Not only does the Our'an regard the previously mentioned groups as manifestations of the two primary poles, the arrogant and the oppressed, but it refers to a series of good qualities and habits, such as honesty, chastity, sincerity, worship, insight, kindness, mercy, chivalry, courtesy, generosity, liberality, fear of God, and humility, all of which it ascribes to the oppressed, and to a series of bad qualities, such as lying, treachery, dissoluteness, hypocrisy, sensualism, blindness of the heart, cruelty, miserliness, and grandiosity, which it ascribes to the oppressors.

Therefore, the conditions of oppressor and oppressed are not only the sources of disparate and opposed groups; they are the sources of opposed moral qualities and practices. These two states constitute the basis for all orientations, tendencies, and even cultural and civil works and manifestations. The morality, philosophy, art, literature, and religion arising from the class of oppressors display its social orientation. They all serve to justify the existing situation and are agents of standstill, stagnation, and congelation. The morality, philosophy, literature, art, and religion having their origin in the class of the oppressed stimulate consciousness, movement, and revolution. The pole of the arrogant, in accordance with its practice of oppression and its monopoly on social privileges, is cynical, traditionalistic, and self-absorbed. The pole of the oppressed is conscious, defiant of tradition, revolutionary, in the vanguard, and dynamic.

In sum, according to these individuals' belief, the Qur'an affirms the theory that what forms man, defines his group membership, orients him, and determines the basis of his thought, morality, religion, and ideology is the state of his subsistence. Its teachings rest on this theory. Accordingly, dependency on a special pole is the touchstone and criterion for everything; one may weigh all claims by this criterion. Claims to be a believer, a worshipper, a leader, or even a prophet or *imam* are to be confirmed or denied according to this touchstone.

This theory is a materialistic conception of man and society. The Qur'an stresses the social background of individuals, but does this mean that it accounts for all social divisions and polarizations on this basis? In my view, this sort of conception of society does not conform to the Islamic conception of man, society, and the universe, but has arisen from a superficial study of the topics raised in the Qur'an.

Unity or Plurality in Identity of Societies

Only by considering the question of unity or plurality can we determine whether human societies can follow a single ideology or ideologies must be as numerous and various as societies. Must every people and nation, every civilization and culture, have its own peculiar ideology, in that ideology consists of a set of plans and means to guide society toward its perfection and happiness? We know that each species has unique properties, effects, and potentials and seeks its own particular happiness and perfection. What constitutes happiness and perfection for a horse never coincides with what constitutes happiness and perfection for a sheep or a person.

Therefore, if societies—on the assumption that they have a substantive and objective reality—all have one essence, nature, and identity, they may have a single ideology. Their variations will be within the range of individual variations of a single species, and any living ideology can show flexibility within the limits of individual variations. But if societies have various natures, identities, and essences, they will naturally have various plans, programs, ideals, and forms of perfection and happiness. One ideology will not be able to embrace them all.

An exact parallel to this question exists in the case of the transformation and evolution of societies in temporal succession. Do societies in the course of their transformation and evolution change in their specificity and identity? Does the principle of the transmutation of species hold here, on the level of societies? Or is the transformation and evolution of a society like that of an individual member of a species, whose specificity and identity are preserved through it all?

The first question pertains to society and the second, to history. Sociological research can help determine whether a range of shared,

essential characteristics exists among societies. Do societies diverge in areas that are to be conceived of as superficial, the effect being felt outside the essence and nature of society, what pertains to the essence and nature of society being everywhere the same? Or do societies differ fundamentally in their essence and nature, such that, for instance, they might be alike in their outward aspects but function in two different ways? This course of reasoning is itself one that philosophy has proposed to determine the specific unity or plurality of objects where ambiguity exists.

Man constitutes a single species. According to biology, modern man has undergone no biological transformation since he first appeared. Some researchers have said that nature, having brought the evolution of animal life to the stage of man, changed the course of evolution from biological to social, from physical to spiritual and ideal. In my discussion of man's sociality, I concluded that man, who constitutes a single species, not a set of species, is social by his primordial and organic nature; that is, man's sociality, his emergence as society, or his coming to have a collective spirit arises from an essential, innate quality. In order for the human species to arrive at that perfection appropriate to it, which it does have the capacity to reach, it has this social aptitude and gains the basis for the collective spirit: The collective spirit itself amounts to a means to bring the human species to its ultimate perfection. Therefore, this specific nature of man determines his collective spirit, which, in its turn, serves the human primordial nature. So long as man remains, the human primordial nature will continue its activity. Therefore, the collective spirit rests on the individual spirit, the primordial human nature of man. Because man is a single species, human societies, too, have a single essence, nature, and identity.

Just as an individual may sometimes deviate from the course of the primordial nature and may at times grow deformed, so may societies. The diversity among societies is like the moral diversity among individuals in never falling outside the bounds of man's specificity. Therefore, the societies, civilizations, cultures, and collective spirits that govern societies, for all their divergencies of form or complexion, have the complexion of the human specificity and have no extrahuman identity in the final analysis.

If we accept the fourth theory on the synthesis of society and regard individuals as nothing but receptive material and empty vessels, and if we reject the principle of the primordial nature, we can entertain the hypothesis of differences in species and identity among societies. However, this hypothesis in its Durkheimian form will be in no way acceptable because certain questions will remain unanswered. One such question is, if the primary sources for the collective spirit are not in the individual and natural aspect of human beings, where are they? Did the collective spirit appear out of nowhere? Is it enough for us to assert that so long as man has existed, society has existed to explain the collective spirit? Durkheim holds that social phenomena (that is, phenomena that pertain to society and that were created by the collective spirit, for example, religion, morals, and art) have been, are, and always will be in every society. As he expresses it, they have "temporal persistence" and "spatial diffusion." This in itself indicates that Durkheim, too, maintains that the collective spirit is one in species and in identity.

Islamic teachings, which hold that religion is of a single species and that divergencies among revealed laws are secondary, not essential (religion is nothing if not a program for individual and social evolution), are based on the specific unity of societies: If societies were of numerous species, their ends of perfection and their means of attaining those ends would be numerous and proliferating, and the identities of religions would perforce be numerous and various. The Noble Qur'an insistently and urgently affirms the following point: Religion is one and no more in all regions and societies, in all ages and times. According to the Qur'an, religions (in the plural) do not exist; religion (in the singular) exists. All the prophets summoned us to one religion, to one primary course and goal. "He has ordained for you that religion which he commended to Noah, and that which We inspire in you [O Prophet], and that which We commended to Abraham, Moses, and Jesus; uphold the religion, and do not grow divided on it ..." (42:13).

There are many verses in the Qur'an that indicate that religion is one thing in all times and places and as expressed by all the true prophets of God and that divergencies of revealed laws are in the nature of different levels of deficiency and perfection. This reasoning, that religion is single in identity, is based on the world-view that envisions man as a single species and that likewise envisions human society, considered as an objective reality, as a single species.

The Future of Societies

As we regard contemporary societies, civilizations, and cultures—supposing we do not regard them as various in species and identity—we cannot deny that they are various in quality, form, and complexion. What sort of future have human societies? Will these cultures, civilizations, societies, and nations always go on as they are? Or is humanity moving toward a single civilization and culture, a single society? In the future, will all these societies give up their peculiar complexion and take on a single complexion, which is the original complexion, the complexion of humanity?

This question, too, depends on the question of the identity of society and the type of interdependence between the collective spirit and the individual spirit. According to the theory of the substantive reality of the primordial nature—the theory that man's social existence, his social life, and the collective spirit of society constitute a means the specific primordial nature of man has adopted to attain its ultimate perfection—societies, civilizations, and cultures are moving toward unification, uniformity, and fusion and the future of human societies is a single, evolved world society in which all of humanity's potential values will be actualized and man will attain his real perfection, happiness, and, finally, genuine humanity.

According to the Qur'an, the ultimate government will be that of the Truth, in which falsity will be altogether swept away, and the end will belong to piety and the pious. It is said in the Tasir al-Mizan:

Profound studies into the states of the creation indicate that man, too, as a part of the creation, will reach his end and perfection in the future. What is said in the Qur'an, that the establishment of Islam in the world is coming about inevitably, is another way of expressing the fact that man will inevitably reach his full perfection. Where the Qur'an says, "If any from among you turn back from his faith, God will bring a people whom He will love and who will love Him" (5:57), in truth it seeks to communi-

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cate the necessity of the creation and the end of man's affairs. The same holds for the noble verse which says: "God has promised to those of you who believe and work righteous deeds that of a certainty He will make them succeed to the earth, as He made others succeed before them, that He will establish for them their religion, that He has approved for them, and that He will grant them security after their fear: 'They shall worship Me and associate nothing with Me...'" (24:55). The same holds where it says: "My servants, the righteous, shall inherit the earth." (21:105)9

The following is said in the same work, under the heading, "The border of the Islamic nation consists in belief, not geographical or treaty boundaries":

Islam annulled the principle of national divisions as having an effective rôle in the creation of society. The basic factors in this process of division are two: one is the primitive tribal life that is based on genetic relationship, and the other is variation in geographic locale. These are the basic factors in the division of the human species into nations and tribes and the divergencies of language and color. At the next stage, these two factors lead each people to take possession of a land, superimpose the name of a nation upon it, and rise to its defense. While this trend is something that nature has impelled man to, something exists in it that is contrary to what the primordial human nature demands, that the human species live as a "whole" and a "unity." Natural law is based on the ingathering of the dispersed and the unification of the multiple; by this means nature attains its ends. And this is an observable phenomenon in the state of nature, seen in how primal matter emerges first as the elements... then as plants, then as animals, and then as man. While the national and tribal divisions gather the individuals of a nation or tribe into a unity, or confer on them a unity, they array them against other unities, in such a manner that the individuals of a people look upon one another as brothers but set other human beings apart and regard them as "objects," that is, as instruments fit only to be exploited.... This is the reason Islam has annulled national and tribal divisions (which fragment humanity) and has based human society upon belief (the discovery of the Truth that is the same for all, and adherence to it), not upon race, nationality, or motherland. Even in connection with marriage and inheritance, it has made shared belief the criterion.10

It is further said under the heading, "The religion of the Truth is in the end victorious":

The human species, in accordance with the primordial nature that has been reposed in it, seeks the perfection and happiness of its own reality,

that is, of mastery of the most sublime stages of material and ideal life as a society. And one day it will attain it. Islam, the religion of tauhid, has the program for such happiness. The deviations that fall to man's lot in the course of traveling this long road must not be taken as invalidating the primordial human nature or as representing its demise. The rule of the primordial nature is always and categorically central to human life: the deviations and errors are in the nature of errors in adaptation. That end and perfection which man seeks in accordance with his restless, perfectionistic primordial nature one day, sooner or later, he will find. The verses of the sura Rum, from "So set your purpose for religion as a true believer-the nature of God, in which He created the people" to "that they might turn back" (30:30-41) convey this sense, that ultimately the rule of the primordial nature is inevitable and that, after a series of left and right turns and experiments, man will find his road, never to relinquish it. One must not heed the words of those who regard Islam as a stage in human culture that has performed its mission and belongs to history. Islam, as we know it and speak of it, consists of man in his ultimate perfection, which, by the necessity of the law of creation, he will one day attain II

Some, on the contrary, maintain that Islam in no way supports the unity and unification of human culture and human societies, but that it supports, formalizes, and confirms the plurality and variety of cultures and societies. They say that the character, identity, and "self" of a nation consist in its culture or collective spirit. This collective spirit shapes that nation's history, which is unique to it. Nature shapes man's specificity, cultural history, character, temperament, and real "self." Every nation has a special culture with a special identity and a unique complexion, flavor, scent, and properties. These establish its character, and to defend that culture is to defend that nation's identity.

Just as an individual's identity and character inhere in his person, and to abandon them and adopt another's identity and character means to deny the selfits selfhood and to grow falsified and alienated from oneself, so every culture other than the one by which a given nation has maintained itself through history is alien to that nation. Each nation has a certain kind of feeling, outlook, taste, approbation, literature, music, sensibility, manners, and customs and admits one range of phenomena. Another nation admits the contrary because throughout its history that nation has come to have a particular culture, owing to its successes and failures, prosperities

and deprivations, climate, migrations, relations, and outstanding figures and geniuses. This particular culture has shaped that nation's national and collective spirit into a certain form with specific dimensions.

Philosophy, science, literature, art, religion, and morality are a collection of elements that have so assumed form and found synthesis throughout the shared history of a human grouping as to define the existential identity of that grouping vis-à-vis other human groupings. This synthesis has created a spirit that gives the individuals of a collectivity an organic and vital relationship as members of one body. This spirit has given this body not only an independent and distinct existence but also a life by which it is known throughout history vis-à-vis other cultural and ideal bodies. This spirit is felt and discerned in man's collective behavior, manner of thought, and customs, in his human responses and affections vis-à-vis nature, life, and events, in his feelings, inclinations, aspirations, and beliefs, and even in all his scientific, technological, and artistic creations—in sum, in all the material and spiritual manifestations of human life.

They say that religion is a kind of ideology; it is belief and the special sentiments and acts this belief entails. But nationality is "character" and the distinguishing features that the common spirit of human beings with a common fate requires. Accordingly, the relationship between nationality and religion is the relationship between character and belief.

They say that one must not take Islam's opposition to racial discrimination and ethnic hegemony to imply opposition to the existence of various nationalities within human society. The declaration of the principle of equality in Islam does not mean the negation of nationalities; on the contrary, it means that Islam acknowledges the existence of nationalities on principle as certain and undeniable natural events. The verse "O people! We created you from a male and a female and made you into nations and tribes, so that you might know one another. Truly, the dearest among you to God is the most pious among you" (49:13)—from which has been deduced Islam's denial, negation, and abolition of nations—really affirms and supports the existence of nations. Having first considered the classification of humanity according to sex (masculinity and femininity) as natural, the verse at once addresses the grouping of humanity as nations and tribes. This suggests that the grouping of the people as

nations and tribes is natural and divinely ordained, like their classification as men or women. It suggests that, just as Islam upholds the special relationship between man and woman, not seeking to abolish sexuality and its effects, it upholds the relationships among nations on a basis of equality, not seeking to abolish nations.

That the Qur'an ascribes the establishment of nations, like the creation of sexualities, to God means that the existence of nations represents a natural reality in the creation. That the Qur'an has spoken of the end and existential philosophy of the divergencies of nations as the mutual recognition of nations indicates that a nation comes to know itself, to discover itself, only by reference to another nation. A nationality crystallizes its own character and comes to life by contact with other nationalities.

Therefore, the theory goes, contrary to the prevailing view, Islam supports nationalism in its cultural sense. What Islam opposes is nationalism in its racial sense, racism. This theory is flawed in several respects. First, it is based on flawed theories of man and of the constituents and principles of human culture—that is, philosophy, science, art, morals, and so on. Concerning man, it is supposed that, down to his atoms, in respect to how he thinks, sees and perceives the world, feels and relates; what he seeks and what course he takes; and to what end he moves, in respect to every content and form, even potentially, he is empty. He bears an equal relation to every thought, sentiment, means, and end. He is an empty vessel, formless, colorless, according with his contents in every respect. He takes his self, character, and means and end from his contents. His initial contents constitute his real form, complexion, personality, and means and end because they have brought his self into existence. Whatever is given him subsequently and wishes to take from him that character, shape, and form is borrowed and alien to him because it is contrary to his first-formed character, through an accident of history. In other words, this theory draws its inspiration from the fourth theory on individualism versus socialism, the theory of pure "socialism," which I criticized previously.

One cannot so judge man from either a philosophical or an Islamic standpoint. In accordance with his unique specificity, man has a definite character and path and end, if only potentially, that arise from his divine primordial nature; this primordial nature determines his real self. Man's deformation or nondeformation

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should be measured against his innate and specific standards, not against the standards of history. Every culture or teaching that accords with and fosters man's human primordial nature is genuine, although it may not be the first culture that historical conditions have imposed upon him. But every culture that does not accord with man's human primordial nature is foreign to him and constitutes a kind of deformation and alteration of his real identity, a turning of "self" into "other," although it may be a product of his national history. For instance, the idea of dualism and the worship of fire constitute a deformation in Iranian humanity, although they are products of Iran's history. *Tauhid* and monotheism, however, the rejection of worship of anything other than God, constitute a return to her real human identity, although they are not products of her own lands.

Concerning the constituents of human culture as well, it has been wrongly supposed that these are colorless, formless, indefinite things to which history imparts form and quality. That is, it has been assumed that although philosophy is in any event philosophy; science, science; religion, religion; morality, morality; and art, art, whatever their shape and color, the color, quality, and shape they actually assume are relative and dependent on history. The history and culture of every people call for a philosophy, a science, a religion, a morality, and an art appropriate to that people. Just as man is, in his essence, without identity or form, to be given identity and form by his culture, so too are the principles and basic constituents of a human culture formless, colorless, and featureless, to be given identity, form, color, and features by history, to be stamped with its special imprint. Some have carried this theory so far as to maintain that "the mathematical way of thinking is influenced by the particular style of a culture."12

This is the theory of human cultural relativism. I have discussed the absoluteness versus relativity of the principles of thought in *Usul-i Falsafa*, where I demonstrated that what are relative are subjective and functional forms of knowledge and perception. These perceptions vary with diversities in cultures and conditions of time and place; these perceptions have no reality beyond themselves corresponding to them and serving as a criterion for their truth or falsity, their correctness or error. But the theoretical knowledge, perception, and ideas that make up the theoretical sciences of man, like the

principles of the religious world-view and the first principles of morality, are constant and absolute, not relative, principles.


There is a second respect in which the theory that holds that Islam supports cultural nationalism and opposes racial nationalism is flawed. To assert that religion is belief and nationality, character, so that the relation of these two is the relation of belief and character, and that Islam affirms and legitimizes national characters as they are is to deny the greatest mission of religion. The greatest mission of religion, especially Islam, is to impart a world-view based on a right understanding of the total system of being, an understanding turning on the axis of tauhid. It is to mold the spiritual and moral character of people and to educate individuals and society on the basis of that world-view. It entails founding a new culture that is human, not national. Islam did not present the world with what today is known as Islamic culture with a view to the fact that every religion more or less blends in with the extant culture of the people. takes on its impress, and brings it under its sway. Rather, it did so with a view to the fact that culture building is inherent in the mission of this religion. The mission of Islam is to empty people of the cultures that they have and should not have, to provide them with what they do not have and should have, and to reinforce them in what they have and should have. A religion that does not interfere with the various cultures of nations but accords with them all serves only for a once-weekly visit to church.

Third, the noble verse "We created you from a male and a female..." (49:13), in mentioning first the sexual classification of humanity and then at once its classification by nationality, should not be taken as implying that, just as difference in sex is a natural phenomenon, on the basis of which, not in denial of which, ideologies must be elaborated, the same holds for differences in nationality. The sense of the verse is, "We have created you from a man and a woman," whether the intended meaning is that the genetic relationships of all human beings trace back to one man and one woman (Adam and Eve) or that human beings stand even in this respect, in having one father and one mother, there being no distinctions in this regard.

Fourth, the phrase "that you might know one another" does not mean that nations have been made various so that they might "know one another," leading one to concluded that nations ought necessarily to retain their independent character so that they might gain a mutual acquaintance. If this were the case, instead of "that you might know," it would have been said, "that they might know." The people are addressed as individuals; the people as individuals are told that the branchings that have appeared are based on a wisdom inherent in the creation: "May you individuals grow acquainted with one another in your attributions to natural and tribal lineages." We know that this wisdom does not depend on nations' and tribes' necessarily retaining their independent characters.

Fifth, what I have discussed concerning the Islamic theory of the unity versus plurality in identity of societies and concerning the facts that the natural and genetic course of societies is toward a single society and a single culture and that the central program of Islam is ultimately to establish such a culture and such a society is sufficient to throw the present theory into question. The Mahdist philosophy in Islam is based on such a [unitive] vision of the future of Islam, man, and the world.





The Nature of History

We can define history in three ways. In reality, we can speak of three sciences related to history that bear a close relationship to one another. First is the science of past events, and the conditions and circumstances of people in the past, as distinct from present conditions and circumstances. Every condition, circumstance, or event, so long as it pertains to the present time, is an event of the day or a current of the day, and the recording of such events amounts to keeping a journal. But when its time has lapsed and it has been joined to the past, an event becomes part of history. Therefore, the science of history in this sense means the science of finished events and the conditions and circumstances of bygone people. The chronicles of lives, careers, and victories written in every nation fall in this category.

The science of history in this sense is, in the first place, particular; that is, it is a science of a series of personal and individual phenomena, not a science of universals and of a range of laws, criteria, and relations. In the second place, it is a narrative, not a noetic, science.¹³ Third, it is a science of "being," not a science of "becoming." Fourth, it pertains to the past, not to the present. We term this kind of history "narrative history."

The second science is that of the laws and norms governing past lives, which is gained from research, investigation, and analysis of past incidents and events. The content and questions of narrative history, that is, past events, are considered the sources and elements of this history. These events have for history in the second sense the force of the materials that the natural scientist assembles in his laboratory to analyze, synthesize, and study for the purpose of discovering their nature and properties, discerning the cause-and-effect relationships among them, and inferring general laws. The historian in the second sense seeks to discover the nature of historical

events and the cause-and-effect relationships among them in order to find a range of formulas and criteria that can be generalized to all similar instances, present or past. We term history in this sense "scientific history."

Although the subject matter of scientific history consists of events belonging to the past, the concepts and formulas that it elicits are not restricted to the past, but can be generalized to the present and future. This consideration makes history very profitable; it makes it one of the bases of human knowledge and places man in command of his future.

There is a difference between the work of the scientific historian and that of the natural scientist. The subject matter for the natural scientist's research is a range of extant, objectively present materials, which he will consequently examine and analyze in an objective and experimental fashion, but the materials the historian studies existed only in the past. Only information about and records of them are at the historian's disposal. The historian in his deliberations is like a trial judge who renders judgment on the basis of the evidence and testimony given in the case, not on that of personal eyewitness. Accordingly, the historian's analysis is a logical, rational, and mental analysis, not an externally and objectively based one. The historian carries on his analyses in the laboratory of the reason, with the instruments of ratiocination and deduction, not in an outward laboratory, with such instruments as the retort and the alembic. Therefore, the work of the historian more resembles that of the philosopher than that of the natural scientist.

Like narrative history, scientific history pertains to the past, not to the present, and is a science of being, not of becoming. Unlike narrative history, it is universal, not particular, and noetic, not purely narrative.

Scientific history is really a branch of sociology; it is the sociology of past societies. The subject matter of sociology includes both contemporary and past societies. If we restrict sociology to the study of contemporary societies, scientific history and sociology will be seen as two distinct, but closely related and interdependent, sciences.

Third, the philosophy of history is the science of the transformation and development of societies by stages and of the laws governing this transformation and development. In other words, it is the science of the becoming of societies, not of their being.

Readers may wonder if it is possible for societies to have both a being and a becoming, such that the former is the subject of one science, called scientific history, and the latter, that of another, called the philosophy of history. No combination of the two is possible because being is static and becoming is dynamic; so one must choose between these two. Our conception of past societies must be either one of beings or one of becomings.

Readers might also bring up the general and inclusive problem that, overall, our knowledge or conception of the world—and of society as a part of the world—is a conception of either static or dynamic phenomena. If the world, or society, is static, then it has being, not becoming. If it is dynamic, it has becoming, not being. Accordingly, the most important division among philosophical schools divides philosophical systems into two primary groupings: philosophies of being and philosophies of becoming. The philosophies of being have postulated that being and nonbeing are unsusceptible to combination and that contradiction is impossible. They have postulated that, if being is, then nonbeing is not and, if nonbeing is, then being is not. Therefore, one must choose one of the two. Because being necessarily is, as the world and society are not mere ciphers, then stasis governs the world. The philosophies of becoming have regarded being and nonbeing as susceptible to combination in the unity that is motion. Motion is nothing other than this: that a thing is and, at the very same time, likewise is not.

Therefore, the philosophy of being and the philosophy of becoming are two wholly opposed conceptions of existence, and one must choose one or the other. If we join with the first group, we must postulate that societies have had being and not becoming, and if we join with the second group, we must postulate that societies have had becoming and not being. Therefore, either we have a scientific history and no philosophy of history or we have a philosophy of history and no scientific history.

This sort of thinking concerning being and nonbeing, motion and stasis, and the principle of the impossibility of contradictions is one of the characteristics of Western thought and arises from unawareness of the question of the philosophy of being (the question of being) and especially the profound question of the substantive reality of being, as well as a series of other questions. First, that being is equal to stasis, in other words, that stasis is being and motion is a combination of being and nonbeing (a combination of two contradictories), is a flagrant error that has befallen some schools of Western philosophy. Second, what is under consideration here does not relate to that philosophical question. What is under consideration here is based on the assumption that society, like any other living being, is subject to two kinds of laws: (1) those that govern every species within the limits of its specificity and (2) those that pertain to the transformation and evolution of species and their transmutations into other species. We term the first kind of laws the laws of being and the second, the laws of becoming.

Some sociologists, including Auguste Comte, have noted this point. Raymond Aron says of him:

Statics and dynamics are the two basic categories of Auguste Comte's sociology and are related to the philosophy whose broad outlines I have sketched. Statics consists essentially in examining, in analyzing what Comte calls the social consensus. A society is comparable to a living organism. It is impossible to study the functioning of an organ without placing it in the context of the living creature. By the same token, it is impossible to study politics or the state without placing them in the context of the society in a given moment. . . . As for dynamics, at the outset it consists merely of the description of the successive stages through which human societies pass. 14

Let us consider every species of living being, including all the mammals, reptiles, and birds. Each has a range of laws peculiar to its specificity; so long as it remains within the limits of that specificity, it is governed by those laws, such as the laws relating to the embryonic stage of an animal, to its health and illness, to its diet, to the nature of its reproduction and nurture of offspring, to its instincts, to its migration patterns, or to its mating habits. But according to the theory of the transmutation of species, transpecific evolution, in addition to the laws peculiar to each species within the compass of its specificity, another set of laws exists that relates to the transmutation of species, the evolutionary transition from a lower species to a higher one. These laws take the form of a philosophy and are occasionally called the philosophy of evolution, rather than the science of biology.

Society, too, in being a living organism, is described by two kinds of laws: biotic and evolutionary. The laws that apply to the causes for

the appearance of civilizations, the causes for their decline, the conditions of social life, and the general laws presiding over all societies in all their phases and transformations, we term the laws of the being of societies. The laws that apply to the causes of the advancement of societies from epoch to epoch and from system to system we term the laws of the becoming of societies.

Therefore, the science of history in the third sense is the science of the evolution of societies from stage to stage, not the science of their life at one particular stage or at all stages. In order that these questions not be confused with the questions I have placed under the heading of scientific history, I term these collectively "the philosophy of history." More often than not, no distinction is made between the questions related to scientific history, which deals with the nonevolutionary movements of society, and the questions related to the philosophy of history, which deals with the evolutionary movements of society. This neglect engenders confusions.

The philosophy of history, like scientific history, is universal, not particular, and noetic, not narrative. By contrast with scientific history, it is the science of the becoming of societies, not the science of their being. By contrast with scientific history, what renders historical the questions of the philosophy of history is not the fact that they pertain to the past, but the fact that they constitute a science of the current that begins in the past and extends into the future. Time is not pure duration vis-à-vis such questions, but forms one of their dimensions.

The science of history in all three of its senses is useful. Even narrative history (the science of the life histories of persons) can be useful, motivating, orienting, instructive, and constructive, depending on whose life histories and what aspects of their lives are selected for treatment. Just as, according to the law of mimesis, one comes under the influence of the behavior, designs, and dispositions of one's contemporaries through association, at times, like Luqman, through seeing them as object lessons, one benefits from study of the lives of people of the past.¹⁵ History is like a living cinema that transforms the past into the present. Accordingly, the Noble Qur'an treats the useful points in the lives of individuals worthy to be models and exemplars. At times, it stipulates that we are to regard them as exemplars. It says of the Most Noble Prophet, "Indeed you have in

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the Messenger of God a beautiful exemplar." It says of Abraham, "You have a beautiful exemplar in Abraham and those with him" (60:4).

Where the Qur'an mentions individuals as exemplars, it has in view not their this-worldly characters, but their moral and human characters. Thus, it names as a sage and proclaims the wisdom of a black slave named Luqman, who is not among the kings, the common garden variety of philosophers noted for their philosophizing, or the wealthy, but who was a clairvoyant slave. The faithful among Pharaoh's people and among the people mentioned in Ya-Sin are of this type.

In this book, in which I have discussed society and history according to the Islamic world-view, I have had in view only scientific history and the philosophy of history because they lie in the general scope of a world-view.

Scientific History

Scientific history is based on the assumption that society has a substantive reality and character independent of individuals. If this were not so, nothing would exist but individuals and the laws governing them; in consequence, scientific history, the science of the laws and norms governing societies, would have no subject matter. History's lawfulness derives from history's naturalness, and history's naturalness derives from society's naturalness. In approaching scientific history, we must consider the following questions:

- 1. Scientific history relies on narrative history, which amounts to raw material for the laboratory of scientific history. Is narrative history valid and reliable? If it is not reliable, any sort of scientific research on the laws governing societies in the past will be pointless and irrelevant.
- 2. Assuming narrative history is reliable, and positing for society a nature and character independent of individuals, we can derive universal laws and regularities from historical events only if causality and cause-and-effect determination govern the domain of human questions, that is, questions dependent on man's will and choice, including historical events. Otherwise, such questions are unsusceptible to generalization and will not prove describable by formulas and criteria. Does the law of causality govern history? If it does, what becomes of man's freedom, choice, and responsibility?
- 3. Does history have a material nature? Is it describable in materialistic terms? Is the basic force governing history a material one? Are spiritual forces all derivative from, functions of, and parasitical upon the material force of history? Or is the nature of history spiritual? Is its governing force spiritual, and are the material forces derivative, dependent, and parasitical? That is, is history in its essence describable in idealistic terms? Or is there a third alternative,

that the nature of history is hybrid and that history is driven by two or more forces? Do numerous material and spiritual forces govern history in a more or less harmonious but sometimes polarized system?

THE RELIABILITY OF NARRATIVE HISTORY

Some regard narrative history with thoroughgoing pessimism. They regard it all as fabricated by narrators who in relating events have added, subtracted, invented, forged, and distorted, out of personal motives and aims, nationalistic, religious or ethnic enthusiasms or social affiliations—who have reshaped history as they pleased. Even those whose morals restrained them from intentional fabrication and forgery have practiced "selection" in narrating events. That is, they invariably have narrated what was not incompatible with their own aims and beliefs. They have abstained from narrating events that ran contrary to their own beliefs and feelings. Although in narrating historical events they may have added nothing of themselves, nothing fabricated, through their arbitrary choices, they have bestowed such form on history as they pleased. An event or a historical figure is susceptible to exact research and analysis only when all that pertains to that figure is at the researcher's disposal. If some material is presented and some withheld, the real face of the event remains hidden and another is shown.

The pessimists regard narrative history much as some pessimistic religious jurists and mujtahids regard religious traditions and narratives, which they call the obstruction of knowledge. These are an obstruction in history as well. Some sarcastically have said of history, "History consists of a series of nonoccurring events related by one who was not present." A jibe attributed to a newspaper reporter runs, "Events are sacred, but belief is free." Some others are not this pessimistic, but adopt an agnostic stance toward history. Edward Hallett Carr, in What Is History?, quotes Sir George Clark:

Historians of a later generation... consider that knowledge of the past has come down through one or more human minds, has been "processed" by them, and therefore cannot consist of elemental and impersonal atoms which nothing can alter.... The exploration seems to be endless, and some impatient scholars take refuge in scepticism, or at least in the

doctrine that, since all historical judgments involve persons and points of view, one is as good as another and there is no "objective" historical truth.¹⁷

One cannot unreservedly rely on the accounts of even trustworthy narrators. However, history has a range of incontrovertible facts that are comparable to the axioms of other sciences, and the researcher can subject these facts to analysis. The researcher, through a kind of *ijtihad*, can determine the soundness or unsoundness of particular accounts by testing them against the touchstone of criticism and so can draw conclusions. Many topics that were once regarded as indubitably true have been shown by research to be groundless. The story of the burning of the library at Alexandria, which first appeared in the seventh century of the Hijra, spread until it found its way into most history books, but research over the past century has proven it the baseless fabrication of Christians with an axe to grind. Similarly, sometimes a reality will be concealed only to reemerge after a time. Thus, one cannot be wholly pessimistic toward historical accounts.

CAUSALITY IN HISTORY

Does the principle of causality govern history? If it does, the occurrence of every event is sure and inevitable in its own time and a kind of determinism governs history. If determinism governs history, what is the rôle of people's freedom and choice? If the occurrence of historical events is determined, then no one has responsibility or deserves praise or blame. But if the principle of causality does not govern history, then universality does not exist. If universality does not exist, then history has no laws or norms because law derives from universality, and universality derives from the principle of causality.

This is the problem that exists in scientific history and the philosophy of history. Some, having accepted the principle of causality and universality, have denied freedom and choice—what they have admitted as freedom is not truly freedom. Others have accepted the principle of freedom and denied the lawfulness of history. Most sociologists have regarded the principles of causality and freedom as irreconcilable and so have accepted causality and rejected freedom.

Hegel, and after him Marx, supported historical determinism.

According to Hegel and Marx, freedom is nothing but consciousness of historical necessity. In Anti-Dühring, Engels says:

Hegel was the first to state correctly the relation between freedom and necessity. To him, freedom is the appreciation of necessity. "Necessity is blind only insofar as it is not understood" [Encyclopédie I, p. 294, Berlin, 1843]. Freedom does not consist in the dream of independence of natural laws, but in the knowledge of these laws, and in the possibility this gives of systematically making them work towards definite ends. This holds good in relation both to the laws of external nature and to those which govern the bodily and mental life of men themselves.18

Piettre explains how the principle of praxis serves to synthesize Marxists' conceptions of historical materialism and their call for struggle, how man can and must act under the special conditions of history and in the direction those conditions dictate:

It is quite true, doubtless, that historical materialism limits man's action to the frame of imposed givens. . . . Knowledge of these givens itself renders his actions effective. To act contrary to these givens is to react, to act contrary to the flow of history: this is what the conservatives do, who conserve nothing. To act in conformity to these givens: this is to go along with the flow; this is to be carried along by it.

But now, one asks, what becomes of liberty? Liberty, replies Marxism, becomes the individual's conscious grasp of historical necessity, of the collective current in which he is swept along.19

These assertions solve nothing. It is a question of man's relationship to historical conditions: Does man govern historical conditions and can he direct or redirect them? If man is incapable of directing or redirecting history, then he can evolve or even survive only if he aligns himself with it, but he will necessarily grow extinct if he aligns himself against it.

Here the question of whether man is free to align himself with or against history or is determined in this respect arises. Given the principle of the priority of society to the individual and the conception that the individual's conscience, intelligence, and sensibility are wholly the product of social and historical conditions, especially economic conditions, does any place for freedom remain? What does it mean that freedom is consciousness of necessity? Is the individual who is caught in a catastrophic flood and is fully aware that in another hour he will plunge to the bottom of the sea or the individual

who has fallen from a peak and is conscious that in a few moments he will be dashed to pieces free when he falls into the sea or the valley? According to the theory of historical materialism and historical determinism, material social conditions delimit man, direct him, and shape his conscience, character, will, and choice. Vis-à-vis social conditions, he is nothing but an empty vessel or a raw material. Man is shaped by conditions—conditions are not shaped by man. Prior conditions determine man's subsequent course—man does not determine the future course of conditions. Accordingly, freedom can in no way acquire any meaning.

Human freedom is inconceivable except in terms of the theory of the primordial nature, that is, the theory that man enters the course of the essential and universal movement of the cosmos with an added dimension, and that this dimension forms the primary basis of his character, afterwards to be evolved and fostered under the influence of environmental factors. This existential dimension imparts to man his human character, to the extent that it comes to surmount and govern history and to determine its course.

Human freedom in the sense I have alluded to is inconsistent with neither the law of causality nor the universality and lawfulness of history. That man should, because of thought and will at the same time as freedom and choice, have a determinate, specified, and inviolable course in social life (necessity by choice) is something other than that a blind necessity should govern man and man's volition.

Other problems arise in the matter of the lawfulness and universality of historical questions. It grows clear through the study of historical events that at times, a series of particular, accidental events has changed the course of history. Accidental events are not events without causes, but events that have not issued from some general and universal cause and accordingly have no universal criterion. If events that have no universal criterion have an effective rôle in historical movements, then history will be devoid of any sort of regularity, law, norm, and predictable course. The accidental historical event that has become proverbial for its effect on history is Cleopatra's nose. Numerous particular and accidental events have changed the course of historical currents, such that, as the well-known saying goes, "The book of days was blown shut by a breeze." Edward Hallett Carr says:

The other source of the attack is the famous crux of Cleopatra's nose. This is the theory that history is, by and large, a chapter of accidents, a series of events determined by chance coincidences and attributable only to the most casual causes. The result of the battle of Actium was due not to the sort of causes commonly postulated by historians, but to Antony's infatuation with Cleopatra. When Bajazet was deterred by an attack of gout from marching into central Europe, Gibbon observed that "an acrimonious humour falling on a single fibre of one man may prevent or suspend the misery of nations." When King Alexander of Greece died in the autumn of 1920 from the bite of a pet monkey, this accident touched off a train of events which led Sir Winston Churchill to remark that "a quarter of a million persons died of this monkey's bite." Or take again Trotsky's comment on the fever contracted while shooting ducks which put him out of action at a critical point of his quarrel with Zinoviev, Kameney, and Stalin in the autumn of 1923: "One can foresee a revolution or a war, but it is impossible to foresee the consequences of an autumn shooting-trip for wild ducks.20

In the world of Islam, the story of the defeat of Marwan ibn Muhammad, the last Umayyad caliph, is a good example of the intervention of accident in historical destiny. In the last battle with the 'Abbasids, Marwan felt a need to urinate and stepped aside from the fray. By chance, one of the enemy passing by saw and killed him. The unexpected news of his killing spread among his soldiers, and his army fell into tumult. His soldiers fled, and the Umayyad state was overthrown. Thus, it was said, "The state passed with a urination."

Edward Hallett Carr, after explaining that every accident is the result of a causal sequence that breaks into another causal sequence and so is not an event that appears without cause, asks: "How can we discover in history a coherent sequence of cause and effect, how can we find any meaning in history, when our sequence is liable to be broken or deflected at any moment by some other, and from our point of view irrelevant, sequence?" The answer to this question depends on whether society and history have a directional character. If they do, the rôle of particular events will be insignificant; that is, although particular events may exchange the pieces, they will have no effect on the overall course of history. The most they can do is advance or retard the flow. But if history lacks a nature, a character, and a course established by them, it will have no determinate flow or universality and will be unpredictable.

As one who believes that history has a nature and character, which are products of the synthesis of the individual characters of persons who by their primordial natures seek to evolve, I believe that the rôle of accidental events does not detract from the universality and necessity of history.

Montesquieu has made some fine observations on the rôle of accident in history:

If the outcome of a single battle, that is, a particular cause, was the ruin of a State, there was a general cause which decreed that that State was destined to perish through a single battle. In short, the main impulse carries all the particular accidents along with it....

It was not the affair of Poltava that ruined Charles [XII, of Sweden]. Had he not been destroyed at that place, he would have been in another. The casualties of fortune are easily repaired; but who can be guarded against events that incessantly arise from the nature of things?²²

THE MATERIAL NATURE OF HISTORY

All the previously mentioned material and ideal factors have been effective in the tapestry of history; what is in question is primacy, priority, substantive reality, and causation. Which of these factors forms the original spirit of history and its real identity? Which of these factors can account for and explicate the rest? Which of them is the infrastructure for which the rest are the superstructure?

Theorists usually regard history as a machine with several motors. They regard history as having several natures, not just one. But if we regard history as having several motors or natures, what becomes of the rôle of evolution in history? If several primary motors govern history, each producing a kind of motion and acting to drive history in a certain direction, how can evolution govern history and how can history have a distinct course of evolution, unless we regard the previously mentioned factors as amounting to instincts for history and posit a spirit for history above all these instincts? We might thus posit that this spirit uses these instincts of history to impel it in a certain evolutionary direction and that this spirit forms the real identity of history. But this interpretation is another way of expressing the idea that history is one in nature. The nature of history is what has been termed the spirit of history, not those things that have been called the instincts of history.

In our time, the theory of historical materialism or historical dialectical materialism has gained many adherents. Historical materialism entails an economic conception of history and an economic and historical conception of man, excluding any humanistic conception of economics or of history. In other words, historical materialism means history has a material identity and a dialectical being.

That history has a material identity means that the basis for all the historical movements, epiphenomena, and manifestations of every society is the economic organization of that society. That is, the forces of material production, the production relations, and, altogether, production and the relationships of the state of production give form and direction to all the ideal social manifestations, including morals, science, philosophy, religion, law, and culture. These forces change these manifestations in themselves changing.

That history has a dialectical being means that the evolutionary movements of history are dialectical; that is, they are the effects of a series of dialectical contradictions, together with the special correlation of those contradictions. Dialectical contradictions, which differ from nondialectical contradictions, consist in every phenomenon's necessarily harboring its own negation and in its evolving to a higher stage that is a synthesis of the two previous stages in a radical, qualitative transformation following upon a series of changes resulting from this internal contradiction. Therefore, historical materialism comprises two points: the material identity of history and the dialectical character of its movement. I shall take up the first of these points now and defer the second to the next chapter.

The theory of the material identity of history stems from a series of prior principles that are philosophical, psychological, or sociological. It in turn gives rise to a series of other theories on ideological questions. In order to clarify this important matter—especially considering that some Muslim intellectuals and writers maintain that Islam, although not accepting philosophical materialism, does accept historical materialism and has founded its historical and social theories on this principle—I have thought it necessary to discuss it in some detail.

BASES OF THE THEORY OF HISTORICAL MATERIALISM

The theory of historical materialism is based on five priorities:

- 1. Matter over spirit
- 2. Material needs over ideal needs
- 3. Work over thought
- 4. Man's social existence over his individual existence (sociology over psychology)
 - 5. Material aspects of society over its ideal aspects

First, man has both a body and a spirit. His body is the object of biological, medical, physiological, and other studies; the spirit and spiritual phenomena are the object of philosophical and psychological studies. Ideas, faiths, sensibilities, beliefs, theories, and ideologies are among psychological phenomena. The principle of the priority of matter over spirit means that psychological phenomena have no substantive reality; they are merely a range of material reactions to objective matter by the nerves and the brain.

The value of these phenomena is confined to the fact that they establish a link between the inner material forces and the external world. But these phenomena themselves are never regarded as having a power of their own vis-à-vis the material powers governing man's existence. As an analogy, one might compare psychological phenomena to the headlights of an automobile. The automobile cannot move by night without headlights; it makes its way by use of their beams. But what propels the automobile is not the headlights; it is the motor.

If psychological phenomena are oriented with the course of the material powers of history, they will aid its movement, but they can never themselves induce a movement or be seen as forces vis-à-vis these material forces. It is not the case that psychological phenomena are forces, but without any material reality; they are essentially not forces at all. The real forces in man's existence are those that are recognized as material forces and that are measurable by material means.

Accordingly, psychological phenomena are incapable of propelling and directing and are never regarded as "levers" to move societies. Psychological values altogether, if they do not support and justify material values, cannot be sources or ends for a social movement.

Accordingly, in interpreting history, one must be exact and undeceived by appearances: Although it may sometimes appear that

some thought, belief, or faith has propelled society to a new evolutionary stage, a proper autopsy of history will show that this belief has no substantive reality, that it is a reaction to the material forces of society, and that these material forces, in the form of beliefs, have impelled society. From a technical point of view, the material forces that carry society forward constitute the system of production. From a human point of view, they constitute the deprived and exploited class of society.

Feuerbach, the well-known materialist philosopher from whom Marx adopted much of his materialist theory, writes: "What is theory? What is praxis? In what does the difference between them consist? That which is confined within my head is theoretical; that which passes among many heads is practical. That which unites many heads makes a mass and so makes a place for itself in the world."23 Marx, his faithful disciple, writes: "The weapon of criticism certainly cannot replace the criticism of weapons; material force must be overthrown by material force...." But to avoid according any substantive reality to extramaterial forces, although making clear their power to illuminate, Marx concludes: "but theory, too, becomes a material force once it seizes the masses."24

The principle of the priority of matter over spirit, of the priority of body over psyche, and of the absence of substantive reality for psychological forces and spiritual and ideal values is one of the basic principles of philosophical materialism.

The point opposite this principle is another philosophical principle, one based on spiritualism and on the idea that all the substantive dimensions of man's existence cannot be explained and interpreted by reference to matter and its states. The spirit is a substantive reality in the field of man's existence, and spiritual energy is independent of material energies. Accordingly, psychological forces, that is, mental, credal, reverential, and affectual forces, are accounted independent agents in some movements, whether at the individual or the social level, such that they may be employed as levers to move history. These levers independently have given rise to many of the movements of history, especially those elevated individual and social movements of man, and this is how man has gained his elevation.

Psychological forces at times powerfully influence the material and corporeal forces, not only at the level of voluntary actions, but even at the level of mechanical and biochemical actions; they employ them to their own ends. The effect of psychological suggestions in the cure of physical illnesses and the paranormal effects of hypnosis are of this sort and are undeniable.²⁵

Science and faith, particularly faith, and especially where these two psychological forces act in harmony, constitute a tremendous and productive force that can play a paranormal rôle in advancing or overturning historical movement. Spiritualism and the reality of spiritual powers constitute one of the pillars of "philosophical realism."²⁶

Second, man has two kinds of needs, at least in his social existence: material (needs for food, water, shelter, clothing, medicine, and the like) and ideal (needs for study, knowledge, literature, art, philosophical contemplation, faith, ideology, prayer, morals, and similar phenomena). The theory of the priority of material needs asserts that these have primacy and priority not only from the standpoint that man in the first place must secure his material needs and, having secured them, proceeds to secure his ideal needs, but that ideal needs arise from, find their wellsprings in, material needs. Man was not created with two innate sets of needs and instincts: material needs and instincts and ideal needs and instincts. Rather, man was created with one set of needs and one set of instincts, and the ideal needs are derivative, in reality a means of better alleviating material needs.

Accordingly, ideal needs are functions of material needs in form, quality, and identity. Man's material needs take on a particular form, complexion, and quality in every age in accordance with the growth in the tools of production. His ideal needs, too, having arisen from his material needs, accord with them in form, character, and properties. Therefore, material needs have two kinds of priority over ideal needs: priority in being, in that ideal needs are the product of material needs, and priority in identity, in that the form, quality, and nature of ideal need are a function of the form, quality, and nature of material need. P. Ruyan quotes Hyman Levy: "Man's material road of life has led him to propound theories in accordance with the means of alleviating the material needs of the time, with reference to the world [world-view], society, art, morals, and other ideal values arising from this same material road of production."²⁷

Accordingly, the methods of scientific judgment, philosophical contemplation, artistic and aesthetic tastes, moral values, and religious beliefs of each individual are a function of his manner of livelihood. At this point, when this principle is applied to the individual, it is articulated in this form: "Tell me what he eats, and I'll tell you what he thinks." And when it is applied to the society, it is articulated in this form: "Tell me the level of growth of the tools of production and what economic relations are in force among the individuals of the society, and I'll tell you what ideology, philosophy, morality, and religion are to be found in that society."

The point opposite this theory is the theory of the substantive reality of ideal needs. According to this theory, although in temporal terms material needs arise and disclose themselves first in the human individual (as we can see in the case of the infant who seeks his mother's breast upon birth), there gradually blossom the ideal needs that are in man's makeup, such that, as man matures, he sacrifices his material needs to them. In other words, ideal pleasures are both substantive in man and stronger than material pleasures and attractions.²⁸ The more humane the education one receives, the more influence his ideal needs, pleasures, and life gain over his material needs, pleasures, and life. The same holds for society. In primitive societies, material needs exceed ideal needs; but the more a society evolves, the greater ideal needs gain in value and priority, the more they emerge as human aims, and the more they overshadow material needs and reduce them to the level of means.²⁹

Third, man is a being who thinks, understands, and works. Is work prior, or is thought? Is the essence of man work or thought? Is the nobility of man in work or in thought? Is man the product of work or of thought?

Historical materialism is based on the substantive reality of work and its priority over thought. It considers work primary and thought, derivative. Ancient logic and philosophy regarded thought as the key to thought. According to that logic, thought is divisible into "representation" and "assent," and each of these is divisible into the "axiomatic" and the "speculative." Then axiomatic thoughts were seen as keys to speculative thoughts. According to this logic and philosophy, the essence (the "I") of man is pure thought. Man's perfection and nobility were seen in knowledge. The perfect man was identified with the contemplative.³⁰

Historical materialism, however, rests on the principle that work is the key to thought, the standard of thought, and that the essence of man is his productive work. Work is considered both the source of

human knowledge and its architect. Marx said that "the entire socalled history of the world is nothing but the creation of man through human labor."31 Engels said that "labour created man himself." in that, from the beginning, man has predominated over his external environment not by pitting his thought against the harsher aspects of nature, but by his arduous work.32 By this same means (revolutionary action), he advances and builds his ideal society in the face of the usurpatory power clite. André Piettre writes:

Whereas in the philosophy of being [the philosophy that interprets the world on the basis of "being," as opposed to the philosophy of "becoming," which interprets the world on the basis of motion: Marxism falls under this latter heading) it was customary to pose the thought, the principle, first, in order to elucidate the practical consequences, praxis [the philosophy of action] makes action the principle, just as thought was. To faith in the idea it opposed the philosophy of power; along with Hegel, it considers that "the true being of a man is ... his act."33 And it catches up with the most serene of the thinkers across the Rhine asinverting the terms of the celebrated prologue, "In the beginning was the Word"—he proclaims: "Im Anfang war die Tat—In the beginning was the Deed "34

This is the principle of materialist and Marxist philosophy. It is the one known in Marxism as praxis. Marx adopted it from his materialist mentor, Feuerbach, and from his other mentor, Hegel.

Opposite this principle is the principle of philosophical realism, which upholds the reciprocal influences of work and thought and the priority of thought. In this philosophy, the essence of man is thought (the immediate essential self-knowledge of the psyche). Man, by means of work or experience in dealing with the external world, acquires his information about the external world. So long as the mind is not enriched by this primary information, it has no possibility for any sort of cognitive activity. After gathering this information, the mind in turn acts upon the products of work in the various forms of "generalization," "abstraction," and "deduction" and makes a right understanding possible. Knowledge is not just a simple reflection upon the mind of objective matter. After the reflection of objective matter upon the mind, knowledge becomes possible through a series of mental operations that arise from the extramaterial substance of the spirit.

Therefore, work is the source of thought, and thought is at the

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same time the source of work. Work is the criterion of thought, and thought is at the same time the criterion of work. This is only apparently a circular argument. Man's nobility lies in the knowledge, faith, grandeur, and greatness of his psyche. Work is ennobling in being a means of securing this greatness and nobility. Man is both the maker of work and its product, and this is a distinguishing feature of man, shared by him with no other being: It springs from the special manner in which God created him.³⁵

Man's productive rôle relative to work is creative and positive, but the productive rôle of work relative to man is preparatory—that is, man actually creates his work, but work does not actually create man; rather, work, practice, and repetition clear the way for the creation of man from within. Whenever the interrelation between two things is creative and positive on one side and preparatory and enabling on the other, priority belongs to the creative and positive side.

Man's essential substance is of the species of consciousness (the immediate essential self-knowledge of the psyche). Man has a reciprocal relationship with work, such that man is the maker and producer of work, and work, the producer of man. Because man is the positive and creative cause of work on the one hand and work is the preparatory and enabling cause of man on the other, man has priority over work, not work over man.

Fourth, man, biologically speaking, is the most highly developed animal. He has the specific capacity for human evolution and a specific character that comprises the human dimensions of his existence. Through a range of experiences and learning, he attains the dimensions of thought, philosophy, and science. Under the influence of another range of factors, he gains the moral dimension, within which he creates values and the "musts" and "must nots" of morals. The same holds for the dimensions of art and of religion. Man in his dimension of thought and philosophy attains a range of principles and intellectual premises that are accounted the foundations of his thought, just as, in his evaluations of moral and social questions, he arrives at a range of absolute and quasi-absolute values. Together, these dimensions form the human being of man.

Man's dimensions are the direct effects of social factors. The newborn lacks all these dimensions; it is only a raw material ready to take any ideational or affectual form. What matters are the factors that influence it. It is like an empty vessel that is filled from without. It is like a blank tape on which songs are to be recorded that it will play back faithfully. In sum, what forms man's personality, turns him from a "thing" into a "person," consists of the external social factors termed "social work." Man in his essence is purely a thing, but he becomes a person through the influence of social factors.

In Matirialism-i Tarikhi ("Historical Materialism"), P. Ruyan quotes from Plekhanov's Fundamental Problems of Marxism: "The qualities of the social environment of a given time are determined through the level of productive forces; that is, when the level of productive forces is determined, the qualities of the social environment, the psychology dependent on it, and the reciprocal relations between the environment on the one hand and thought and behavior on the other are also determined."36

He says in the same work:

When, through the productive forces, the psychology has been determined, the relevant ideology, closely rooted in the psychology, is determined in consequence. But for an ideology, arising from a historical stage of social relations, to persist, and for the interests of the ruling class of the time to be preserved, it is necessary for them to be reinforced and completed by the social institutions. Therefore, while social institutions in class societies come into being to maintain the ruling class and to reinforce and amplify the ideology, in reality and in principle they are the consequences of social relations and, in the final analysis, arise from the nature and character of production. For instance, the churches and mosques serve to promulgate religious beliefs, the root principle of which, in all religions, is belief in the Resurrection. Belief in the Resurrection arises from a special set of social relations, based on class divisions, arising from an evolutionary stage of the means of production. That is, in the final analysis, belief in the Resurrection is a consequence of the character of productive forces.37

The point opposite this principle is another principle of anthropology, founded on the idea that the basis of man's personality, which is the basis of his thought and sublime attitudes, has been implanted in his makeup through agencies of the creative process. It is true that, contrary to Plato's theory, man did not come to the world with a ready-made personality, but he does gain the primary elements and bases of his personality from the creative process, not

from society. If we wish to speak in philosophical terms, we must say that the primary source for the human dimensions of man, including his moral, religious, philosophical, artistic, technological, and amatory dimensions, is his human specific form, differential principle, or rational soul, which is formed by the agencies of creation. It either fosters or deforms human society from the standpoint of its essential capacities. The rational soul is at first potential and is actualized gradually. Therefore, from the standpoint of the first principles of thought and the principles of ideal and material aptitudes and tendencies, man is like any other living being, all of whose capacities at first exist within it in potentia and then, following a series of substantial movements, blossom and mature as traits. Man fosters and perfects, or at times deforms and skews, his primordial character under the impact of external factors. This is the principle of the primordial nature in Islamic theology. It is considered its mother principle.

In accordance with the principle of the primordial nature, man's psychology is prior to his sociology; the latter derives from the former. In accordance with the principle of the primordial nature, the newborn, although lacking apprehension, representation, assent, and other human aptitudes in actu, does nonetheless come into the world with existential dimensions additional to those animals possess. These additional dimensions gradually give rise to a range of abstract representations and assents (in the terminology of logic and philosophy, "secondary intelligibles") that form the primary basis of human thought, without which any sort of logical thought is impossible, and to a range of sublime aptitudes in man. These dimensions are also accounted the prime basis of man's human personality.

According to the theory of the priority of man's sociology to his psychology, man is purely a "receptive" being, not a "dynamic" one. He is raw material, and whatever shape is given him, it is essentially the same to him. He is a blank tape on which whatever song is recorded is just like another. There is within this raw material no movement toward a certain form, such that if that form is given it, its "own form" has been given it, and if another has been given it, it has been deformed from what "should be." There is within that blank tape nothing calling for a certain song. The relation of that matter to all forms, the relation of that tape to all songs, or the relation of that vessel to all contents is the same.

But according to the theory of the substantive reality of the primordial nature and the principle of the priority of man's psychology over his sociology, even though at first man lacks any apprehension or aptitudes in actu. he embodies a dynamic tending toward the range of primary judgments that are termed "first axioms" and toward a range of sublime values that are the touchstones for his humanity. After a series of simple representations (which are the primary elements of thought, termed in philosophy "first intelligibles") enter the mind from without, these principles burgeon in the form of a series of speculative or functional assents, and these aptitudes disclose themselves.

In accordance with the former theory, although man under present conditions calculates, for instance, that two times two equals four and regards this calculation as absolute, applying to all times and places, in fact, it is the product of special conditions of his environment. This environment and these special conditions have suggested this calculation to him, and this calculation is the reflection in man of these special conditions, in reality, the song that this environment has recorded. It is possible that, in another environment, under other conditions, this calculation would have been different.

According to the latter theory, the environment gives man the concepts two, four, eight, ten, and the like. But the calculation two times two equals four or five times five equals twenty-five is integral to the structure of the human spirit, and it is absurd that it should assume any other form. Similarly, man's perfective aptitudes are integral to the structure of the human spirit.38

Fifth, society is composed of various sectors, organizations, and structures: economic, cultural, administrative, political, religious, judicial, and so forth. In this respect, society is like a complete edifice in which a family lives that includes a sitting room, a bedroom, a kitchen, a bathroom, and so forth. Among these social organizations is one that amounts to the infrastructure, that is, the building's original foundation. That infrastructure is the economic structure of society.

The social structure is equivalent to whatever pertains to the material production of society: the tools, the resources, and the relations of production. The tools of production, which constitute the most basic part of the structure of society, are mutable and

evolving in their essence. Every degree of evolution in the tools of production entails a special set of production relations distinct from those preceding them. Production relations are rules and prescriptions related to ownership and dependent upon its form. They are prescriptions applying to people's contractual relations to the fruits of social work. With the inexorable changes in production relations, all of man's legal, intellectual, moral, religious, philosophic, and scientific principles necessarily change. In other words, the infrastructure is economics.

Piettre quotes from Marx's Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy:

In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely, relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political, and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness. 39

He also quotes a letter from Marx to Paul Annenkov: "... pose a certain state of development of the productive forces of people, and you will have a certain form of commerce and of consumption. Pose certain degrees of development of production, of commerce, and of consumption, and you will have a certain form of social constitution, a certain form of family organization and organization of orders or classes, in a word, a certain civil society,"40

Piettre explains Marx's outlook in this way:

From here [the preface to Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, page 20, see note 43] comes the famous comparison of society to an edifice, in which the "infrastructure," the foundation, would be represented by economic forces, and the "superstructure," the edifice itself, would correspond to ideas, to manners, to judicial, political, religious, and other institutions. Each foundation implies a certain structure; each technology, a certain economy; and each economy, certain ideas, manners, political systems.41

Piettre quotes Lenin (in Marx and Engels), in turn quoting Capi-

tal, volume three: "The technology discloses man's activity vis-à-vis nature, the immediate process of production of his life, and as follows his social conditions and the intellectual concepts that spring from them."⁴²

Furthermore, Marx says in the preface to Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy: "My inquiry led me to the conclusion that neither legal relations nor political forms could be comprehended whether by themselves or on the basis of a so-called general development of the human mind, but that on the contrary they originate in the material conditions of life... the anatomy of this civil society, however, has to be sought in political economy."⁴³

Marx has written in his *Poverty of Philosophy:* "Social relations are closely bound up with productive forces. In acquiring new productive forces men change their mode of production; and in changing their mode of production, in changing the way of earning their living, they change all their social relations. The handmill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam-mill, society with the industrial capitalist."44

The theory of the priority of the material structures of society to its other structures parallels the theory of the priority of work to thought. The theory of the priority of work to thought is set forth on the individual level, and the theory of the priority of material over other social structures in reality contemplates this same priority of work to thought, but on the level of society. Considering that the proponents of this theory are likewise the proponents of the theory of the priority of man's sociology to his psychology, the priority of individual work to individual thought is a logical outgrowth of the priority of material to other social structures. By contrast, if we were to regard man's psychology as prior to his sociology, we would account the priority of the material structures of society to its other structures as the effect and consequence of the priority of individual work to individual thought.

The material structure of society, also termed the economic structure or economic base, has two parts: the tools of production, which are the product of man's relationship with nature, and individuals' economic relations in the field of the distribution of wealth, which are sometimes termed "production relations." The two together are generally termed the "mode of production" or the "method of production." These terms, as used by the leading writers on his-

torical materialism, are not devoid of ambiguity and have not been completely refined and differentiated. 46 When it is said that economics is the infrastructure and that the material structure of society is prior to the other structures, the aggregate of productive apparatus, including the tools of production and production relations, is meant.

The point that must certainly be noted and that shows through quite clearly in the works of the early historical materialist thinkers is that the infrastructure has two stories, one of which serves as the infrastructure to the other. The primary foundation of the building comprises the tools of production or work embodied. It is work embodied that necessitates special economic relations in the distribution of wealth. These relations, which reflect the degree of growth of the tools of production, are, at their inception, not merely harmonious with the tools of production but actuated and prompted by them. They are the best means of profiting from these tools and are like a garment tailored to them. But the tools of production grow of themselves; their spreading roots disrupt the harmony between the two sectors of the productive apparatus. Productive and economic relations are those laws that arose proportioned to the previous tools of production that have become too tight-fitting for the growing body of the newer ones. They are accounted a barrier to their growth and constitute a contradiction between the two sectors. New production relations, appropriate to the new tools of production, must be established, and the infrastructure of society must be wholly transformed. After this transformation, the whole superstructure of legal, philosophical, moral, religious, and other relations must be overturned.

Attention to the priority of social work (that is, the work embodied, which is termed the "tools of production") and to the fact that Marx considers the sociology of man to be prior to his psychology and regards man qua man as a social being (in Marx's terms, a "generic" being) clarifies the rôle of the philosophy of work in Marxism. It is the essence of Marxist philosophy, but has been little studied.

Marx sees man's being in work just as Descartes saw it in reason, Bergson saw it in duration, and Jean Paul Sartre saw it in rebellion. Descartes says, "I think, therefore I am"; Bergson says, "I endure, therefore I am"; Sartre says, "I rebel, therefore I am"; Marx would sav. "I work, therefore I am." None of these thinkers seeks to demonstrate the existence of a human "I" beyond these various phenomena (thought, duration, rebellion, or work) by these various means. Instead, each maintains that man has no existence apart from one of them; or rather, each seeks implicitly to define the essence of humanity and the existential reality of humanity in these terms.

For instance, Descartes says implicitly, "My being equals the being of my thought; if there were no thought, there would be no I." Bergson implies that man's being is the being of duration and time, and Sartre implies that man's essence and real being are rebellion and mutiny. If you take rebellion from man, he is no longer man. Marx implies, "The whole being of man, his real being, is work. Work is the essence of humanity. 'I work, therefore I am' means not that work proves the existence of the I, but that work is the very being of the I. Work is my real being."

It is with such a principle in view that Marx says, "for the socialist man the entire so-called history of the world is nothing but the creation of man through human labor ...," that he differentiates man's consciousness from his actual existence and says, "It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness," or that he says, "The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but real premises from which abstraction can only be made in the imagination. They are the real individuals, their activity and the material conditions under which they live."47 Marx describes these "real individuals": "individuals, not as they may appear in their own or other people's imagination, but as they really are; that is, as they are effective, produce materially, and are active under definite material limits, presuppositions and conditions independent of their will."48 Engels says: "Labour is the source of all wealth, the economists assert. It is this-next to nature, which supplies it with the material that it converts to wealth. But it is also infinitely more than this. It is the primary basic condition for all human existence, and this to such an extent that, in a sense, we have to say that labour created man himself."49 Marx and Engels adopted this theory of the rôle of work in the being of man from Hegel. Hegel was the first to say, "The true being of a man is ... his act. ... "50

Thus, according to Marxism, in the first place, the human being of man is social, not individual, and, in the second place, this being of social man is social work, that is, work embodied. Every individual phenomenon, such as self-consciousness and individual feelings, and every social phenomenon, such as philosophy, morals, art, and religion, is a manifestation of the real being of man, not that real being itself. Accordingly, man's actual evolution is precisely the evolution of social work. But mental, affectual, and emotional evolution and the evolution of the social system are manifestations of the real evolution, not that evolution itself. The material evolution of society is the standard of its ideal evolution. That is, just as work is the standard of thought, and the correctness or incorrectness of thought must be measured against work and not against intellectual or logical standards, so is material evolution the standard for ideal evolution. Therefore, intellectual and logical standards cannot point out the more progressive philosophical, moral, religious, or artistic school. The sole standard by reference to which the question may be considered is the following: Of what conditions and degree of the evolution of social work, that is, the tools of production, is that school the product and manifestation?

For us who consider the real being of man his I, who conceive of this I as an extramaterial substance, and who consider this substance to be the product of the essential movements of nature, not the product of society, this manner of thought is astonishing. Then, too, someone like Marx, who thinks in materialistic terms and does not believe in any extramaterial substance, ought to explain man's essence and reality in biological terms and say that man's essence is the very material structure of his body, as did the ancient or the eighteenth-century materialists. But Marx rejects this view and maintains that the essence of humanity derives from society, not from nature. What derives from nature is man in potentia, not man in actu. Apart from this, Marx is obliged either to conceive of thought as the essence of humanity and work or activity as the manifestation of thought or, conversely, to conceive of work as the essence of humanity and thought as the manifestation of work. Marx, who thinks in materialistic terms and who upholds the substantiating rôle of matter not only for the individual (denying any extramaterial substance in the individual), but also for society and history, of necessity chooses the second alternative.

Now it grows clear how Marx's theory of the identity of history differs from those of other materialists. Every materialist thinker, in

regarding man and his existential manifestations as material, as a matter of course regards the identity of history as material. But Marx goes farther than this; he would say that the identity of history is economic. Within the field of economics, in view of the fact that Marx conceives of economic production relations (that is, the ownership relations of man and the products of work) as a necessary and inevitable reflection of the stage of growth of the "tools of production" (that is, of work embodied), in reality, he would say that history is implemental in its identity. Therefore, if we say only that history is material in its identity, or even if we say that history is economic in its identity, we shall not have done full justice to Marx's theory. We must note that, according to Marx, the spirit and identity of history are "implemental." Accordingly, in some of my writings, I have termed Marx's historical materialism the "implemental" theory, as opposed to my own "anthropic" theory of history, in which I maintain that history has a human identity.51

Marx is, in fact, so immersed in the philosophy of work and has such a conception of social work that, to follow this philosophy strictly, you would have to suppose that human beings are not those people who go about in the streets and lanes, think, and resolve, but that the real human beings are the tools and machines that keep the factories turning. The beings who speak, walk, and think are "simulacra" of man, not the "self" of man. Marx's conception of social work and of the tools of work approaches a conception of an animate being that grows and evolves automatically, blindly, by necessity, and apart from the will and resolve of these simulacra (that is, of these beings who are the manifestations of man, not man himself), such that this being has a determining influence and sway on the will and thought of these apparent human beings (that is, these simulacra that think and will), drawing them along.

From one standpoint, one can say that Marx speaks of social work with its dominance over man's intelligence, consciousness, and will just as some theosophers spoke of man's unconscious physical actions, such as the actions of his digestive system, heart, and liver, as being under the influence of the hidden volition of a "unit of connection of the psyche." According to these hukama', appetites, desires, musts and must nots, and all the phenomena that are connected with the functional aspect of the psyche (that is, the lower, managerial, and connective aspect) and with the body, and that are

displayed to the mind at the conscious level, are reflections of a range of natural needs that are necessarily and automatically under this hidden management of the psyche, without the conscious mind's knowing where the roots of these phenomena lie. Marx's theory also resembles what Freud says about what he termed the inner or unconscious mind, which has a determining power over the conscious mind.

Here is the difference: What the *hukama*'s aid and what Freud said apply only to a portion of the outer mind and posit the governance of an inner mind. Furthermore, what they spoke of is not something external to man's being, but what Marx describes is. If one considers Marx's theory closely from a philosophical standpoint, it is really stupefying.

Marx compares his discovery with Darwin's famous biological discovery. Darwin demonstrated how a process external to the animal's mind and will gradually and unconsciously results in the animal's organs being modified in form. Marx, too, maintains that a blind process (which is additionally the real being of man) gradually and unconsciously results in the formation of the social organs of man, that is, of all those things that Marx calls the superstructure, plus even a portion of the infrastructure, that is, socioeconomic relations. He says:

Darwin has drawn attention to the history of natural technology, to the formation of the organs of plants and animals considered as means of production for their lives. Is not the history of the productive organs of social man, the material base of every social organization, deserving of such research? . . . Technology bares man's mode of action vis-à-vis nature, the process of the production of his material life, and, in consequence, the origin of social relations and the ideas and intellectual conceptions that spring from them.⁵²

From all that has been said up to now, it is apparent that the theory of historical materialism rests on several other theories, some of which are psychological, some sociological, some philosophical, and some anthropological.

CONCLUSIONS

The theory of historical materialism in turn leads to a series of conclusions that affect the functional strategy of a society. Historical

materialism is not just an intellectual and theoretical question having no impact on social behavior and choice.

The first conclusion relates to the question of knowledge of society and history. According to historical materialism, the best and surest means of analyzing and knowing historical and social events is investigating their economic foundations. Otherwise, no exact and valid knowledge of historical events is possible because it is supposed that all social transformations are economic in identity, however much it may appear on the surface that they have an autonomous cultural, religious, or moral identity. That is, all these transformations reflect the economic and material condition of society. They are all the effects and it, the cause. The ancient hukama', too, maintained that the most noble and perfect kind of knowledge of things is knowledge of them through their creative causes. Therefore, assuming that the ultimate root of all social transformations is the economic structure of society, the best means to a knowledge of history is socioeconomic analysis. In other words, just as the cause has priority over the effect at the stage of event and realization, so does it at the stage of knowledge and demonstration. Therefore, the priority of the economic foundation is not only an objective and existential priority; it is a subjective and probative one as well. Khamei says in explanation of this point:

In analyzing social revolutions, one must not judge social conflicts by their political, juridical, or ideological forms. Instead, one must explicate them by reference to the "contradictions between the productive forces and the production relations." Marx seriously warns us against such [former] judgments, since, in the first place, they are unrealistic, placing the effects, that is, the political, juridical, and ideological forms, in place of the causes, which are nothing but the economic contradictions and transformations; in the second place, they are superficial, since instead of penetrating to the depths of society to seek out the real causes, they remain at the surface and content themselves with what presents itself at once; and in the third place, they are illusory, since the superstructures, which are generally ideological, are nothing but illusions, deformed images of reality. Now to substitute for the real object of the analysis some deformed images of it will certainly lead to error.

Here Khamei quotes from Marx and Engels, Selected Works: "Just as our opinion of an individual is not based on what he thinks of himself, so can we not judge of such a period of transformation by its own consciousness..."53

Marx strives to annul the rôle of consciousness, thought, and innovation, often regarded as constituting the basic factor in evolution. For instance, Saint-Simon, many of whose ideas Marx availed himself of, said of the rôle of the "instinct for innovation": "Societies are subject to two moral forces of equivalent strength that exert their effects in alternation: One is the force of habit, and the other is that which results from the desire for innovation. After a certain time, habits necessarily grow evil. . . . It is then that the need for new things is felt, and this need constitutes the true revolutionary state." 54

Or consider Proudhon, Marx's other preceptor, who says of the rôle of beliefs and thoughts in evolving societies: "The political forms of nations are the expression of their beliefs. The movement of these forms, their modifications and their destruction, are the solemn experiences that disclose to us the value of these ideas and gradually release ... the absolute, eternal, and immutable truth. Now we see that every political institution tends to level out social conditions, on pain of death. . . ."55

Notwithstanding all this, as Khamei notes: "For Marx, revolution is above all a socioeconomic necessity, arising from the polarization between the base and the form of civil society, between productive forces and social relations..."

Marx would say that it is not this instinct for innovation or these stirring beliefs and faiths that bring about social transformations. Rather, it is socioeconomic necessity that creates desire for innovation or for stirring beliefs and faiths.

Therefore, having drawn this conclusion from historical materialism, if we wish to analyze, for instance, the Greco-Persian wars, the Crusades, the Islamic conquests, the European Renaissance, or Iran's Constitutional Revolution, it would be a mistake for us to study and analyze their overt incidents and formal aspects, be they political, religious, or cultural, or even to adopt as criteria the feelings of the revolutionaries themselves that their movements were political, religious, or cultural. To get hold of the master key to these movements, we must contemplate their real essence and identity, which is economic and material.

Today's fledgling Marxists will bluff their way through an explanation of any historical movement by saying a few lines about the economic conditions associated with that movement, even if they know nothing about it.

The second conclusion is that the law governing history is necessary and inescapable, being outside men's wills. Elsewhere I have discussed the question of whether history is governed by a series of laws of causation, entailing a kind of causal necessity. I explained that some have denied the governance of society and history by the law of causality, and consequently the existence of necessary and inescapable norms, on the grounds of accident, and that others have denied them on the grounds that man is a free and empowered being. But I demonstrated that this theory is groundless; the laws of causality. and hence causal necessity, govern society and history, just as they do all other phenomena. I also demonstrated that because society and history possess a unity, a real being, and a special nature, the laws governing them are necessary and universal. Therefore, a series of necessary and universal laws govern society and history, I term this "philosophical necessity." This necessity decrees that history run its course in conformity to a series of definitive and necessary laws.

But the Marxists' historical necessity, termed "economic necessity," constitutes a special definition of philosophical necessity. This theory is a synthesis of two others: One is this philosophical necessity that decrees that no event comes into being without necessity, that the existence of any phenomenon is certain and inevitable, given the appearance of its own special causes, and that, in the absence of these causes, its existence is impossible and absurd. The other is the theory I have already outlined of the priority of the material basis of society over its other bases. The two theories together imply the material determination of history, that is, that the superstructure follows from the infrastructure certainly and inevitably. As the infrastructure changes and transforms, the superstructure surely and inevitably changes and transforms. Without change in the infrastructure, change in the superstructure is impossible.

This principle is what makes Marxist socialism, as the Marxists claim, "scientific," what makes it a natural law, alongside the rest of the natural laws of the universe, because it is according to this principle that the tools of production, the most basic part of the economic structure of society, continuously develop in conformity to a series of natural laws, just as the various species of plants and animals, having undergone gradual growth over their histories of so many hundreds of millions of years, find new species identities at certain stages. And just as the growth, evolution, and transforma-

tions in species of plants and animals are beyond anyone's will, whim, or desire, so are the growth and evolution of the tools of production.

The tools of production, in the course of their gradual growth, traverse stages: On reaching each stage, they necessarily transform the other aspects of society along with themselves; this cannot be prevented. Prior to their reaching a new stage of growth, there is no possibility for the superstructural transformations of society to proceed. Socialists and seekers after justice in general who fail to observe the possibilities that can arise only through the growth of the tools of production, in seeking justice and socialism out of mere emotion, are wasting their efforts, will accomplish nothing. Karl Marx says in the foreword to Capital:

The country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future.... And even when a society has got upon the right track for the discovery of the natural laws of its movement... it can neither clear by bold leaps, nor remove by legal enactments, the obstacles offered by the successive phases of its normal development. But it can shorten and lessen the birth-pangs.⁵⁷

Toward the end of this passage, Marx explains a point that has passed unnoted, or little noted; in fact, he seeks to answer the question or objection of "fate." Someone might say that the gradated development of society parallels the gradated development of nature in being determinate and inevitable so long as man does not understand it or discover the course of natural law. But as soon as man understands it, it comes under his control; man governs it. Thus, so long as nature remains unfathomed, it is man's master; to the degree it is understood, it becomes man's servant. For instance, so long as such diseases as cholera were not understood and their causes and cure remained unknown, they ruled human life absolutely. As soon as they were understood—as they are understood today—they were checked and casualties were prevented. The same holds for floods, storms, and so forth.

Marx suggests that society's ordered and gradated movement is a dynamic movement and change—a kind of automatic movement and ordered growth intrinsic to things like plants and animals. It is not a mechanical movement or change, like the changes that transpire in things through agencies external to their being, like all the changes

in nature brought about by technology and industry (such as the destruction of insects by insecticides or the destruction of pathogenic microbes by antibiotics). Those laws of nature whose discovery has resulted in nature's being harnessed and placed at man's service are laws of mechanical relationships, but when it comes to the dynamic transformations and essential and intrinsic movements of things, the most man's science and consciousness can do is to allow man to bring himself into conformity with the action of these laws and so to profit by them. In discovering the laws governing the growth of plants and the evolution of animals (including those governing the development of the embryo in the womb), man comes upon a series of determinate and inescapable laws to which he is obliged to submit.

Marx suggests that man's social development, which is a function of the development and evolution of the tools of production, is a kind of dynamic, intrinsic, essential, and automatic development that science and consciousness cannot alter and reshape at will. Man must submit to the special stages of social evolution, which follow as determinate a course as that followed by the embryo in the womb. He must give up any thought of changing that course, for instance, the thought of skipping some intermediate stages to arrive at the final one or the thought of reaching the final stage by roads other than those history has indicated.

In regarding social evolution as an automatic, unconscious, natural and determinate process, Marxism has arrived at something similar to what Socrates said of man's mind and its intrinsic birthing process. Socrates used the interrogative method in his teachings; he believed that, if questions were asked in sequence, step by step, and through a precise understanding of the mind's operation, the mind would answer those questions one after the other through its natural and innate movement and that there would be no need for instruction from outside. Socrates was a midwife's son; he said he was doing for minds what his mother did for women in labor. The midwife does not bring about birth; the mother's nature brings about the birth in its own time. There is nonetheless a need for the midwife's presence. The midwife makes sure no abnormal course of events happens to cause the mother or child problems.

According to Marxism, although the discovery of the laws of sociology and of the philosophy of history cannot effect a change in

society, these sciences should be valued. Scientific socialism is nothing if not the discovery of these laws. The least of its effects is the discrediting of utopian socialism and struggles for justice based on wishful thinking, in that the laws of dynamics, despite being inaccessible to change or substitution from outside, do have one virtue, and this is predictability. In the light of scientific sociology and scientific socialism, one can study the condition of any society, determine what stage it has attained, and predict its future. In consequence, one can learn what stage the embryonic socialism has reached in the womb of that society and expect the inevitable at every stage, setting aside groundless expectations. One must not expect a society still at the stage of feudalism to make the transition to socialism, just as one must not expect immediate birth of a fourmonth-old fetus.

Marxism strives to recognize and represent the natural, dynamic stages of societies and to discover the determinant laws of the transformations of societies from each era to the next. According to Marxism, societies traverse four general stages in arriving at socialism: primitive communism, slavery, capitalism, and socialism. Sometimes five, six, or seven are spoken of, when any of the four eras is subdivided into two eras.

The third conclusion is that each historical era differs from the rest in identity and specificity. Just as, biotically, animals may transpose from species to species and change in identity, so can historical eras. Accordingly, each historical era has special laws. The laws governing the eras preceding or following a given era can never be generalized so as to embrace it, just as, when water is liquid, it obeys the laws specific to liquids, but when it is vaporized, it obeys the laws specific to gasses. The same holds for society; so long as it is at the stage of, say, feudalism, it runs according to a given set of laws, but as soon as it passes from this stage to that of capitalism, all effort to perpetuate the laws of the era of feudalism will be in vain. Accordingly, it cannot have eternal laws. According to historical materialism and the idea that economics is the infrastructure, any sort of law claiming eternality is condemned. This is one of the respects in which historical materialism is incompatible with religion, especially with Islam, which posits a series of eternal laws.

Khamei quotes from the appendices to the second edition of Capital:

"in [Marx's] opinion every historical period has laws of its own.... As soon as society has outlived a given period of development, and is passing from one given stage to another, it begins to be subject also to other laws. In a word, economic life offers us a phenomenon analogous to the history of evolution in other branches of biology.... Social organisms differ among themselves as fundamentally as plants or animals." 58

The fourth conclusion is that, at the dawn of history, the growth of the tools of production resulted in private ownership coming into being and in society's being divided into the two classes of the exploiters and the exploited. These two classes have formed the primary poles of society from that time to the present. A contradiction and a conflict have always existed between these two poles. That society has been bipolarized does not mean that all groups have been either exploiters or exploited; at times there may have been groups that are neither. What it means is that the groups influencing the fate of society are these two that form the two primary poles. The other groups have followed one of these primary ones. Khamei writes:

Thus, one finds in Marx and Engels two different models of the division of society into classes and their struggle: one bipolar, the other multipolar. The definitions of class are different for each: in the first model, class is virtual; in the second, it is real. The criteria for the formation of classes also differ. Engels in the preface to *The Peasant War in Germany* attempts to reconcile the two models and to form them into one coherent model. He discerns multiple classes and various groupings within each of them. But among them only two classes can accomplish a decisive historical mission: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, because they form the truly antagonistic poles of society. 59

According to Marxist philosophy, just as it is absurd that society as a superstructure should outpace its infrastructure, so it is absurd that, while society as an infrastructure (socioeconomic relations, ownership relations) is divided into the two poles of exploiter and exploited, it should remain integral as a superstructure. The social conscience, in its turn, is divided into two parts: the conscience of the exploiter and the conscience of the exploited. Two world-views, two ideologies, two systems of morals, and two kinds of philosophy appear in society. The socioeconomic situation of each class inspires a certain kind of ideation, outlook, taste, way of thinking, and social alignment and positioning. No class can outpace its economic situation in its conscience, taste, and way of thinking. The only things that

are not bipolarized, but are characteristic institutions of the class of exploiters, are religion and the state. They are the exploiters' special contrivances to pacify the exploited and captive class. But members of the exploiting class, in owning the material endowments of society, impose their own culture, including their own religion, on the exploited. Accordingly, the dominant culture, that is, the dominant world-view, ideology, morality, taste and sensibility, and a priori the dominant religion, is the culture of the exploiting class. The culture of the exploited, like that class itself, is always subjected and stunted. Marx says in *The German Ideology*:

The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas; that is, the class, which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore the ideas of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think. In so far, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in their whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch.60

The ruling and exploiting pole is in its essence reactionary, conservative, traditionalistic, and backward looking; its culture, the dominant and imposed culture, is a reactionary, traditionalistic, and backward-looking culture. The pole of the exploited and captive, however, is in its essence revolutionary, iconoclastic, progressive, and forward looking. Its culture, that same dominated culture, is the revolutionary, unconventional, and forward-looking culture. Being exploited is the necessary condition for becoming a revolutionary; that is, only this class has the potential to be revolutionized. Following the previously quoted discussion of Engels's *Peasant War in Germany*. Khamei says:

One year after the redaction of this preface, the Congress of German Socialists in Gotha wrote in its program: "... in contrast to [the working class] all other classes are only one reactionary mass." Marx severely criticizes this phrase. But to be reasonable, one must admit that after all of what Marx himself had written in the Manifesto and elsewhere, the socialists, with no way of distinguishing between his bipolar and multipolar models, could not have judged otherwise. In the Manifesto, Marx had presented the existing class struggle as a struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie; he had written, "Of all the classes that stand face to face with the bourgeoisie today, the proletariat alone is a really revolutionary class."

Marx said that only the proletariat has all the characteristics and conditions for being revolutionized, which consist of the following:

- 1. Being exploited, which further implies being a producer
- 2. Owning no property (the cultivators, too, have this and the first characteristic)
- 3. Being organized, which implies concentration and congregation (This characteristic is unique to the proletariat, who work cooperatively in a factory. It does not exist among the cultivators, who work scattered across the land.)

Marx said about the second characteristic: "The worker is free in two senses: free to sell his labor power, and free of all ownership."62 In regard to the third characteristic, Marx and Engels have said: "But with the development of industry the proletariat not only increases in number; it becomes concentrated in greater masses, its strength grows, and it feels that strength more."63

This principle could be called the principle of congruity between the ideological foundation and the class and social foundation. According to it, every class produces those kinds of thought, morality, philosophy, art, poetry, literature, and so forth that its living situation, livelihood, and interests require. One could accordingly call this the principle of the congruity between the source of every thought and the reason for that thought. That is to say, whatever class any thought, moral system, or religion has arisen from, its reason for being is service to the interests of that class. It is absurd that a system of thought should arise from a given class having for its

reason the welfare and advantage of another class or the welfare of humanity at large, with no particular class orientation. Thought will take on a humanistic and supraclass character when the evolution of the tools of production calls for the liquidation of all classes. That is, when the contradiction in the class foundation is liquidated, the contradiction in the ideological foundation will also be liquidated, and when the contradiction in the origins of thought is liquidated, the contradiction in the orientations for thought will also be liquidated.

In some of the works of his youth, for example, A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Law', Marx stressed the political aspect of classes (rule and submission) over the economic aspect (exploitation and being exploited). He perforce regarded class struggle as essentially a struggle for freedom and liberation from bondage. He differentiated two stages of this struggle: the particular, political stage and the universal, humanistic stage. He expressed the idea that the proletarian revolution, which is the final state of the revolution of the "captives of history," is a radical revolution, that is, a revolution for the total liberation of man and for the total eradication of all forms of rule and servitude. To account for how a class within its social orientation is to transcend its class status and find universal and humanistic goals, how this is to tally with historical materialism, Marx explained that, because the bondage of this class is radical, its revolution is likewise radical. This class has not been subjected to some particular injustice; rather, the very essence of injustice has been visited upon it. Accordingly, it seeks the very soul of justice and the liberation of man.

In the first place, this argument is poetry, not science. What does it mean that the very essence of injustice has been visited upon the proletariat? Did the class of exploiters previously transcend its class status in another way, to seek oppression for the sake of oppression, not for the sake of its interests, and injustice for the sake of injustice, not for the sake of exploitation, with the result that, in reaction, the proletariat should seek the very essence of justice? This hypothesis, that the class of oppressors should reach such a state in the capitalist period, contradicts the concept of historical materialism. It is a form of idealism, as it were.

Just as the principle of the congruity between the ideological basis and the class basis calls for a congruity between the origins of an idea and its reason for being, so does it call for a congruity between an individual's tendency to adhere to a school and that individual's class origins. That is, any individual's natural tendency is to adhere to the school of thought that has arisen from his own class and is oriented to its interests.

According to Marxist logic, this principle is extraordinarily fertile and conducive to a knowledge of society, that is, to a knowledge of the identity of ideologies and of social classes with respect to their tendencies.

The fifth conclusion is that ideology, leadership, summons, propaganda, counsel, and similar superstructural phenomena have a limited rôle in directing society and its classes. It is generally supposed that ideology, summons, persuasion, demonstration, exhortation, and counsel can form and alter the human conscience at will. The conscience of every individual, group, and class is the artifact and necessary reflection of its social and class situation, which it cannot outpace or fall behind; so the supposition that such superstructural phenomena can become sources for social transformation constitutes an idealistic conception of society and history.

Thus it is said that intellectualism, reformism, and revolutionism have an aspect of spontaneity. That is, class deprivation, not external educational or other factors, spontaneously inspires intellectualism, reformism, and revolutionism. At the least, the class situation automatically lays the essential groundwork for these phenomena. At the most, the rôle of ideology, leadership, and other intellectual functions is to make class contradiction and the class situation of the deprived class part of that class's self-consciousness. It is, in the words of the gentlemen themselves, to transform the "class in itself" (that is, the class that is a special class in its essence)into the "class for itself" (that is, the class that additionally has class consciousness).

Therefore, the only mental lever that can animate a class within the class society is that class's growing consciousness of its condition, of its exploitation. Universal, humane, justice-minded, and humanitarian levers can play no part in class societies, bisected into exploiter and exploited, in which each group has succumbed to a kind of self-alienation and the social conscience has been dichotomized. When, as the evolution of the tools of production necessitates, the proletariat reaches power and classes are abolished, man regains his real self (humanity without class barriers), and man's conscience,

fragmented through property, is reunified, then the humanitarian mental levers that will reflect the communal state of ownership of the tools of production can come into play. Therefore, just as from the standpoint of historical eras one cannot prematurely and by fiat bestow socialism—the superstructure of a special historical era—on a prior era (as the utopian socialists sought to do), so one cannot impose the special consciousness of one class on the other class in a society divided into two classes. No common human consciousness exists.

Therefore, in class society, a general, universal ideology without a class orientation could not appear (every ideology appearing in a class society automatically having the complexion of a special class) or, if it could appear, could not play a rôle in practice. Accordingly, when it comes to the summons of the religions, or at least of what guidance, propaganda, and counsel is addressed to humanity in the name of religions and advocacy of justice, fairness, and equality, if we are not to call it deceitful, we must at any rate call it fantastic.

Another conclusion we must draw is that the origin of the struggling, progressive, revolutionary leadership must necessarily be the exploited class. Having demonstrated that only the exploited class is ready for intellectualism, reformism, and revolutionism, that this readiness comes about only through exploitation and deprivation, and that, at the most, superstructural factors are needed only to bring class contradictions into self-consciousness, we must conclude that those outstanding individuals who can bring this intellectualism into the self-consciousness of the exploited class must share that class's affliction and captivity, so that they can attain that selfconsciousness. Just as it is absurd from the standpoint of historical era that a society's superstructure should outpace its infrastructure, and just as it is absurd from the standpoint of social conscience that a class should outpace its social situation, it is likewise absurd that an individual should outpace his own class as a "leader" and reflect wants beyond those of his own class. Accordingly, it is absurd that an individual belonging to the exploiting class should rise against his class in support of the exploited class, even exceptionally. Khamei says:

Another innovation of The German Ideology is an analysis of class consciousness. Contrary to his previous works, here Marx represents this consciousness as the product of the class itself, not something imported from without. The true class consciousness can be nothing but an ideology, because it must give "the form of universality" to the interests of a class. But this does not preclude the founding of this ideology on a class's spontaneous consciousness of its interests. In any case, the class will not find maturity without realizing its own proper class consciousness, and this necessitates, according to Marx, "the division of mental and material labour" [the former being the work of ideology and leadership] within that class: "... one part appears as the thinkers of the class (its active, conceptive ideologists, who make the perfecting of the notions of the class about itself their chief source of livelihood), while the others' attitude to these ideas and illusions is more passive and receptive.

..."64

Khamei likewise says in the course of an analysis of the theory Marx presents in the Manifesto and in The Poverty of Philosophy:

Thus the acquisition of class consciousness by the proletariat and its formation into a class for itself are the work of the proletariat itself, the result of its spontaneous economic struggle. It does not come from without, neither from the theoreticians outside the workers' movement, nor from the political parties. Marx reproaches the "utopian socialists" because, since despite their proletarian character, "...the proletariat... offers to them the spectacle of a class without any historical initiative or any independent political movement...," for "the gradual, spontaneous class-organization of the proletariat" they would substitute "an organization of society specially contrived by these inventors [themselves]." 65

This principle has taken on a special importance in Marxist logic for an understanding of society, social tendencies, and individual tendencies—especially for an understanding of those who would lead and reform society. It enjoys a signal importance in Marxist logic.

Marx and Engels do not and cannot accept the existence of an independent body of intellectuals who are above class. If at times, in some of his works, Marx has said otherwise, these are instances in which he has chosen not to be a Marxist, and I show later that there are not few of these instances. Here the question of how Marx and Engels accounted for their own position as intellectuals with reference to Marxist principles arises. Neither Marx nor Engels was a

member of the proletariat; they are two philosophers, not two workers, who nonetheless produced the greatest theory of labor.

Marx's answer to this question is worth hearing. Khamei says:

Marx very seldom speaks of the intellectuals. Apparently he does not regard them as a special stratum, but as sections of other classes, especially the bourgeoisie. In *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, he counts the members of the academy, the press, the university, and the judiciary, along with the priests and army officers, among the bourgeoisie. In the *Manifesto*, when he would speak of theoreticians of the working class of a nonproletarian origin, such as Engels and himself, he does not present them as intellectuals, but as "sections of the ruling classes. . . precipitated into the proletariat" who supply it "with fresh elements of enlightenment and progress."66

Marx offers no explanation of how he and Engels slipped from the empyrean of the ruling class and wound up "fallen" to the earth of the ruled class, bringing with them precious gifts for the edification of this fallen class (in Qur'anic terms) "in the dust" (90:16). In fact, Marx and Engels, and through them, the lower, fallen class, were allotted something that was not allotted Adam, the father of man, who, according to religious narratives, fell from heaven to earth: Adam brought along no such gifts.

Marx does not explain how the liberating ideology of the proletariat assumes form in the midst of the ruling class. He does not explain whether this fall is possible, exceptionally, only for these two, or is also possible for others. He does not clarify, now that it has been shown that, at times, although exceptionally, this "gate" between heaven and earth will open, whether passage only takes the form of a fall, individuals of the heavenly and empyreal class falling to the level of the earthly class, or whether an ascent may also at times take place, whereby individuals of the earthly class may ascend to the heavenly. Of course, if they so ascend, they will have no gifts to bring worthy of the heavenly hosts.

Basically, to carry gifts from earth to heaven is meaningless. However, if any are graced with such an ascent, fail to be absorbed by the heavenly class, and return from heaven to earth, they, like Messrs. Marx and Engels, after their fall, will surely bear heavenly gifts.

Critiques

I intend to criticize neither all the theories that have appeared in Marx's works nor Marxism as a whole. I shall criticize historical materialism, one of the pillars of Marxism. It is one thing to criticize Marx's theories and another to criticize Marxism as such or one of its principles, such as historical materialism. To criticize Marx's theories means to review the aggregate of his theories that have appeared in the various books and writings dating from the various periods of his life, with all their numerous contradictions. This task has been carried out by numerous persons in the West. In Iran, the best work on this subject is Tajdid-i Nazar Talabi az Marks ta Ma'u [Le Révisionnisme de Marx à Mao-Tsé-Toung], which I have quoted often and made copious use of in this section.⁶⁷

To criticize Marxism or one of its principles means to criticize one or more of the principles considered the bases of the Marxist school and considered by Marx himself to be inviolable or to criticize one or more of the principles that, although not necessarily conceived of by Marx as altogether final, and in instances contradicted by Marx in certain of his works, are necessary concomitants to the principles of Marxism, in opposing which Marx in a way departed from Marxism. This is the approach I have adopted for this volume in regard to Marx's historical materialism.

I am concerned with Marx's definitive and certain principles and the definitive conclusions that must be drawn from them. I do not seek to discover whether Marx had contradicted them decisively in his works, riddled as they are with contradictions, because my basic object is to criticize historical materialism, not Marx's theories per se.

Although Marx talks of historical materialism throughout his works on philosophy, sociology, and economics, when he analyzes

and assigns causes to certain objective historical events of his own time, he takes little note of its principles. There are various explanations for this. Not just on this question, but on many, Marx follows a method that is self-contradictory. That is, in theory or in practice, Marx deviates from Marxism. Therefore, we must seek out some answer of general application.

Some attribute these deviations to Marx's immaturity at certain periods of his life. This explanation is untenable, at least from a Marxist standpoint, because much of what today is taken to constitute the principles of Marxism dates from Marx's youth or middle age, and much of what is taken to be deviation, including his analyses of some events of his own time, dates from near the end of his life.

Others attribute this deviation to a split in his personality. They maintain that, on the one hand, he was a philosopher, ideologue, and founder of a school and so was obliged to be dogmatic and to conceive of principles as final and inviolable. At times this rôle entailed his forcing events to conform to his preconceptions. On the other hand, he had a scientific temper and spirit that compelled him always to submit to realities and not to be bound to any dogmatic principle.

Others distinguish Marx from Marxism. They maintain that Marx and his thought constitute one stage of Marxism. Marxism in its essence is an evolving school; so there is nothing to prevent Marxism from having put Marx behind it. That Marx's Marxism, the infantile stage of Marxism, is dubious does not show that Marxism per se is dubious. But those claiming this do not make clear what they see as the original essence of Marxism. The evolution of a school is conditional upon its having constant first principles, such that dubieties arise in its adjuncts, not in its principles. Otherwise, no difference remains between the evolution of a theory and its abrogation. If we agree not to regard evolution as conditional upon fixed and enduring principles, then why should we not begin with Marx's forerunners, such as Hegel, Saint-Simon, or Proudhon? Why should we not speak of Hegelianism, Saint-Simonism, or Proudhonism as an evolving school, of which Marxism is one stage?

The reason for the contradictions in Marx is that he is less a Marxist than most. It is said that at a meeting of Marxists, at which he was defending a theory contrary to his first theory, which his

audience was not up to hearing, he said, "I am not so much a Marxist as vou." And it is said that at the end of his life he said, "I am not a Marxist at all." Marx's departure from Marxism in some of his theories arises from the fact that Marx was too bright and assure to be one hundred percent Marxist. To be Marxist straight down the line calls for more than a little boneheadedness. Historical materialism, the aspect of Marxism here being considered, has bases and conclusions. Not only Marx the scientist, but also Marx the philosopher was unable to remain bound to them indefinitely.

WANT OF PROOFS

The first criticism is that this theory does not go beyond being a mere theory, without proofs. A theory of the philosophy of history must be based upon the historical experience of objective, contemporary events, to be generalized to other periods, be built upon historical data from past events, to be generalized to the present and the future, or else be established through logical inference and deduction on the basis of a series of proven, axiomatic scientific, logical, and philosophical principles.

The theory of historical materialism rests on none of these methods. It so fails to explain the events of Marx's and Engels's own time that Engels must explain, "As regards the error Marx and I committed in some books as to the importance of economics, where we were analyzing the events of our own time, considering we were faced with the events themselves, we are to be excused for such errors."68

The theory is not supported by the events of several millennia of human history. As one reads these works full of ex cathedra pronouncements that attempt to force history into the mold of historical materialism, one grows astonished at the gentlemen's explanations and interpretations. For instance, in the Tarikh-i Jahan ("History of the World"). . . . 69

THE FOUNDERS' REVISIONISM

As I have noted repeatedly, Marx calls the economic basis of society the infrastructure and its other bases the superstructure. This definition itself is enough to show the unilateral dependency of these other bases on the economic basis as functions of it. In many of his expositions, some of which I have quoted from, Marx says explicitly that this is a unilateral effect and dependency, that is, that the economic factors are the effective factors and the other phases of society receive their effects. The economic factors operate independently, and the other factors are dependent. Marx's theories on the priority of matter to spirit, material needs to ideal needs, man's sociology to his psychology, and work to thought require such a view.

In many of his writings, however, Marx has advanced another idea, based on dialectical logic, that must be conceived of as a revision of, or to an extent a deviation from, pure historical materialism, and this is the idea of reciprocal influence. According to this principle, the relation of causality must not be conceived of as unilateral. Instead, an interrelatedness and a reciprocal influence exist among all the parts of nature and of society: Just as a has a causal rôle toward b, so b has a causal rôle toward a.

I shall not argue the correctness or incorrectness of this dialectical principle as stated in this form, but, on the basis of this principle, it is meaningless to speak of priority in the relation of two things, such as matter and spirit, work and thought, or economic basis and other social bases, because, if two things are interdependent, if the existence of either is conditional upon that of the other, then to speak of one as prior, the infrastructure, is meaningless.

In some of his writings, Marx has assigned the whole rôle, whether primary or otherwise, to the economic basis and said nothing of any influence of superstructure upon infrastructure. In other writings, he has admitted a reciprocal influence of infrastructure and superstructure, but has assigned the primary and ultimate rôle to the infrastructure. Khamei, in comparing Marx's Capital with his Critique of Political Economy and showing that the former, like the latter, rests on a one-sided economic determinism, adds: "Nonetheless, consciously or unconsciously, he has added something to this definition, namely, that the superstructures, despite the priority of the [infra]structure over them, can play the principal rôle in society." Khamei then asks: "What is the difference between the 'dominant' rôle, the determinant rôle, played by the economic structure, and the 'principal' rôle, played by the superstructures?"70 That is, if the

superstructures at times play the principal rôle, then they have the dominant and determinant rôle, or rather, what we call the superstructure becomes the infrastructure, and what we call the infrastructure becomes the superstructure.

Near the end of his life, in a letter he wrote to Joseph Bloch, Engels recalled the following:

According to the materialist conception of history, the determining factor in history is, in the final instance, the production and reproduction of real life. [This is the revised definition from the Origin of the Family, in our discussion of which we have shown the difference between this and the classical enunciation. (A.K.)] Neither Marx nor I ever have asserted anything more than this. If after Marx anyone so deforms this proposition as to make it say that the economic factor is the sole determinant, he will have transformed it into an empty, abstract, and absurd catch-phrase. [A revision pure and simple! (A.K.)] The economic situation is the base. but the diverse elements of the superstructure, political forms of the class struggle, and its results-the constitutions established once a class emerges victorious from the battle, and so forth...—the juridical forms. and also the reflections of these real struggles upon the minds of the participants, political, juridical, and philosophical theories, religious conceptions, and their later development into dogmatic systems-all equally exert an effect on the course of historical struggles and in many cases predominate in determining their form. There is an action and reaction of all these factors among which the economic movement ends up clearing its path as a necessity through the infinite throng of hazards.⁷¹

It is strange that the theory that "the economic factor is the sole determining factor" should prove "an empty, abstract, and absurd catch-phrase"! This is a phrase none other than Marx has used. Additionally, if the so-called infrastructural factors "in many cases predominate in determining [the] form [of historical struggles]," then the determinant rôle is not that of economic factors alone. So what room remains for us to say, "The economic movement ends up clearing its path as a necessity through the infinite throng of hazards"?

What is more surprising is that, in this same letter, Engels lays some of the responsibility for this error (or, as he puts it, this "deform[ation]") on Marx and himself. He says ". . . it is Marx and myself, in part, who must bear the responsibility for the fact that the young sometimes attach an undue weight to the economic side. In

the face of our adversaries, it was necessary for us to underscore the essential principle they denied, and then we never found the time, the place, or the occasion to render justice to the other factors that participate in the reciprocal action."72

But others have explained Marx's and Engels's "undue" emphasis on economic factors in another way. They say that it was directed not toward opponents of this theory but toward rival supporters of it and was intended to disarm them. In explaining the reasons for the writing of A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, in which, more than in any other work. Marx has laid a lopsided stress on economic factors, Khamei says:

Another reason for the Contribution to the Critique was the publication of Proudhon's Manuel du spéculateur à la bourse and that of a book by Darimon, Proudhon's disciple.... In brief, Marx, seeing that his rivals, that is to say, the Proudhonians on the one hand and the Lassallians on the other, are relying on economic factors, but in a reformist manner, essays to wrest this weapon from their hands and to apply it in a revolutionary manner. This entails a "hardening," one might say, a vulgarization.73

As conditions in China necessitated, and to account for the rôle of the Chinese revolution and his own leadership, Mao so revised the concepts of historical materialism and of the infrastructural character of economics that one must say nothing remains of them, or, in consequence, of the so-called "scientific" socialism based on them, but the words and wordplay.

In his essay "On Contradiction," under the heading "The Principal Contradiction and the Principal Aspect of a Contradiction," Mao savs:

... the principal and the nonprincipal aspects of a contradiction transform themselves into each other and the nature of the thing changes accordingly. In a given process or at a given stage in the development of a contradiction, A is the principal aspect and B is the nonprincipal aspect; at another stage or in another process the roles are reversed—a change determined by the extent of the increase or decrease in the force of each aspect in its struggle against the other in the course of the development of a thing. . . .

Some people think that this [transposition of basic aspects] is not true of certain contradictions. For instance, in the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production, the productive forces are the principal aspect; in the contradiction between theory and practice, practice is the principal aspect; in the contradiction between the economic base and the superstructure, the economic base is the principal aspect; and there is no change in their respective positions. This is the mechanical materialist conception, not the dialectical materialist conception. True, the productive forces, practice and the economic base generally play the principal and decisive role; whoever denies this is not a materialist. But it must also be admitted that in certain conditions, such aspects as the relations of production, theory and the superstructure in turn manifest themselves in the principal and decisive role. When it is impossible for the productive forces to develop without a change in the relations of production, then the change in the relations of production plays the principal and decisive role (by means of the superstructural agencies of the military, politics, culture . . . l. The creation and advocacy of revolutionary theory plays the principal and decisive role in those times of which Lenin said, "Without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement." . . . When the superstructure (politics, culture, and so forth) obstructs the development of the economic base. political and cultural changes become principal and decisive. Are we going against materialism when we say this? No. The reason is that while we recognize that in the general development of history the material determines the mental and social being determines social consciousness, we also—and indeed must—recognize the reaction of mental on material things, of social consciousness on social being and of the superstructure on the economic base. This does not go against materialism; on the contrary, it avoids mechanical materialism and firmly upholds dialectical materialism.74

What Mao says completely contravenes historical materialism. Mao, in saying "When it is impossible for the productive forces to develop without a change in the relations of production" or "Without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement" or "When the superstructure . . . obstructs the development of the economic base," he speaks of something that always happens and is indeed bound to, but according to historical materialism, the evolution of the productive power must change production relations, revolutionary theory must appear spontaneously, and the superstructure must change along with the infrastructure.

Marx, in the foreword to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, says:

At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or—this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms—with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution. The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure.⁷⁵

Change in the production relations prior and preparatory to growth in the productive forces, codification of revolutionary theory prior to the spontaneous ferment of revolutionary thought, and change in the superstructure for the sake of change in the infrastructure all mean priority of thought over work, priority of spirit over matter, and substantive reality and autonomy for political and intellectual forms vis-à-vis economic forms. These all contravene historical materialism.

Mao rightly observes that if we regard the influence as unilateral, we contravene dialectical materialism. But what is to be done? So-called "scientific" socialism is based on this unilateral influence and is contrary to dialectical logic, that is, contrary to the principle of reciprocal interdependence of the principal aspects of a dialectic. One must either submit to so-called "scientific" socialism and contravene dialectical logic or accept dialectical logic and bid farewell to scientific socialism and the historical materialism that is its basis.

What does Mao mean when he says, "we recognize that in the general development of history the material determines the mental and social being determines social consciousness"? Given that the "principal and the nonprincipal aspects of a contradiction transform themselves into each other," sometimes productive forces determine production relations and sometimes the reverse is true; sometimes the revolutionary movement creates revolutionary theory, and sometimes the reverse; sometimes culture, force majeure, religion, and the like change the economic foundation of society, and sometimes the reverse. Therefore, sometimes matter determines spirit, and sometimes the reverse; and sometimes social existence determines social consciousness, and sometimes the reverse.

What Mao says under the rubric of the transposition of the principal aspects of a contradiction is a Maoist explanation that in

practice contravenes Marxist historical materialism instead of explaining it, while purporting to explain it. Mao in practice shows that, like Marx, he is too astute to be always a Marxist. The Chinese Revolution led by Mao in practice contravened scientific socialism, historical materialism, and, in consequence, Marxism.

China under Mao's leadership overturned its ancient feudal régime in an agrarian revolution and set up a socialist régime in its place, notwithstanding the fact that, according to scientific socialism and historical materialism, a country advancing from the stage of feudalism must first pass through the stage of industrial capitalism and reach the apogee of that stage before setting out for socialism. According to historical materialism, just as an embryo in the womb cannot skip a stage, society cannot reach its ultimate stage without an ordered passage of the successive intermediate stages. But, in practice. Mao showed himself to be one of those midwives who can deliver a four-month fetus well and sound. He showed thatcontrary to what Marx maintained—leadership, party education, political organization, revolutionary theory, and social consciousness, that is, those things Marx said were in the nature of consciousness, not existence, and in the nature of a superstructure, not an infrastructure, those things Marx held to be without substantive reality, can overturn production relations, industrialize a nation, and thus in practice dispense with so-called "scientific" socialism.

Mao also contravenes the Marxist theory of history in another way. According to Marxist theory, or at least according to Marx, although the agrarian class may fulfill the first and second conditions for being revolutionized (that is, the conditions of being exploited and lacking ownership), they do not fulfill the third condition, which consists of centralization, cooperation, shared understanding, and consciousness of their own power. Therefore, the agrarian class can never initiate a revolution. The most it can do is at times move in the wake of the proletariat, in semiagrarian, semi-industrialized societies. Moreover, according to Marx, the agrarian class is "the thoroughly reactionary rabble," "absolutely incapable of revolutionary initiative." In a letter to Engels on the Polish revolution, Marx had this to say about the rural population: "The peasantry, the thoroughly reactionary rabble... one must not appeal to them." But Mao built a revolutionary class out of this same thor-

oughly reactionary class of rabble who must not be called to struggle and with them overturned the ancien regime. According to Marx, not only are agrarians incapable of leading a country to socialism, but they have no share in the transition from feudalism to capitalism. The class that accomplishes that transition and has a revolutionary character at that historical juncture is the bourgeoisie, not the agrarians. But Mao, with that thoroughly reactionary rabble, skipped a stage and leapt from feudalism to socialism. Therefore, Mao has every right to depart thus far from Marxism, to explain in Maoist terms the transposition of the principal aspects of a contradiction, and without batting an eye to affect that he is delivering himself of a scholarly exegesis of Marxism, historical materialism, and scientific socialism.

Mao learned his lesson—that when necessary, a Marxist must in practice depart from Marxism-from his estimable predecessor, Lenin. Before Mao's time, Lenin had accomplished a revolution. He for the first time established a socialist nation in the yet semiindustrialized, semiagrarian country of Russia. Lenin saw that he would not live to see Tsarist Russia emerge as a completely industrialized nation and capitalism, with its exploitation of the worker, reach its culminant stage, then automatically to be revolutionized and wholly transformed through a spontaneously arising consciousness and a dynamic movement. He saw that, if he were to sit and wait for the pregnancy to come to term, for the birth pangs to begin, and then were to play head midwife at a natural birth, he might find himself waiting a long time. He, too, started with the superstructure; he used party, politics, revolutionary theory, war, and force majeure to turn the semi-industrialized Russia of the day into today's USSR. In fact, Lenin realized the well-known maxim that "an inch of horn is better than a vard of tail." He did not sit waiting for Marx's vard of tail, the automatic and dynamic preparation of the economic foundation of Russian society and a spontaneous uprising. Instead, Lenin used the inch of horn of force, politics, party education, and political consciousness

CONTRAVENTION OF THE NECESSARY CONFORMITY OF SUPERSTRUCTURE TO INFRASTRUCTURE

According to the theory of historical materialism, a kind of conformity of superstructure to infrastructure must always exist in

societies, to the extent that, by understanding the superstructure, one can understand the infrastructure (an a posteriori demonstration, which represents a halfway-perfect understanding) and that, by understanding the infrastructure, one can understand the superstructure (an a priori demonstration, which represents a perfect understanding). Whenever the infrastructure is transformed and the conformity of superstructure to infrastructure is disrupted, society's equilibrium is necessarily disrupted and a crisis is begun. The superstructure falls apart more or less speedily. But so long as the infrastructure remains as it is, the superstructure remains stable.

Contemporary historical events have demonstrated the contrary. In the wake of a series of economic crises between 1827 and 1847, which were accompanied by a series of political and social revolutions, Marx and Engels came to believe that social revolutions were the necessary and inseparable products of economic crises. But as Khamei has noted:

Through an irony of history, we find, after 1848, no economic crisis to which corresponds a revolution in the industrialized nations. Already before the death of Marx, productive forces mutinied four times against production relationships without any revolution resulting. . . . Later, certain economists such as J. Schumpeter went so far as to call sthese periodic convulsions] "creative destruction" and to consider them safety valves to reestablish economic equilibrium and growth.77

Countries such as England, Germany, France, and the United States have achieved vast industrial progress and brought capitalism to its zenith, and, contrary to what Marx anticipated—that these would be the first countries in which the workers' revolution would get under way and in which socialism would be established—they have not changed in their politics, law, and religion, in their superstructure. The infant whose birth Marx expected in nine months was not born in nine years or ninety, and now no hope remains for its birth.

Of course, these régimes will fall sooner or later, but the revolution that is expected in these countries absolutely will not be a workers' revolution, and the Marxist theory is not going to be realized. The ruling régimes of today's so-called socialist countries will likewise be overthrown; they will not survive as they are. But the régime of the future definitely will not be the capitalist régime. Conversely, those countries in Eastern Europe, Asia, and South America that have attained socialism have done so "prematurely."

Today we see countries that are alike in their infrastructures but different in their superstructure. The two superpowers, America and the Soviet Union, are the best examples. America and Japan are also alike in their economic régime (the régime of capitalism), but differ in their political, religious, moral, literary, and artistic régimes. Conversely, there are countries that are alike in their superstructures, their political and religious régimes, and so on, but differ totally in their economic condition. This all goes to show that the "necessary conformity of the superstructure to the infrastructure" historical materialism calls for is sheer delusion.

WANT OF CONFORMITY OF IDEOLOGY TO CLASS FOUNDATIONS

According to historical materialism, the superstructure can never outpace the infrastructure in any historical era. Accordingly, the consciousness of any age necessarily depends on that age and becomes obsolete and abrogated with the passage of that age, to be consigned to the annals of history. Patterns of consciousness, philosophies, plans, forecasts, and religions are all necessary products of the special requirements of the age in which they have appeared and cannot conform to the requirements of the next.

But the contrary has proven true. Many philosophies, personalities, ideas, patterns of consciousness, and religions are in advance of their time or class origins. How numerous are the ideas that yet shine over human history, although the material exigencies of the age of their appearance have totally vanished! Here, too, Marx has departed from Marxism in some of his assertions. In *The German Ideology*, he says: "... consciousness can sometimes appear further advanced than contemporary empirical relationships, so that in the struggles of a later epoch one can refer to earlier theoreticians as authorities."⁷⁸

AUTONOMY OF CULTURAL GROWTH

According to historical materialism, the cultural and scientific structures of society, like all the other structures, depend on the economic structure and cannot experience any growth independent

of it. Science grows in the wake of the growth of the tools of production and of the economic foundation of society.

First, we know that the tools of production, among them man, never grow by themselves; they grow through the relation of man and nature and within the field of human explorations. The growth and evolution of the tools of production are mated to man's growth in science and technology. But it is a question of priority: Does man first make a discovery and then use it to create an industry, or does the industry come about first, and then man's discovery? There is no doubt that the second alternative is correct.

Plainly, the laws of science and the principles of technology are discovered in connection with man's explorations and experiments. If man assumes no relationship with nature, does not explore, and does not experiment, he will discover no scientific law of nature and perceive no principle of technology. But after exploration and experiment, does man first realize scientific growth within himself and then create the tools of technology exterior to his being, or is the reverse the case? Here, the first alternative is correct.

Additionally, in the case of man, the terms "growth" and "evolution" are real, but in the case of technological tools, tools of production, they are metaphorical. There are real growth and evolution where an objective event progresses from a lower to a higher stage. Metaphorical growth, however, means that no objective event changes stage, but that an event disappears or is abrogated, and another, dissimilar event replaces it.

For example, a maturing child experiences real growth and development. But if a teacher teaches a class, and then another, more literate and competent teacher comes to teach, here the teaching situation of the class has evolved, but this evolution is metaphorical. The evolution of man in the course of his tool making is real—man really grows and evolves from a spiritual standpoint—but the evolution of industry (like the evolution of the automobile, in which every year a newer, more advanced, and better equipped model is marketed) is metaphorical. That is, no objective event has advanced from a lower to a higher stage. Last year's model has not come out better equipped this year. Rather, it has disappeared, been abrogated, exited the stage, and another model has taken its place.

In other words, a "defective" unit has disappeared, and a "complete" unit sits in its place. No unit has made the transition from the

stage of defect to the stage of completion over an interval of time. Where a real evolution and a metaphorical evolution occur alongside one another, the real evolution is primary, and the metaphorical evolution is secondary.

We see how this holds true for technology. As regards such other sciences as medicine, psychology, sociology, logic, philosophy, and mathematics, one can in no way verify such a dependence, that is, a unilateral dependence. The growth of science depends on the material and economic situation to an equal or lesser extent than that to which the material and economic situation depends on the growth of science. It is just as G. Schmoller said in refutation of Marxism: "Certainly the most sublime manifestations of culture are conditional upon the material and economic state; however, it is no less certain that spiritual and moral life represent an independent development. . . ."

If we set aside one flaw in August Comte's exposition, which is his idea that humanity is summed up in the "mind," which in fact only constitutes a portion of the human potentialities of man, and half his ideal life, Comte's theory of social evolution proves much more valuable than Marx's. Comte believed that "social phenomena are subject to a strict determinism which operates in the form of an inevitable evolution of human societies—an evolution which is itself governed by the progress of the human mind."80

SELF-CONTRAVENTION OF HISTORICAL MATERIALISM

According to historical materialism, no idea, philosophical or scientific theory, or moral system can have an absolute credibility and value because all are manifestations of particular material and economic conditions and depend on these particular objective conditions. Rather, each belongs to its own particular age and relinquishes its validity and credibility with the passing of that age and the necessary and inescapable changes in material and economic conditions. Other ideas and theories must inevitably replace them.

This universal law must comprehend historical materialism, as it has been propounded by a given set of philosophers and sociologists, because, if this were not so, then an exception would exist: There would be one or more scientific or philosophic laws having

substantive reality and existing as functions of no economic infrastructure. If this law does comprehend historical materialism, then the latter holds only for one limited period or era, which is the era of its appearance, and not for earlier or later periods. Therefore, in any case, historical materialism has been contravened.

Historical materialism as a theory, a philosophical theory, a phenomenon of the superstructure, either applies to what is other than itself but not itself and so contravenes itself or applies to itself and what is other than itself, but only over a limited period, such that in other periods it applies to neither itself nor what is other than itself. This same objection applies to dialectical materialism, according to which the principles of movement and reciprocal dependence apply to all things, even to scientific and philosophical principles. I have discussed these principles in *Usul-i Falsafa va Ravish-i Ri'alism*, volumes one and two. Here it grows clear how unfounded are the assertions that the world is the theater of dialectical materialism and society, the theater of historical materialism.

Other objections also apply to historical materialism. I will not take them up now. Yet I really cannot withhold my amazement that a theory so baseless and unscientific can yet gain such a reputation for being scientific. The art of propaganda is a wonder to behold.

Islam and Historical Materialism

Has Islam accepted historical materialism? Does the Qur'an, in its analyses and explanations of historical events, base its logic on historical materialism? Some suppose so; they maintain that this idea formed the basis for historical analysis at least a thousand years before Marx, in the Qur'an of Muhammad. 'Ali al-Wardi is one of the Shi'i scholars of Iraq who hold such a position; he has written several controversial books on the subject, among them Manzilat al-'Aql al-Bashari ("Stages of the Human Reason"). He was perhaps the first to propound this position. Today such historical analysis of the language of Islam is conceived of as a sort of intellectuality and has grown fashionable among a stratum of Muslim writers.

Those who think this way have a defective understanding of Islam, historical materialism, or both. For those familiar with the logic of Islam, a perusal of the previously outlined five principles and six conclusions of historical materialism will suffice to show that the logic of Islam and that of historical materialism are poles apart.

Considering that this manner of social and historical thought poses a great danger to Islamic culture, science, and thought, especially when it is falsely given an Islamic coloration and stamped with Islam's seal of credibility, I deem it necessary to explore the questions that have led or might lead to the notion that Islam regards economics as the infrastructure of society and sees history as material in its identity. I consider these questions in a much more extended form than these writers have presented. They have built their case on one or two verses and one or two phrases from the traditions, but I discuss points that they did not cite but well might have.

First, the Qur'an has set forth many social concepts. In "Society," I recounted about fifty social terms from the Qur'an. Studying the

social verses of the Qur'an shows that these terms attest a bipolar vision of societies in the Qur'an. On the one hand, the Qur'an propounds a bipolarity of society on a material basis, that is, on the basis of material wealth or deprivation: It refers to the members of one of these poles as the "grandees" (the exhibitionistic and grandiose), the "tyrannical," the "prodigal," or the "affluent"; and it refers to the members of the other pole as the "oppressed" (the abased), the "people" (the masses), the "offspring" [dhurriya] (the little people, the humble, the opposite of the grandees), or the "rabble" [aradhil, ardhalun]. It opposes these two poles to each other. On the other hand, it propounds a kind of bipolarity in society based on ideal concepts, in which one pole is that of the unbelievers, the mushriks, the hypocrites, the libertines [fasiqun], and the corrupters; and the other is that of the believers, the muwahhids, the pious, the virtuous, the peacemakers, the strivers, and the martyrs. 192

If we study closely the Qur'anic verses that have advanced these two material poles and these two ideal poles, we see that there exists a kind of congruity between the first material pole and the first ideal one, as well as between the second material pole and the second ideal one. The unbelievers, mushriks, hypocrites, and libertines appear to be those selfsame grandees, arrogant, prodigal, affluent, and taghuts; they are neither another set of persons nor a set made up of these and other individuals. The believers, muwahhids, virtuous, and strivers are the oppressed, poor, destitute, enslaved, and deprived; they are neither another set of persons nor a set made up of these and other individuals. Therefore, society has two poles: that of the affluent, oppressors, and exploiters, which comprises all the unbelievers, and that of the oppressed, which comprises all the believers. The division of society into oppressors and oppressed has brought about the existence of two groups, believers and unbelievers. Oppressorhood gives rise to shirk, unbelief, hypocrisy, debauchery, and corruption. Being oppressed gives rise to belief, tauhid, virtue, reform, and piety.

In order to clarify this congruity, consider certain of the verses of the sura A'raf from the fifty-ninth verse ("We sent Noah to his people...") to the one hundred thirty-seventh ("... and We demolished what Pharaoh and his people had constructed and erected."). These verses sketch the stories of Noah, Hud, Salih, Lot,

Shu'ayb, and Moses. In all these stories (except the story of Lot), the class that adhered to the prophets was the class of the oppressed, and the class that opposed them and persisted in unbelief was the class of the grandees and the arrogant.⁸³ Nothing accounts for this congruence but the class conscience that is intrinsic to the materiality of history and likewise necessitates it. Therefore, according to the Qur'an, that belief and unbelief are ranged against each other truly reflects the fact that the agents and the objects of oppression are ranged against each other.

The Qur'an says explicitly that "to have," the ownership that it terms ghana', gives rise to refractoriness and rebellion; that is, it works against the humility and peacefulness that the prophets call us to: "Truly man overruns all bounds—when he sees himself as self-sufficient" (96:6-7).

Again we see that the Qur'an relates the story of Qarun to underline the evil effects of "ownership" and "having." Qarun was a Sibtaean [that is, a member of the twelve tribes], not a Nabataean. He was one of Moses's folk, one of those oppressed by Pharaoh. At the same time, this same oppressed individual, in growing immensely wealthy by various means, rose against his own people, the oppressed.

The Qur'an says, "Qarun was indeed one of Moses' people, but he committed outrages against them" (28:76). Does this not in itself show that the prophets' stand against rebellion was in truth a stand against wealth, against "having" and "the haves"? In some verses, the Qur'an states explicitly that the leading adversaries of the prophets belonged to the class of the "affluent," that is, those immersed in luxury, the Sybarites of history. In the sura Saba, verse 34, this point is advanced as a universal principle and law: "We have never sent a warner to a community but that the affluent among them said, 'We disbelieve in what has been sent you' " (34:34). That the prophets and their adversaries are ranged against each other, or that belief and unbelief are ranged against each other, reflects the alignments of the two social classes: the oppressed and the oppressors.

Second, the Qur'an addresses itself to the people [nas], and the word people means the masses of the people, the deprived. This fact shows that the Qur'an acknowledges the idea of a class conscience and holds that only the deprived masses are apt to receive the

summons of Islam. It also shows that Islam has a class origin and a class orientation; that is, it is the religion of the deprived and the oppressed, and Islamic ideology is addressed exclusively to the deprived masses. This further shows that Islam holds economics to be the infrastructure and the identity of history to be material.

Third, the Our'an expressly states that the leaders, the reformers. the strivers, the martyrs, and finally the prophets rise from among the masses of the people, not from among the class of the well-off and wealthy. The Qur'an says of the Prophet of Islam: "It is He Who has sent among the ummivin Ithose belonging to the ummal a messenger . . . " (62:2).84 The umma is nothing if not the deprived masses. Similarly, it says of those martyred in the way of the Truth: "And We shall draw from each people a witness, and We shall say, 'Produce your proof' (28:75). This means, "We arouse a martyr from among every people, that is, every segment of the deprived masses, and We say to them, 'Bring forth your proof, that is, your martyr.' " The fact that the leaders of movements and revolutions necessarily arise from among the deprived masses shows the necessary congruity between the credal and social basis and the economic and class basis. This necessary congruity can be explained on no other grounds than those of the material identity of history and the infrastructural status of economics.

Fourth, in the Qur'an, the prophets' struggle and social orientation is infrastructural, not superstructural, in identity. It is to be inferred from the Qur'an that the aim of the prophets' missions is to establish justice, equity, and social equality and to demolish class barriers and walls. The prophets always have proceeded from the infrastructure, the object of their mission, to the superstructure, not vice versa. The superstructure—beliefs, faith, moral reforms, behavioral patterns—always has been the secondary object of the prophets' actions, to be pursued after they have reformed the infrastructure.

The Most Noble Prophet said, "Who has no livelihood, has no afterlife." Whoever has no material occupation realizes none of the spiritual fruits of life. This statement expresses the priority of livelihood to afterlife and of material life to spiritual life, as well as the dependence of spiritual life as superstructure to material life as infrastructure. The Prophet likewise said, "Lord, bless us in bread; were there no bread, we would neither show charity nor pray." This

statement, too, expresses the dependence of spirit upon matter as a superstructure.

Today most people suppose the prophets acted only in terms of the superstructure and sought only to make believers of the people and to reform their beliefs, morals, and conduct, while having nothing to do with the infrastructure; or they suppose that the workings of the infrastructure held only a secondary importance for the prophets; or they suppose that the prophets sought to make believers of the people, on the assumption that, once they had accomplished this, everything else would work itself out automatically, justice and equality would be established, and exploiters would voluntarily and spontaneously hand over to the deprived and oppressed their rights. In sum, people suppose that the prophets accomplished all their aims armed only with belief and faith and that their followers must do likewise. Such a supposition is a deceit forged by the class of exploiters and their clerical clients to neutralize the prophet's teachings. They have imposed it so efficiently on society that a nearly unanimous majority of the people has accepted it. As Marx says: "... the [ruling] class, which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production . . . "85

The prophets' method was just the opposite of what most people now suppose. The prophets first freed society from the social *shirk*, the social discrimination, and the oppression that are the roots of *shirk* in belief, morality, and conduct. Only then did they proceed to *tauhid* in belief and piety in morals and practice.

Fifth, the Qur'an contrasts the prophets' logic and that of their followers with the logic of their antagonists throughout history. The Qur'an clearly indicates that the antagonists' logic is always the logic of conservatism, traditionalism, and regression; but the logic of the prophets and their followers is the logic of modernism, unconventionality, and progressivism. The Qur'an makes it clear that the former group employs the same logic that (in societies divided, in sociological terms, into exploiter and exploited) the class of exploiters employs, which benefits from the status quo, while the latter group, the prophets and their followers, employs the same logic as the disadvantaged and deprived of history.

It would seem that the Qur'an takes care to rehearse the special logics of the adversaries and the supporters, to show what the logic of each group really is. Because these two logics, like the two groups themselves, have been at odds throughout history, it may be seen that the Qur'an wishes in presenting them and acquainting us with them to give us a standard for life today.

In the Qur'an, there are many scenarios in which these two logics are opposed. See the *suras* Zukhruf: 40-50, Mu'min: 23-44, Ta Ha: 49-71, Shu'ara': 16-49, and Qasas: 36-39. As an example, I cite five verses of Zukhruf and discuss them briefly:

And they said, "If the Merciful had so willed, we would not have worshipped these [angels]." [Therefore, as "we" now do worship them, it is clear that God has willed this, implying absolute determinism.] They know nothing of this. They only conjecture. [They did not arrive at the idea of determinism through perception and knowledge, or in reliance upon logic and scientific reasoning. They employ nothing but conjecture and estimation.] Have we given them a scripture before [containing such a deterministic concept) to which they hold fast? [No such scripture exists, nor is a serious belief in determinism being advanced.] Rather, they say: "We found our forefathers following a certain religion, and we guide ourselves by their footsteps." Thus, whenever We sent a warner to any people before you, the affluent among them said, "We found our forefathers following a certain religion, and we guide ourselves by their footsteps." He said, "What! Even if I brought you better guidance [one which you know to be founded on a firmer logic) than that which you found your forefathers following?" They said, "[At any rate,] we disbelieve in what you are sent with." (43:20-24)

We see that the adversaries of the prophets sometimes used the logic of fatalism and fatalistic decree and foreordination, saying, "We have no will of our own." As sociologists have shown, this is always the logic of those benefiting from the status quo, who advance the pretext of decree and foreordination as a means of averting any change in it. At times, they speak of following their forefathers' traditions and conceive of the past as sacred and worthy of emulation. It is enough for them that something belongs to the past for it to be true and a source of guidance. This is the pandemic logic of the conservatives, those who profit from the status quo.

Conversely, the prophets speak of something more logical, more

scientific, and more liberating than traditionalism and fatalism, which is the logic of revolutionaries and those aggrieved at the status quo. When the adversaries finally find themselves at a loss for an argument against the prophets, they have the last word by saying, "At any rate, determinism or no, whether we respect our traditions or not, we oppose your message, mission, and ideology because they are inimical to our social and class position."

Sixth, the Qur'an's alignment in the struggle between the arrogant and the oppressed is clear: Just as historical materialism promises, on the basis of dialectical logic, it sees the ultimate victory as belonging to the oppressed. In so aligning itself, the Qur'an in fact conveys the all-important nature of the factor of historical necessity in the course of history, according to which the essentially revolutionary class, in its protracted struggle with the class that by virtue of its class position is an essentially reactionary and regressive one, emerges victorious and inherits the earth: "And We seek to show favor to those who were being oppressed in the land, to make them leaders, and to make them heirs" (28:5). Note also verse 137 of the sura A'raf: "And We made a people who were being oppressed inheritors of the East and the West of the earth, lands We had blessed. And the fair word of Your Lord was fulfilled for the Children of Israel, because of their endurance, and We demolished what Pharaoh and his people had constructed and erected" (7:137). In other words, "We gave the blessed promised land as an inheritance from border to border to a people who were being oppressed. God's promise to the Israelites found full realization, on the condition that they would show forebearance. And We destroyed what Pharaoh and his people had built and erected."

This Qur'anic conception—that history proceeds toward the victory of the deprived, captive, and exploited—accords fully with the principle previously derived from historical materialism, that, first, the exploiter's essential trait is reaction and attachment to the past. Because this trait is contrary to the evolutionary norm of the creation, it is necessarily condemned to extinction. Second, the exploited's essential trait consists in intellectualism, ferment, and revolution. Because this trait is in harmony with the evolutionary norm of the creation, it will necessarily prove victorious.

Here it will be appropriate to quote from an article by a group of

Muslim intellectuals who have made this transition from "the intellectualism of the past" to "the Marx mania." The article is headed by the previously quoted verse (28:5), which it comments on as follows:

What is most striking is the stand God and all the phenomena of being take vis-à-vis the oppressed of the land. There is no doubt that, on the basis of Qur'anic thought, those "oppressed in the land" are those same deprived and enslaved masses who necessarily and perforce have no rôle in determining their own fate. . . . This noted, and with regard to the stand God and all the manifestations of being take vis-à-vis these, that is, the fact that the absolute Will governing being so operates as to show favor on them, this question arises: What persons work to accomplish this divine will? The answer to this question is clear, because once we have appraised the administrative organizations of societies polarized into oppressor and oppressed, while from a standpoint we know that the accomplishment of God's will culminates on the one hand in the leadership of the oppressed and their inheritance of the earth and on the other hand in the extinction and annulment of the systems of the oppressor, we realize that it is these oppressed themselves, their emissaries, and the committed intellectuals who have arisen from among them who are the objective manifestation of the will of God.

In other words, the chosen prophets and taken martyrs who take the first steps in the struggle with the plundering systems of taghut, the steps that smooth the way to the oppressed people's assuming their inheritance and leadership rôle, arise from among the oppressed. This idea is in fact a reflection of the Qur'anic conception of the revolutions of tauhid and the transformations of history. That is, just as the revolutions of tauhid from a social standpoint pivot on the leadership of the oppressed and their inheritance of the earth, so the leadership and vanguard of this movement must necessarily have arisen from among the oppressed, and so too must the ideological foundation and class situation be that intellectual foundation and special social orientation of the oppressed.⁸⁶

This discussion makes several points:

- 1. According to the Qur'an, society is bipolar: it is always divided into the two poles of oppressor and oppressed.
- 2. The will of God (as the article puts it, "the stand [of] God and all the phenomena of being") is set upon the leadership and inheritance of the oppressed and enslaved of history, wholly and unconditionally, whether they be muwahhids or mushriks and idolators, believers or otherwise. That is, the word alladhin (those who) in the

verse indicates inclusion and generalization. And the divine norm demands the triumph of the oppressed qua oppressed over the oppressor. In other words, the basic identity of the struggle that has gone on throughout history is that of a struggle between the deprived and the oppressors, and the evolutionary law of the world is that the deprived will triumph over the oppressors.

- 3. God's will is fulfilled by means of the oppressed themselves, and the leaders, the vanguard, the prophets and martyrs, necessarily arise from the pole of the oppressed, not from any other pole.
- 4. There is always a congruity and harmony among the intellectual foundation, the social foundation, and the class situation.

So we see how several Marxist principles of history are derived from this noble verse and how the Qur'an has anticipated Marx's thought and philosophy, articulating it fourteen hundred years before his birth! What can we conclude from analyzing our own contemporary history in the light of the so-called Our'anic vision of history? As an example, the gentlemen draw on this so-called Qur'anic principle to deduce something of urgent importance: They test it against the phenomenon of the present-day clerical movement. They say that the Qur'an teaches us that the vanguard and leadership of revolutions must necessarily be of the oppressed class, although today we know that the clergy, one of the "three dimensions of the plundering system of history," has changed in its social foundation and become revolutionary. The resulting paradox can be solved simply enough by dogmatically asserting that matters are not as they appear to be. When the ruling class saw its position jeopardized, it ordered its clerical clients to play the part of revolutionaries. This, too, follows from the Marxist-or supposedly the Our'anic-worldview. Is it clear who reaps the benefits of this conclusion today?

Critique

Either the arguments that the Qur'an supports historical materialism are radically in error or they are correct, but erroneous conclusions are drawn from them. I shall consider the six arguments I have presented.

First is the assertion that the Qur'an divides society into two pairs of poles, material and ideal, that are congruent. This is an out-and-out lie. I refer to the assertions that, according to the Qur'an, the unbelievers, mushriks, hypocrites, libertines, and corrupters are the grandees, arrogant, and tyrants, and the believers, muwahhids, virtuous, and martyrs constitute the class of the oppressed and the deprived and that the alignment of unbelievers against believers reflects the infrastructural alignment of oppressors against oppressed. The Qur'an never suggests any such congruence, but rather suggests the lack of one.

In its historical narratives, the Qur'an tells of believers who arose from the class of the affluent and the arrogant and who revolted against that class and its values. An example is the story of the believer among Pharaoh's folk that appears in the *sura* of the same name, that is, "The Believer" [Mu'min]. This holds for Pharaoh's wife, who shared in Pharaoh's life, enjoying every luxury that he enjoyed. Her life is alluded to in the Qur'an.⁸⁷

The Qur'an movingly recalls Pharaoh's magicians on several occasions; it indicates how the primordial human conscience that seeks right and truth is aroused, upon encountering right and truth, to resist deceit, tyranny, and error, how it leaves its own interests behind and shows no fear in the face of Pharaoh's threats to first cut off one hand and the opposite foot, and then hang you.

According to the Qur'anic account, the one-man rebellion of Moses (upon whom be peace) contravenes historical materialism. Moses was a Sibtaean, not a Nabataean, and an Israelite, not one of Pharaoh's folk, racially; but he grew up from infancy in Pharaoh's

house and was raised as a prince. Nonetheless Moses rebelled against and deserted this Pharaonic system in which he had lived and from which he had benefited. He chose working as a shepherd for the elder of Midian to continuing his life as a prince; he followed the same path until finally he was chosen for a prophetic mission and formally entered into conflict with Pharaoh.

The Most Noble Prophet (upon whom be peace) was orphaned in his childhood and poor through his early youth. He was in easy circumstances after his marriage to the wealthy Khadija. The Qur'an refers to this point where it says: "Did He not find you an orphan and shelter you; find you wandering and guide you; and find you impoverished and enrich you?" (93:6-8). He was in easy circumstances when he began his practices of worship and seclusion. According to the principles of historical materialism, the Most Noble Prophet ought to have turned into a conservative apologist for the status quo in the very period when he began his revolutionary mission and rose against the capitalists, usurers, and slavers of Mecca and the system of idolatry that symbolized that way of life.

Similarly, not all believers, muwahhids, and revolutionaries for tauhid rose from the class of the oppressed. The prophets searched out pristine or nearly pristine natures among the class of oppressors and aroused them against themselves (in repentance) or against their class (in revolution). Nor did the whole class of the oppressed enter the ranks of the believers and revolutionaries for tauhid. The Qur'an presents various scenarios in which groups from among the oppressed are condemned and presented as typifications of unbelievers, subject to divine wrath.88

Therefore, all the believers do not belong to the class of the oppressed nor all the oppressed, to the class of the believers. This supposed congruity is sheer nonsense. However, the greater part of the class of those believing in the prophets is composed of the class of the oppressed, or at least the class of those whose hands are not stained from the work of oppression; and most of the adversaries of the prophets are oppressors. This division occurs because, although the human primordial nature, which enables man to receive God's message, is common to all, the exploiters as a class, the prodigal and the affluent, are faced with a great obstacle: their complicity in and habituation to the status quo. Members of this class must free

themselves from the great burden of their own complicity, and few succeed in this. But the oppressed as a class have no such barrier before them because, in addition to answering the summons of their own primordial nature, they will recover their own alienated rights. For them, to join the ranks of the believers is doubly beneficial. This is why a majority of the prophets' adherents are of the oppressed class. But the kind of congruity that has been suggested is sheer nonsense.

The Qur'an bases its conceptions of the identity of history on one set of assumptions; historical materialism bases its on another. According to the Qur'an, the spirit has substantive reality, and matter is in no way prior to spirit. Ideal needs and aptitudes have a substantive reality in man's being and do not depend on material needs. Thought, too, is substantive vis-à-vis work. Man's primordial psychical character is prior to his social character.

In maintaining the substantive reality of the primordial nature and in seeking for the enchained primordial being in every human being, even in those as deformed as Pharaoh, the Qur'an upholds the principle that even the most deformed human beings have the possibility, however faint, of rising toward truth and reality. Accordingly, God's messengers have among their foremost responsibilities the admonition of oppressors, that perchance they may set free the primordial being enchained within them and arouse their primordial character against their defiled social character. In many instances, they succeeded in bringing about repentance.

In the first phase of his mission, Moses is charged with seeking out Pharaoh and with reminding him and awakening his primordial nature. If this is of no avail, he is to combat him. In Moses' view, Pharaoh has imprisoned one human being within himself and many outside himself. Moses first acts to arouse the prisoner within Pharaoh against him, in truth, to arouse the natural Pharaoh, who is a human being, or at least the vestige of one, against the social Pharaoh, that is, the Pharaoh formed within society: "Go to Pharaoh, for he has overrun the bounds, and say, 'Would you be purified? So I might guide you to your Lord, and you might fear Him?" (79:17-19).

The Qur'an attaches a value and power to guidance, edification, counsel, demonstration, and deduction (collectively, in the language

of the Qur'an, hikma [wisdom]). According to the Qur'an, these things can transform a human being and alter the course of his life. They can modify his character and produce a spiritual revolution within him. The Our'an envisions no limits to the rôle of ideology and thought, by contrast with Marxism and materialism, which conceive of the rôle of guidance as being limited to transforming a class in itself into a class for itself, that is, to bringing class contradictions into consciousness.

Second, it is also wrong to say that the Our'an is addressed to the people, the nas, that the term "people" means precisely the deprived masses, and that therefore Islam is addressed to the deprived class, Islamic ideology is the ideology of the deprived class, and Islam draws its adherents and soldiers solely from the deprived masses. Of course Islam is addressed to the people, but "people" here means human beings, people at large. Nowhere in Arabic dictionaries or Arabic usage is nas used to mean the deprived masses; it has no class connotations. The Qur'an says: "Pilgrimage to the House is owed God by the people—whoever has the capacity for the journey . . . " (3:97). Is this meant to signify the deprived masses? Similarly, the vocative expression Ya ayyuha 'n-nas (O people!) occurs often in the Qur'an, but in no instance does it signify the deprived masses; it always addresses the people at large. That the Our'an is addressed to all arises from the theory of the primordial nature it propounds.

Third, it is also wrong to say that the Our'an maintains that the leaders, prophets, vanguard, and martyrs have arisen solely from among the oppressed. The Our'an never says any such thing.

The argument that the verse "It was He Who has sent among the ummiyin a messenger" shows that the prophets arose from the umma, and that the umma is synonymous with the masses of the people, is ludicrous. Ummiyin is the plural of ummi (unschooled), which is an attributive form deriving from umm (mother), not umma (people). Furthermore, the word umma itself refers to society as an aggregate of various groups and even various classes; it never means the masses of the people.

The line of reasoning concerning martyrs applied to Qasas: 75 ("And We shall draw from each people a witness, and We shall say, 'Produce your proof'") is more ludicrous still. Here is how they have interpreted (and in truth deformed) this verse: From among every umma (segment of the masses of the people) We arouse a martyr (one killed in the way of God); that is, We mold him into a revolutionary. Then We say to the peoples, "Bring forth each of you your proof, that is, that martyr, that revolutionary figure, killed in the way of God."

In the first place, this verse is the continuation of the preceding verse, and together they pertain to the Resurrection. Here is the preceding verse: "The day that He will call to them and say, 'Where are My "partners" whom you had asserted?" (28:74).

In the second place, the meaning of naz'ana is "We shall separate, We shall draw out," not "We shall arouse."

In the third place, shahid in this verse does not mean one killed in the way of God. It means a witness to the acts in the sense that the Qur'an speaks of every prophet as a witness to the acts of his people. One cannot find in the Qur'an even a single instance in which the word shahid has the common present day sense of one killed in the way of God. The Prophet of God and the Imams used it in this sense. but the Our'an never has done so. We see therefore how the verses of the Qur'an have been twisted to support a Marxist conception alien to them.

The fourth argument concerns the prophets' primary object. Is it to establish justice and equality? Or is it to set up the bond of faith and knowledge between God and servant? Or are these both primary objects, so that the prophets are "dualists" with regard to ends? Or does some third alternative hold? I have discussed this topic already.89 Here I consider the matter from the standpoint of the prophets' method. As I said in discussing tauhid in practice, contrary to what some people involved in Sufism have supposed, the prophets did not devote all their efforts at reforming man to freeing him inwardly and severing his attachments to objects. 90 Nor did they, like some materialist schools, regard it as sufficient to modify and reform outward relationships in order to modify and reform inward relationships. The Noble Qur'an asserts, "Say, 'O people of the book! Come to an agreement between yourselves and ourselves: that we worship none but God, that we associate nothing in partnership with Him, and that we not set up some from among us as lords over others'" (3:64).

Did the prophets begin with the inside or the outside? Did they

first launch an inward revolution, through instilling belief, faith, and idealistic fernor, then mobilize people—once they had attained to tauhid in their minds, feelings, and sentiments—for the attainment of social tauhid, social reform, and the establishment of justice and equity? Or did they first set to work by pulling on the material levers, that is, by attending to the deprivations, swindles, and oppressions the people were suffering, first eliminating social shirk and social discrimination, and only then pursuing faith, belief, and morality?

By contrast with mere reformers (true or self-proclaimed), the prophets began with thought, belief, faith, spiritual fervor, divine love, and a reminder of the Source and the Destination. Study of the [chronological] order of the revealed *suras* and verses of the Qur'an—what questions they begin with—as well as study of the life of the Most Noble Prophet—what questions he addressed in his sixteen years' work in Mecca and in his ten years' work in Medina—makes this point perfectly clear.

Concerning the fifth argument, it is natural that the prophets' adversaries should have adopted a conservative logic. If we could infer from the Qur'an that all adversaries of the prophets adopted such a logic, it would grow clear that they must have arisen from the class of the affluent, the class of exploiters. However, what we can actually infer from the Qur'an is that this logic was that of the leaders of the opposition, the grandees and the arrogant. These, who, as Marx puts it, are the owners of the material goods of society, supply these intellectual goods to the rest of the people.

It is likewise natural that the prophets' logic should be that of mobilization, reasoning, and disregard for norms and rôle models; it could not be otherwise. But deprivations, class swindles, and oppression did not mold their consciences into this form, so that this logic was the natural and inevitable reflection of their deprivations. Rather, they grew to perfection in humanity, that is, in logic, reasoning, and human sentiments and feelings. The more one grows in humanity, the less one depends on the natural environment, the social environment, and material conditions—the more liberated and autonomous one grows. The prophets' autonomous logic results in their being free of norms, conditioning, and social rôles and their being able to liberate the people from blind conformity to these norms and rôles.

What is said of oppression in the sixth argument is also unacceptable. First, in other verses [than the "verse on oppression," 28:5], the Qur'an explicitly explains historical destiny, including the evolutionary course of history, in another way. These other verses explain, interpret, and condition the meaning of this verse—supposing it has the previously discussed meaning. Second, contrary to what is widely believed, this verse on oppression sets forth no general principle at all, such that it would need to be explained, interpreted, or made conditional through comparison with other verses on this subject. This verse is linked with the preceding and the following verse. If we take these two verses into account, the verse in question clearly propounds no general principle upon which to base the sort of deduction I have discussed here. Accordingly, my discussion of this verse falls into two parts.

In the first part, I begin from the hypothesis that the verse is separate from the preceding and following verses, derive a general historical principle from it, and compare it to other verses that express a historical principle contrary to the one it conveys, in order to see what the net result is. In the second part, I assume that the verse expresses no general historical principle on which the kind of deduction I have examined could be based.

Regarding the first part of my inquiry, in several verses, the Qur'an explains that the culmination and destiny of history, and likewise the course of historical evolution, is the triumph of faith over faithlessness, piety over apathy, virtue over corruption, and righteous action pleasing to God over unworthy action. We read in Nur:55: "God has promised those of you have faith and do good deeds that He will cause them to succeed to the earth, just as He caused others to succeed to it before them, that He will surely establish the religion that He has chosen for them, and that He will transform their state from their prior fear into security: 'They shall worship Me and associate nothing with Me'" . . . (24:55).

In this verse, those who are promised the final victory and inheritance of the earth, viceregency of the earth, are the believers, those who do good. By contrast with the verse on oppression, which deals mainly with oppression, deprivation, and injustice, this verse deals mainly with an ideological trait and other moral and behavioral traits. It proclaims the final victory and dominion to belong to a

particular kind of belief, a particular kind of faith, and a particular kind of behavior. In other words, this verse proclaims the victory of a humanity that has attained faith, has realized the truth, and acts righteously. This victory is proclaimed to comprehend the following:

- 1. A grant of succession (that is, an assumption of power and an eclipse of prior powers)
- 2. The establishment of religion (that is, the realization of all the moral values of Islam—justice, decency, piety, courage, munificence, love, worship, sincere devotion, and self-purification)
 - 3. The abolition of every sort of shirk in worship or obedience

It is said in the *sura* A'raf, verse 128: "Moses said to his people, 'Ask help of God and be patient; for the earth is God's; He will give it in inheritance to whomever of His servants He pleases, [but] the outcome belongs to the pious'" (7:128). That is, the divine norm implies that the pious will finally inherit the earth.

It is said in the *sura* Anbiya', verse 105: "Before this We wrote in the Psalms, after the reminder, 'My virtuous servants shall inherit the earth'" (21:105). There are further verses to this effect.

Suppose we consider the sense of the verse on oppression or the sense of the verse on succession [24:55] along with several others. Can we say that these two classes of verses, though differing in their overt meaning, bespeak one truth, that the oppressed are the believers, the virtuous, and the pious, that they are designated the oppressed in respect to their social and class status and the faithful, the righteous, the virtuous, and the pious in respect to their ideological status? Can we say that the converse holds for the oppressors?

We cannot, because, in the first place, I have shown that the theory of congruity between the so-called "superstructural" categories of faith, virtue, and piety and the so-called "infrastructural" categories of oppression, deprivation, and exploitedness does not accord with the Qur'anic outlook. According to the Qur'an, it is possible for those who are not oppressed to be believers or for those who are oppressed not to be believers: The Qur'an has noted groupings of both types. When an ideology of tauhid, based on divine values of justice, munificence, and beneficence, is presented in a class society, the oppressed people will constitute the majority of its adherents because they do not face the obstacles to the expression of their

primordial nature that are before the opposed class. But the class of believers is never confined to the class of the oppressed.

In the second place, each of these two verses presents a different mechanism for history. The verse on oppression depicts the course of history as a class war and presents the mechanism of its movement as pressure coming from the region of the oppressors, from the essentially reactionary ethos of that class, as well as from the revolutionary ethos of the exploited, owing to their exploitation. The final outcome of this movement is the victory of the oppressed class, whether or not they attain a faith in right action in the Qur'anic sense. This class also includes, for instance, the exploited peoples of Vietnam, Cambodia, and so forth. This verse seeks to expound the principle of God's protection of the oppressed given in the Qur'an: "Do not think God heedless of what the oppressors do" (14:42). That is, it expounds divine justice. The idea of succession and leadership expressed in the verse on oppression is an expression of divine justice.

However, the verse on succession and those resembling it present a different mechanism for history as a natural process and, in a divine modality, propound a principle that includes that of divine justice, but is more comprehensive.

The mechanism these latter verses present is reflected in the fact that, in the midst of the various struggles that exist in the world and have a material and profit-oriented identity, there is a struggle "for God and in God" [lillah fi'llah] that the prophets and after them the faithful have directed, a struggle for values, hallowed, devoid of selfish interests and material motives. This struggle has carried man forward in human civilization. Only this struggle is worthwhile and may be called "the war of truth against falsity." Only this struggle has impelled history onward in humanity and humane ideals. The primary motive force of this struggle is not pressure from the opposed class, but an instinctual and innate factor: inclination to the truth or the will to know the system of being as it is, along with the aspiration for justice, or the will to know society as it must be.

Not the feeling of being deprived and cheated, but the innate will to perfection, has urged humanity onward. Man's animal potentialities will remain at the conclusion of history just what they were at the outset. They have found no further growth. Man's human potentialities, however, gradually bloom. In the future, man will free himself from material and economic bonds and cleave to belief and faith more fully than now. The course of historical growth and evolution is not that of material, profit-oriented, and class struggles, but that of ideological struggles, struggles for God and faith. This is the natural mechanism for human evolution and for the final victory of the pure, the virtuous, and those struggling in the way of Truth.

In respect to the divine modality of this victory, what courses and evolves through the length of history and reaches its culmination at the conclusion of history is the manifestation not only of the principle of divine justice, which entails only recompense, but of divine dominicality and mercy, which entail the evolution of beings. In other words, what is proclaimed is the expression, the manifestation, of the dominicality, the mercy, and the supreme generosity of God, not just divine omnipotence and vengeance.

Thus, the verse on oppression and the verse on succession (along with those resembling it) have each a special logic—from the standpoints of the class that is to be victorious, the historical course of their victory, that is, the natural agent of historical movement, and the divine modality (that is, the manifestation of the divine names). The verse on succession is more comprehensive in its conclusions. What the verse on oppression tells us humanity obtains is only a tiny fraction of what the verse on succession tells us humanity obtains. The value the verse on oppression represents is that of repulsing oppression from the oppressed, in other words, God's protection of the oppressed. This is a fractional part of the values the verse on succession represents.

Equally important, the verse on oppression is not intended to propound a general principle. Consequently, it does not explain the course of history, refer to its mechanism, or accord the final victory of history to the oppressed per se. This erroneous supposition that the verse propounds a general principle arises from a failure to see the connection between this verse and preceding and following verses. Those so failing have read into alladhin (alladhina 'staz'afu, "those who were being oppressed") the senses of generalization and inclusion. Then they have inferred the principle that runs contrary to the principle derived from the verse on succession. Here are the three verses together:

Truly Pharaoh exalted himself in the land and arrayed its people in factions. He oppressed a tribe among them, slaughtering their sons but sparing their women, for he was one of the corrupters. And We sought to show favor to those who were being oppressed in the land, to make them leaders, and to make them heirs—to settle them on the land, and through them to face Pharaoh, Haman, and their hosts with what they were seeking to avoid. (28:4-6)

The three verses are connected, and together they propound a single point. The connected meaning of the three verses is this: Pharaoh sought hegemony in the land and splintered the people of the land into sects. He abased a group of them; he beheaded their sons and left only their daughters alive. He was one of the corrupters. We sought to show favor to those oppressed by Pharaoh, to make them leaders and inheritors, to settle them in the land, and through them to show Pharaoh and his minister Haman what they had been avoiding.

The phrase wa numakkina lahum fi'l-arz (to settle them on the land) and the phrase wa nuriya Fir'auna wa Haman (and to face Pharaoh and Haman [with]) in the third verse are in apposition to the second verse and complete its meaning. Accordingly, one cannot separate these two verses. The content of the second phrase of the third verse, wa nuriya Fir'auna wa Haman, relates to the content of the first verse; it discusses the fate of Pharaoh, whose acts of tyranny are discussed in the first verse. Therefore, one cannot separate the third verse from the first, and because the third verse is in apposition to the second and completes its meaning, one cannot separate the second verse from the first either.

If the third verse did not appear or did not discuss the fates of Pharaoh and Haman, it would have been possible for us to separate the second verse from the first and derive an independent general principle from it, but the inseparable linkage among the three verses prevents this. What we can gather from these three verses is that Pharaoh sought hegemony, sowed dissensions, practiced oppression, and killed children; at the same time, God's will was set on showing favor to those despised, oppressed, and deprived people by making them leaders and heirs. Therefore, the *alladhin* of the verse refers to those in question and is not general or inclusive.

There is a further point: The phrase wa naj'alahum a'immatan (to

show favor), which means to bestow a favor on in a particular way. It does not say bi an naj'alahum, which would imply "The favor We bestowed on them was this very gift of leadership and inheritance," which is the way this phrase is usually understood. The meaning is, "Our will was to show favor to those oppressed people by sending them a prophet and a scripture (Moses and the Taurat) and by providing religious teachings and instilling a belief grounded in tauhid. It was to make them a people of faith and virtue and to make them leaders and heirs to the land (their own land)." So the intent of the verse is, "And We sought to show favor to those who were being oppressed [by sending Moses and the Book We revealed to Moses] and to make them leaders..."

Therefore, the meaning of the verse on oppression is precisely that of the verse on succession, except more narrow; that is, it sets forth one of the corroborations for this latter verse. Apart from the fact that the conjunction of the phrase wa naj'alahum a'immatan and the phrase an nnamunna requires this interpretation, one must basically regard it as improbable that the verse intends that the Israelites arrived at leadership and heirship because they were oppressed, whether Moses had appeared as prophet or not, whether he had brought his celestial teachings or not, whether they had adhered to these teachings or not.

Those who hold that the theory of historical materialism is Islamic could make another point, that in its spirit and ideals, Islamic culture must be the culture of the oppressed class, or that of the oppressor class, or else an inclusive culture. If it is the culture of the oppressed class, then it must have the complexion of that class. It must be addressed to the oppressed and oriented to their needs. If it is the culture of the oppressor class, as opponents of Islam claim, besides pivoting on and having the complexion of that class, it will be a reactionary, inhuman, and therefore ungodly culture.

No Muslim accepts such a theory, and the whole of this culture bears witness against it. There remains the possibility that Islamic culture is inclusive. An inclusive culture is neutral, indifferent, irresponsible, and uncommitted, a bystander's culture that would leave God's work to God and Caesar's to Caesar, a culture that would reconcile fire and water, oppressor and oppressed, exploiter and exploited, that would bring all under one roof, a culture whose

watchword is "Let neither skewer burn nor kebab." Such a culture in practice proves conservative and benefits the class of oppressors, monopolists, and exploiters. Just as if a party takes the road of neutrality, indifference, irresponsibility, and withdrawal, not seeking to participate in the social struggles between plundered and plunderer, it in practice is backing the plunderers and freeing their hand, so if the spirit of a culture is neutrality and indifference, it is in practice the culture of the oppressors. Therefore, because Islamic culture is neither a neutral and indifferent culture nor one backing the oppressor class, we must account it the culture of the oppressed class. We must consider that its origin, message, orientation, and constituency are all within the sphere of this class and pivot on it.

This argument is mistaken. I think the appeal historical materialism has for some Muslim intellectuals has two principal roots: One is the supposition that, to see Islamic culture as revolutionary, or to set up a revolutionary culture for Islam, they have no other recourse than to adhere to historical materialism. They maintain that their understanding of the Qur'an suggests this to them. This is what they have inferred from the verse on oppression. All this is just to justify their prejudgment. This is where they stray from the pure, humane, innate, and divine logic of Islam and reduce it to the level of a materialist logic.

These intellectuals suppose that a culture can be revolutionary only by belonging solely to the deprived and plundered class, by having arisen from that class, by approaching that class, by being oriented to the advantage of that class, and by being addressed solely to that class. They suppose the social and class base of the leaders, guides, and vanguard must be the exploited and that the relation of this culture to other groups and classes must be solely one of enmity and conflict.

These intellectuals suppose that the road to revolutionary culture must necessarily lead through the stomach and that all the great revolutions of history, even those directed by the prophets of God, have been revolutions of the stomach and for its sake. Therefore, they have taken the great Abu Dharr, the sage of the community of believers, the sincerely devoted enjoiner of good and forbidder of evil, the striver in God's way, and made of him Abu Dharr of the stomach, who keenly felt his hunger and, because of it, thought it

permissible and even incumbent to draw his sword and strike out at all and sundry. The highest value in his being was—having personally tasted of hunger and so having understood the hunger of those of his class—to nourish his resentment against those who had caused that hunger and to struggle against them relentlessly. The whole character of this Luqman of the community, this muwahhid who knew God, this struggling believer who gave up everything for Islam, this second perfection of Islam, begins and ends here.

These intellectuals have supposed that, just as Marx believed, "revolution...cannot come except by a movement of force, a mass movement." They cannot imagine that a culture, a school, an ideology of divine origin addressed to man—in truth, addressed to the human primordial nature and so having a universal import—oriented to justice, equality, purity, idealism, love, beneficence, and struggle against injustice can create a tremendous movement and instigate a profound revolution—but a godly and humane revolution in which godly fervor, joy in spirit, divine rapture, and humane values surge forth. But we have seen repeated examples of this in history. The revolution of Islam is a shining example.

They cannot imagine that this culture need not originate in the deprived and plundered class to be committed and responsible, not to be neutral and indifferent. They suppose that an all-inclusive culture is necessarily neutral and indifferent. What creates commitment and responsibility is not affiliation with the deprived class, but affiliation with God and the conscience of humanity. This is one principal root of these gentlemen's error, one in the relation of Islam to revolution. The other principal root of this error is in a conception of the relation of Islam to its social orientations. These intellectuals have seen clearly that, in offering a historical interpretation for the prophets' movement, the Qur'an demonstrates that the prophets were closely aligned with the oppressed. At the same time, they conceived of the Marxist principle of the congruity between origin and orientation, in other words the principle of "the congruity between social basis and basis of belief and practice," as incontestable. Thus, they were forced to conclude that, because the Our'an plainly regards these holy and progressive movements as aimed at benefiting the oppressed and at securing their rights and freedoms, it must then regard them as arising from the class of the deprived, plundered, and oppressed. Therefore, they conclude that, according to the Qur'an, history has a material and economic identity, and economics is the infrastructure.

The Qur'an clearly holds to the principle of the primordial nature and upholds a logic governing the life of man that must be called the logic of the primordial nature, opposite which is the logic of self-interest, the logic of degenerated, bestial men. Therefore, Islam does not accept the principle of the congruity between origin and orientation. It regards it as an inhuman principle; that is, this congruity holds for people who have not realized their humanity, who have had no humane education, whose logic is the logic of self-interest. It does not hold for educated, humanized people whose logic is that of the primordial nature.

Apart from these points, when we say Islam is oriented toward benefiting the oppressed, we speak rather loosely and figuratively. Islam is oriented toward justice and equality. Plainly, those who benefit from this orientation are the deprived and oppressed, and those who lose are the plunderers, monopolists, and exploiters. Even where Islam works to secure the rights and interests of a class, its primary aim is to realize a value, to found a humane principle. Here again grows clear the extraordinary value of the principle of the primordial nature, which the Qur'an sets forth explicitly and which must be recognized as the mother of sciences in Islamic culture and science.

Much has been said about the primordial nature, but little attention has been paid to its depth and its vast dimensions. Generally, people fail to pay proper attention to its wider dimensions, and end up adopting theories that actually run contrary to this principle.

Similar but more frightening mistakes have been made in regard to the origins of the religions themselves. Now I am speaking of religion as a sociohistorical phenomenon that has existed from the dawn of history down to the present. The origin and orientation of this social phenomenon must be clarified. Marxist historical materialism advances a principle according to which there is a congruity between the origin of any cultural phenomenon and its orientation. This is the principle that the 'urafa' and the theist hukama' have maintained holds for the overall course of the system of being. As they put it, "Ends are return to beginnings." As Rumi says,

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The parts all set their faces to the whole,
The bulbul's love flows to the rose's face.
All things that journey on from sea to sea
At last return to just from whence they came.
From Whom proceed these vast onrushing floods?
From our slight forms let pass this ardent soul.92

Marxism says something analogous in relation to the phenomena of mind, aesthetics, philosophy, religion—sociocultural phenomena in general. This school maintains that every idea is headed back toward its origin—"Ends are return to beginnings": No unaligned idea, religion, or culture exists, nor do any that are aligned, but toward constructing a social context other than that from which they arose. According to this school, every class has its own special intellectual and aesthetic modes of expression. Accordingly, economically fragmented societies, class societies, have two sorts of basic concern and two forms of philosophy, morals, art, poetry and literature, aesthetics, sensibility, existential outlook, and sometimes science, in accordance with their economic life. When the infrastructure and ownership relations become twofold in form, all these become twofold in form, take the form of two systems.

Marx himself maintains two exceptions for this bifurcation: religion and the state. According to Marx, these are special devices of the plundering class, their special method of exploitation. Naturally, these two phenomena are oriented toward the interests of this class. Owing to its social position, the exploited class gives rise to neither religion nor the state; they are imposed upon it by the opposed class. Therefore, two systems of religion do not exist, nor do two systems of the state.

Some Muslim intellectuals maintain that, Marx's theory notwithstanding, two systems of religion do in fact exist. Just as morals, art, literature, and other cultural phenomena fall under either of two systems, each system arising from and oriented toward its particular class, the same holds for religion. Two religions can always be found in society: the dominant one (that of the ruling class) and the dominated one (that of the ruled). The dominant religion is that of shirk, and the dominated religion is that of tauhid. The dominant religion is that of discrimination, and the dominated religion is that of equality. The dominant religion is that of apology for the status quo, and the dominated religion is that of revolution and condemnation of the status quo. The dominant religion is that of stagnation and silence, and the dominated religion is that of uprising, movement, and outcry. The dominant religion is the opium of society, and the dominated religion is the source of energy for society.

Therefore, Marx's theory that religion is absolutely oriented to the benefit of the ruling class and against that of the ruled class, that religion is the opium of society, holds true for that religion arising from the ruling class: Only this religion effectively has prevailed and governed. It does not hold true for the dominated religion, the religion of the true prophets, which the dominant systems have never allowed to be expressed and promulgated.

Thus, these intellectuals have rejected Marx's theory, that religion in the absolute is oriented toward the interests of the ruling class. They suppose that they have rejected Marxism itself in the process, but they fail to note that, however much what they say runs contrary to the views of Marx, Engels, Mao, and the other leading figures of Marxism, it is a Marxist and materialist explanation of religion. This is a terrible thing, and they have failed utterly to perceive it. They have posited a class origin for the dominated, as well as for the dominant religion, and they have accepted the principle of congruity between origin and orientation. In other words, they unconsciously have accepted the principle of the material identity of religion and of every other cultural phenomenon, as well as the principle of a necessary congruity between the origin of a cultural phenomenon and its orientation. What runs contrary to the views of Marx and the Marxists is the notion that a religion, too, has its origins in the deprived and plundered class and is oriented toward its interests. In fact, they have come up with an interesting explanation for the dominated religion from the standpoint of orientation, but the idea of a material and class identity for its origins is unacceptable.

One must conclude that the religion of *shirk*, the dominant religion belonging to the ruling class, is the only objective historical religion, the only religion to have a rôle in life. Because historical necessity has been behind this class and economic and political power has been at its members' disposal, their religion, which represents a rationale for their position, necessarily has endured and ruled. The religion of *tauhid*, however, automatically has been

unable to penetrate society. It has played no historical rôle in society; it could play no such rôle because the superstructure cannot outpace the infrastructure.

Accordingly, the movements of the prophets of tauhid have been the dominated and defeated movements of history; they could have been nothing else. The prophets brought a religion of tauhid, a religion of equality; but before long, the religion of shirk cloaked itself in the religion of tauhid and began using the prophets' teachings to perpetuate itself. It assimilated those teachings by distorting them and grew more powerful than before, more able to vex the deprived class.

The true prophets did indeed strive to put a morsel in the people's mouths, but they were ultimately a disaster to the people; they became tools in the hands of the opposing class to draw the noose tighter around the necks of the deprived and plundered. What the prophets sought to accomplish through their teachings was not accomplished; what took place they had not sought. In the language of the jurists, what he intended did not occur, and what occurred he did not intend.

What the materialists and the antireligious say—that religion is the opium of society, that it is a narcotic, an agent of torpor and quiescence, a justification for oppression and discrimination, that it harbors ignorance and deceives the masses—is true, but of the dominant religion, the religion of shirk, the religion of discrimination, which has held sway over history. It is not true of the true religion, the religion of tauhid, the religion of the deprived and oppressed, who always have been pushed off the field of life and history.

The only rôle the dominated religion has played is that of protest and criticism. It is as if a party should gain a majority and come to power, form a government, implement its programs, and carry out its resolutions while another party, however much more progressive, should always remain in the minority and manage to do nothing but protest and criticize. The majority party generally pays no heed to these criticisms; it runs society however it pleases, only occasionally using the minority's criticisms and protests to consolidate its own position. Were it not for these criticisms, it might fall of itself in the face of mounting pressures.

This argument is incorrect in its analysis of the identity of the religion of shirk, its analysis of the identity of the religion of tauhid, and its conception of the rôles these religions play in history. Doubtless either or both the religions of tauhid and shirk are always found in the world. Sociologists have offered various theories about which appeared first. Most have said that the religion of shirk existed first and that religion gradually evolved into the religion of tauhid. Others have said the contrary.

Not only religious traditions but some religious principles support the view that the religion of tauhid is earlier. But why has the religion of shirk appeared? Was it really devised to rationalize the oppressors' acts of injustice and discrimination? Researchers have suggested other reasons, and one cannot so lightly accept that shirk is the product of social discrimination. The analysis of the religion of tauhid holding that it restates the demands of the deprived classes, the opponents of discrimination and supporters of unity and fraternity, is even less scholarly and is wholly inconsistent with the principles of Islam.

The argument in question reduces the true prophets of God to "unfortunate innocents." They are seen as unfortunate in having been defeated and put to rout by falsity throughout history. Their religion has been unable to penetrate society or to have a noteworthy impact on the dominant, false religion. It has been able to fulfill no other rôle than that of criticism and protest against the dominant religion. They are seen as innocent in not having aligned themselves with the pole of exploiters and plunderers, in not having been agents of stagnation and standstill (contrary to what the materialists maintain). They were not aligned with the interests of that class; on the contrary, they stood at the pole of the oppressed and exploited. They had tasted their pain; they had arisen from among them. They struggled to advance their interests and to enforce their alienated rights.

In being innocent in respect to the spirit of their mission, which is this alignment and confrontation, the true prophets grow quite innocent in respect to their failure as well. That is, they are not responsible for their failure because a historical necessity arising from private ownership backed up their antagonists. The appearance of private ownership bisected society into exploiter and exploited.

The exploiters, who owned the material products, perforce owned the ideal products as well. And one cannot contest historical necessity, which is just materialist language for divine decree and foreordination issuing from a god not in heaven but on earth, not abstract but material, meaning that sovereign power whose name is "economic infrastructure" and whose essence is the "tools of production." Therefore, the prophets were not responsible for their failure.

Although this argument exonerates the true prophets, it denigrates the true system of being, which has been called the system of goodness or of Truth, in which good predominates over evil. The theologians, who view this system with optimism, maintain that it is the true system of being. Evil, falsity, and crookedness have an accidental, parasitical, ephemeral, and insubstantial existence; the axis of the system of being and of the human social system is the Truth: "For the scum disappears like froth, while what benefits the people remains on earth" (13:17).

It is said that, in the struggle of truth and falsity, truth will prevail: "Nay, We hurl the truth against falsity, and it breaks its head, and lo! it perishes!" (21:18). It is also said that God stands behind the true prophets: "We will certainly aid Our messengers and those who have faith, in the life of this world and on the day when the witnesses will stand up" (40:51). "Already has Our word been passed to Our servants sent (to warn), that they would certainly be assisted, and that Our host would certainly be victorious" (37:171-173).

But the argument being discussed would place these principles in doubt. In accordance with it, although the prophets, messengers, and other peacemakers of history are exonerated, their God is impugned. No doubt a problem exists. On the one hand, the Qur'an presents a kind of optimistic view of the overall course of the universe. It insistently presents the Truth as the axis of being and of life in human society. Theosophic wisdom, too, according to its special principles, maintains that truth and goodness always outweigh falsity and evil, that evil and falsity are accidental, parasitical, and insubstantial. On the other hand, research and observation of the past and the present induce a kind of pessimism toward the current system and lead one to suppose that those who maintain that the whole of history consists of "calamities," of acts of oppression, injustice, and exploitation, are on the right track.

Have we misunderstood the system of being and the human social system? Have we misunderstood what the Qur'an is trying to express in thinking that it regards being and history with optimism? Or are we mistaken in neither regard? Does this irreduceable contradiction exist between the Qur'an and reality?

I have discussed this point of doubt insofar as it pertains to the system of being in 'Adl-i Ilahi and, by the grace of God, resolved it. I shall address it insofar as it pertains to the course of history and human social life in a future essay to be entitled "Nabard-i Haqq va Batil" ("The Battle of Truth and Falsity"). 93

Criteria

In order to ascertain a school's perspective on the "identity" of history, one can use a range of criteria. Before advancing these criteria and employing them to probe the Islamic perspective, I must state that, in my view, the Qur'an has referred to certain principles that explicitly point to the priority of the ideal bases of society vis-à-vis its material bases. The Qur'an says, "Truly God does not change the condition of a people until they change what is in their souls" (13:11). God does not change the condition of a people until they with their own hands, their own will and resolve, change what pertains to their own behavior. In other words, a people's fate is not changed until they change what pertains to their own psyches and mentalities. This verse denies economic determinism in history. I shall likewise discuss the criteria I have discerned and test the logic of Islam against them.

THE STRATEGY OF SUMMONS

Every school that has a message for society and calls upon the people to embrace it must use a method that relates to the primary aims of the school on the one hand and to that school's manner of envisioning the identity of historical movements on the other. A school's summons consists in imparting a consciousness to the people and in pulling the right levers to set them in motion.

For instance, August Comte's "religion of humanity" purports to be a kind of "scientific religion"; it envisions the essence of man's evolution as inhering in his mind and holds that man, having traversed the two stages of myth and philosophy in his mind, has arrived at the stage of science. Thus, the forms of consciousness it deems necessary are "scientific" and the levers it would pull are those of science. The forms of consciousness Marxism, the revolutionary theory of the working class, imparts are of the class contradictions it raises to the self-consciousness of the workers. The levers it pulls are those of ressentiment and feelings of being deprived and cheated.

Schools differ in how they envision the nature of society and history and, accordingly, in how they work to impart consciousness, what sort of levers they pull. In having these various visions of history, historical evolution, and man, they arrive at various theories of the compass of their summons and the relation it bears to force—its morality or immorality.

Some schools, such as Christianity, consider only peaceful summons a moral way of encountering people. They consider force in any form or under any circumstances immoral. Therefore, in this religion, the holy commandment is, if your right cheek is struck, proffer your left, and if you are being robbed of your coat, hand over your hat as well. Other schools, such as Nietzsche's, regard force alone as moral in that man's perfection is in power; the superman is the strongest of men. In Nietzsche's view, Christian morals are slavery, weakness, and abasement, a basic factor in the stagnation of humanity.

Others regard morality as contingent on force and power, but do not regard every sort of force as moral. According to Marxism, the force the exploiter brings to bear against the exploited is immoral because it serves to maintain the status quo, but the force the exploited employ is moral because it serves to transform society and raise it to a higher stage. A perpetual warfare between two groups is the central fact of social life. One group plays the rôle of thesis and the other, that of antithesis. The former group, being reactionary, is immoral, and the latter, being revolutionary and evolutionary, is moral. Of course, this force that is now moral will later confront another force whose rôle will be to negate it. Then this force will have a reactionary rôle, that of a new antagonist for the "soul of morality." Therefore, morality is relative. What is moral at one stage is contrary to morality at a higher, more developed stage.

According to Christianity, the relation of the school to opposing groups it sees as antievolutionary is a simple one of summons coupled with gentleness; only this relation is moral. According to Nietzsche, the only moral relation is what the powerful bear to the weak; nothing is more moral than power, and nothing is more immoral, criminal, or sinful than weakness. According to Marxism,

the relation of two groups opposed in their economic foundations can be none other than one of force and the exercise of power. In this relation, the exercise of power by the exploiting class is immoral in being antievolutionary, and the exercise of power by the exploited is moral. The relation the newly arisen force bears to the old one is always militant and moral.

Islam rejects all these theories. Morality is not summed up in what Christianity envisions; peaceful relation, gentle summons, reconciliation, serenity, sincerity, and love. Sometimes force and power, too, are moral. Therefore, Islam sanctions struggle against tyrannical force and oppression as a duty; it prescribes jihad, this armed uprising, under certain conditions.

Nietzsche's theory is hollow, antihuman, and antievolutionary. The Marxist theory is based on that same mechanism it posits for historical evolution. According to Islam, by contrast with the Marxist theory, the confrontational relation of facing antievolutionary groups with force comes second, not first. The relation of wisdom and good counsel comes first ("Summon to the way of your Lord with wisdom and good counsel" [16:125]). The exercise of force toward the antievolutionary bloc becomes moral when the stages of intellectual persuasion (wisdom equals reasoning) and of spiritual persuasion (counsel equals reminding) have been traversed and proven fruitless.

Thus, all the prophets who engaged in warfare first undertook this prior stage of their summons, with "wisdom and good counsel," and at times with verbal disputation. Only when they had achieved nothing substantial by this means did they deem it moral to engage in armed struggle, jihad, the exercise of force and power. This is essentially because Islam, in thinking in spiritual, not material, terms, holds that demonstration, reasoning, and counsel have a tremendous power. Just as it holds that there is a power in what Marx called "the criticism of weapons," it maintains that there is a power in the "weapon of criticism." It uses it. It does not regard it as the one force to be used everywhere; Islam says that armed struggle with the antievolutionary block comes second, not first, and that it upholds a power for demonstration, counsel, and debate. This is the particular spiritual outlook of Islam toward man, society, and history.

The relation of one school to the opposing bloc is one of pure

summons, that of another, sheer struggle, and that of yet another, one first of summons and then of struggle. One can clarify a school's outlook toward the effective power of logic and reminder and toward the course of history and the place of struggle in it.

The consciousness Islam instills is of, primarily, the Source and the Destination [the Hereafter]. This method is used in the Qur'an and related to have been used by earlier prophets. The prophets' admonition concerns this: from where? wherein? and to where? From where have you come? Where are you now? And where are you going? From whence did the universe appear? Through what stages does it pass? Which way is it headed? The first apprehension of responsibility that the prophets instill is toward the whole of the creation, the whole of being. The apprehension of responsibility toward society is an aspect of that felt toward being as a whole. I mentioned earlier that the Meccan suras revealed to the Most Noble Prophet over the first thirteen years of his mission have little for their subject matter save a reminder of the Source and the Destination.94

The Most Noble Prophet launched his summons with "Say, La ilaha illa 'llah,' and prosper," that is, with a credal movement, with a purification of thought. It is true that tauhid has many dimensions, that all the teachings of Islam, if analyzed, revert to tauhid, and that tauhid, when elaborated, culminates in those teachings. But at first this statement had no other function than to redirect thought and action, from shirk-laden forms of belief and worship to tauhid in thought and worship. People did not contemplate any hypothetical broader significance for it.

This consciousness that strikes deep roots in people's primordial natures induces in them such a fervor, a zeal in the defense of belief, and a joy in propagating it that they do not shrink from any sacrifice of self, wealth, position, or offspring. The prophets began with what in our time is called the superstructure and then proceeded to the infrastructure. According to the school of the prophets, man depends more on belief, doctrine, and faith than on personal interests. According to this school, thought and belief are the infrastructure, and work, meaning the relations with nature and nature's gifts and with society, is the superstructure. Every religious summons must be prophetic, that is, conjoined with a continuous reminder of the Source and the Destination. The prophets mobilized society by

awakening this feeling, bringing this intelligence into bloom, dusting off this conscience, and imparting this consciousness while relying on the "satisfaction," the command, the reward, and the punishment of the Truth. (Reference is made thirteen times in the Our'an to the "satisfaction" [rizvan] of God.) That is, it has mobilized the people of faith by pulling these ideal levers of society. One can call this consciousness "God consciousness" or "cosmic consciousness."

Next, a humanistic consciousness is felt in Islamic teachings. which draw man's attention to the grandeur and nobility of his own essence, to his own essential greatness. According to this school, man is not that animal who exists because, having first been on a level with the other animals, over hundreds of millions of years of struggle for survival he proved so wily that now he has reached this level. Rather, he bears within him a ray of the divine spirit. The angels prostrated before him and call to him from the battlements of the empyrean. Notwithstanding his animal propensities to lust, evil, and corruption, man bears in his form a pure substance that is essentially inimical to evil, bloodshed, deceit, corruption, wretchedness, baseness, humiliation, and sufferance of tyranny and injustice, that is a manifestation of the divine glory: "But to God is the glory, and to His Messenger, and to the faithful" (63:8).

Where the Most Noble Prophet says, "The nobility of a man is his nightly vigil, and his glory is his independence of the people," where 'Ali (upon whom be peace) says to his companions at Siffin, "Life lies in your dying victorious, and death lies in your living subjected," where Husayn ibn 'Ali (upon whom be peace) says, "I see death as nothing but felicity and life with the oppressors as nothing but torment," or where he says, "Baseness is remote from what we are," there is this reliance on the lever of the sense of honor and nobility. The meaning of man is in every human being by primordial nature.

Tertiary is consciousness of social rights and responsibilities. We encounter instances in the Qur'an where it would create movement through an appeal grounded in one's own alienated rights or those of others. "And what is the matter with you; why do you not fight in God's way and for those oppressed men, women, and children who call out, 'Our Lord! Rescue us from this town whose people are oppressors! Give us from Your presence a guardian; give us from

Your presence a supporter!" (4:75). This noble verse grounds its instigation to jihad in two spiritual values: One consists in the fact the way is the way of God, and the other in the fact that human beings may not be left without support or refuge in the clutches of the oppressors. It is said in the *sura* Hajj:

Permission is given to those who fight because they have been oppressed, and God is truly capable of aiding them—those who have been driven from their homes unjustly, only for having said, "Our Lord is God." For if God did not repel some of the people by means of others, monasteries, churches, synagogues, and mosques, in which the name of God is much mentioned, would have been razed. Truly God helps those who help Him, for truly God is strong, almighty. —those who, if we settle them in the land, perform prayer and give in charity, enjoin good and forbid evil. And to God is the end of affairs. (22:39-41)

In this verse, we see that the permission for jihad begins with a reference to the alienated rights of the *mujahidin*. It goes on to say that the basic philosophy of defense is something higher, a value more fundamental than the alienated rights of some, which is reflected in the fact that, if there were no jihad or defensive action, if the people of faith just sat on their hands, the mosques and other places of worship that are the beating heart of society's spiritual life would be razed and would cease functioning.

It is said in the *sura* Nisa': "God does not love that offenses should be made public by declaration, unless by the one who has been wronged, and God is the all-Seeing, the all-Knowing" (4:148). This constitutes a kind of encouragement to the oppressed to rise up. It is said in the *sura* Shu'ara', after a rebuke to the poets with their fanciful mentality: "... except for those who have faith, work righteousness, remember God often, and who avenged themselves [with poetry] after being oppressed" (26:227).

In the Qur'an and the sunna, although to submit to oppression is among the worst of sins and to realize [one's or another's] rights is a duty, these questions are all propounded in humanistic terms as a range of values. The Qur'an never appeals to psychological complexes or to the motives of envy, lust, or appetite. It never says, for instance, "Such-and-such a party got, ate, enjoyed this or that; why shouldn't you be in their place?"

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If someone's property is demanded and seized by force, Islam does not permit the owner to remain quiescent on the excuse that material things have no value. If someone's family honor is violated, it does not permit him to remain quiescent on the excuse that these are carnal matters. It regards defense as a duty. Whoever is killed in the defense of his family honor and property is accounted a martyr. But although the logic of Islam encourages us to defend our possessions, this is no encouragement of avarice, but of defense of "right" as a value. Likewise, where it demands defense of family honor, this amounts to no elevation of lust, but to a call to defend one of the greatest laws of society, that is, chastity, which the man has been appointed to guard.

THE DESIGNATION OF A SCHOOL

Every school marks out its adherents by some special designation. The designation that marks out the adherents of a race theory, a racist school, according to which they become a special "we," hinges on, for instance, being white. When the adherents of that school say "we," they mean whites. Marxist theory, the theory of the worker, marks out its adherents as workers, that is their identity. The Christian religion defines its adherents as the followers of one individual. It would seem its adherents have no interest in the way or the intended destination; their whole sense of collective identity lies here: "Where is Iesus? There we must be."

Islam refuses to accept any racial, class, occupational, regional, personal, or other designation to identify itself as a school or its adherents. The adherents of this school are not marked out as Arabs, Semites, poor, rich, oppressed, whites, blacks, Asians, Easterners, Westerners, Muhammadans, Qur'anians, or people of the gibla. None of these designations truly defines this "we," the unifying factor and true identity of this school's adherents. When the true identity of this school and its adherents emerges, all these designations are obliterated. Only one thing remains: the relation between man and God. This is Islam, being surrendered to God. What is the Muslim people? It is a people that is surrendered to God, surrendered to reality, surrendered to the revelation, the inspiration, that dawns on the horizon of reality in the hearts of the individuals most worthy to guide humanity. What is the "we" of Muslims, their real

identity? What identity does this religion seek to impart to them? What label does it seek to apply to them? What banner does it seek to gather them under? The answer is Islam, surrender to reality. To learn the criterion for unity that any school upholds for its adherents is a good way to understand that school's aims and grasp its perspective toward man, society, and history.

CONDITIONS FOR AND OBSTACLES TO ACCEPTANCE

I said earlier that various schools pose various mechanisms for historical movement. One supposes the natural mechanism of movement to be the press of class upon class, the essentially reactionary nature of one class versus the essentially revolutionary nature of the other. Another seeks for the primary mechanism in man's pure, perfective, and progressive primordial nature. A third turns to something else. Each school in its teachings explains conditions and causes, as well as obstacles and constraints, in accordance with the mechanism it poses for [historical] movement. If a school that sees this movement arising from the press of class upon class sometimes sees this press or constriction as insufficient to move society, it will augment it artificially to draw society out of stasis and stagnation. Marx has noted: "Where, then, is the positive possibility of German emancipation? Our answer: in the formation of a class with radical chains ... a class that is the dissolution of all classes. ... This dissolution of society existing as a particular class is the proletariat."95

Such a school conceives of reform as an obstacle because reform reduces pressure, and to reduce pressure obstructs or at least delays the eruption of revolution. Contrast a school that upholds an innate and essential movement for society: Such a school never judges a class to be enchained to a necessity of its nature because it does not regard pressure as a necessary condition for evolution. Likewise, it does not conceive of gradual reform as an obstacle to progress.

In Islam, these conditions and obstacles mostly, or even always, turn on the primordial nature. Sometimes the Qur'an suggests that survival is contingent upon preserving one's original and primal purity: "guidance to the pious" (2:2). Sometimes it suggests that it is necessary to feel that anxiety and apprehension arising from a conception of one's responsibility toward the system of being indicated in "those who fear their Lord in secret" (21:49, 35:18), "those who

fear [God]" (20:3), "those who fear the Merciful in secret" (36:11), and similar expressions. And sometimes it suggests it is necessary that the primordial nature be alive and remain alive: "to warn whoever lives" (36:70). Islam views acceptance of its summons as conditional upon purity, feelings of apprehension and anxiety, a sense of responsibility toward the creation, and being alive with the life of the primordial nature. Conversely, it names the following phenomena as obstacles and as representing spiritual and moral corruption: sin of the heart (2:283), rusting of the heart (83:14), scaling of hearts (2:7), blinding of the eye [of insight] (22:46), deafness of the ear [of the heart] (41:44), corruption of the book of the soul (91:10), following the customs of forefathers (43:23), following great men and personages (33:67), reliance upon supposition and conjecture (6:116), and similar phenomena. Extravagance, affluence, and indulgence in pleasure are also conceived of as obstacles in that they reinforce animal propensities and turn a person into a grazing animal or a predatory beast. According to the Qur'an, these phenomena obstruct movement toward goodness, well-being, and the evolution of society.

According to Islamic teachings, the young are more disposed to accept this summons than the old, and the poor more so than the rich, because the young, in being young, are yet by their primordial natures remote from pollution of the soul and the poor are remote from wealth and affluence.

That the Qur'an presents the conditions and obstacles in this form confirms the idea that it regards the mechanism of social and historical transformation as more spiritual than economic and material.

THE RISE AND DECLINE OF SOCIETIES

Every social school offers a methodical study of the causes for the rise and progress of societies as well as for their decline and fall. How a school addresses this subject—what it regards as basic factors in progress or regress—is expressive of how it views society and history, evolutionary movements and courses of decline.

The Noble Qur'an has taken note of this subject, especially in its stories and narratives. What does the Qur'an regard as constituting an infrastructure and a superstructure? Does it regard material and

economic questions as basic factors in social life? Does it so regard moral and credal questions? Does it consider all these questions together without assigning priority?

The Qur'an advances four factors as effective in the rise and decline of societies. The first is justice/injustice. The Qur'an has reflected upon this subject in many of its verses, among them Qasas: 4: "Truly Pharaoh exalted himself in the land and arrayed its people in factions. He oppressed a tribe among them, slaughtering their sons but sparing their women, for he was one of the corrupters" (28:4). After recalling Pharaoh's struggle for hegemony, how he claimed supreme lordship and looked upon others as his slaves, how he believed in fragmenting the people and setting them against one another, how he abased a special group of the people of his country, killed their sons, and seized their women to serve himself and his henchmen, this noble verse names him as one of those who work corruption. The phrase "for he was one of the corrupters" refers to the fact that such acts of social oppression radically disrupt society.

The second factor is unity/disunity. In Al 'Iram: 103, we are expressly commanded to unite and accord on the basis of faith, through holding fast to God's firm rope. We are to shun disunity and discord (3:103). In the next verse, save one, we are commanded not to be like our predecessors, who practiced disunity and discord (3:105). An'am: 153 says much the same thing. Note also An'am: 65: "Say, 'He is capable of sending calamities from over your heads or under your feet, or of arraying you in factions, giving some of you to taste of the tyranny of others'..." (6:65). Note also Anfal: 46: "... and do not wrangle with one another, lest you lose heart and your power decline..." (8:46).

The third factor is performance/nonperformance of enjoining good and forbidding evil. The Qur'an has spoken much of the necessity of enjoining good and forbidding evil. It can be clearly deduced from one verse that to abandon this major obligatory practice will effect a people's destruction, and this is verse 79 of the sura Ma'ida. Here it is said that one of the reasons the unbelievers among the Israelites fell far from God's mercy was their failure to restrain one another from reprehensible acts, that is, the abandonment of the practice of forbidding evil: "Nor did they forbid one another the evils they committed; evil indeed were the things they

did" (5:79). Much appears in reliable Islamic traditions on the positive and negative functions of enjoining good and forbidding evil.

The fourth factor is debauchery and moral corruption. There are many verses on this subject as well. One set of them also speaks of affluence as a source of ruin. Another encompasses most of the verses that include the word zulm (injustice, oppression). In the language of the Qur'an, zulm applies not only to the encroachments of a person or group on the rights of another person or group; it also applies to the injustice an individual perpetrates upon himself or that a people perpetrates upon itself. All debauchery, all departure from the right road of humanity, is zulm. Zulm has an inclusive sense in the Qur'an in comprehending injustice toward others as well as debauchery and immoral acts. The word is more often used in the latter sense. There are many verses in the Qur'an in which zulm in its inclusive sense is given as the cause for the ruin of a people.

One may grasp the outlook of the Qur'an toward the bases of society and history by reference to the sum of these criteria. The Qur'an maintains a decisive and definitive rôle for a number of phenomena, some of them so-called "superstructural" phenomena.

The Transformation and Evolution of History

Man has no monopoly on social life. Some other animals also have a social being and life. Their lives take shape through mutual aid and cooperation, through division of tasks and responsibilities, according to an ordered system of formulas and laws. The honeybee is such an animal. But there exists a basic difference between the social being of man and the social being of these other creatures. The latter is fixed and stereotyped. No transformation or evolution occurs in their system of life, in what Maurice Maeterlinck calls their "civilization," if one may speak of such a thing, 97

By contrast, man's social life transforms and evolves; indeed, this evolution gradually accelerates. Accordingly, the history of human social life is divisible into eras that differ from various standpoints, such as the standpoint of means of livelihood: the eras of hunting, agriculture, or industry. They may differ from the standpoint of the economic system: the eras of primitive communism, slavery, capitalism, or socialism. They may differ from the standpoint of the political system: the eras of feudalism, aristocracy, or democracy. Or they may differ from the standpoint of sexual politics: the eras of matriarchy and patriarchy.

Why is no such transformation seen in the life of other social animals? What is the secret of this transformation, the basic agency by which man makes this transition from one social era to another? In other words, what is in man, carrying his life forward, that other animals lack? According to what laws, by what mechanism, does this transition, this advance, take place? At this point, the philosophies of history ask if this advance or evolution is real. That is, do the changes seen across the history of human social life really represent an advance, an evolution? What is the standard for evolution?

Some write of their doubts that these changes represent advance

and evolution. 98 Others regard historical movement as cyclical, maintaining that history passes through a point, traverses stages, and returns to that point, that the motto of history is "da capo." For instance, a nomadic people having the courage and the will found a rude tribal régime. This government by its nature culminates in an aristocracy. The aristocracy's monopolization of government leads to a popular revolution and a democratic government. Disorder, anarchy, and license within the democratic system again occasion the rise of a rude tyranny deriving from the tribal mentality.

I assume that the aggregative trend of history is progressive. Naturally, all those who see history as progressive acknowledge that all societies do not have better futures than pasts in every respect or do not constantly and ceaselessly ascend. There is such a thing as decline. Societies doubtless stagnate, decline, regress, deviate, and collapse. The idea is that human societies in the aggregate are on an ascending course.

In works on the philosophy of history, this question concerning the motive factor in historical advance and social transformation is generally propounded in a way that does not withstand close scrutiny. Generally, theories on this question take one of five forms: race, geographical, hero, economic, or divinity.

RACE THEORY

According to the race theory, the basic progressive element in history consists of certain races. Some races have the capacity to create civilizations and cultures; others do not. Some can produce science, philosophy, industry, morals, and art; others cannot produce, but can only consume.

It follows that a kind of division of labor must come about among races. Those having the capacity for politics, education, and production of culture, technology, art, and industry must be responsible for such humane, sophisticated, and sublime human activities. Races lacking this capacity are excused from them and instead are entrusted with rude physical and quasi-bestial activities not calling for such mental and aesthetic sophistication. Aristotle entertained such a theory on differences among races; thus, he believed some races are fit to be slave masters and others are fit to be enslaved.

Some believe that special races are the progressive element in history, for instance, that the northern races are superior to the southern and these former races have developed civilizations. Joseph Arthur comte de Gobineau, the French philosopher who was for three years French minister plenipotentiary to Iran around a century ago, supported this theory.

GEOGRAPHICAL THEORY

According to the geographical theory, the natural environment produces civilization, culture, and industry. Temperate climates conduce to temperate dispositions and powerful minds. Avicenna, toward the beginning of his *Qanun*, offers an extended exposition on the influence of the natural environment on human beings' mental, aesthetic, and perceptual character.

According to this theory, what prepares people to advance history does not consist in racial or hereditary factors, such that a certain race could create and advance history in whatever environment or locale, but another race could never do so, regardless of the environment. Rather, the differences among races arise from the differences among environments; as races migrate, capacities are gradually redistributed. Therefore, these special climes and locales create and advance history. Montesquieu, the seventeenth-century French sociologist, advocates this theory in his *Spirit of the Laws*.

HERO THEORY

According to the hero theory, geniuses create history, that is, the transformation and evolution of history, whether from the standpoint of science, politics, economics, technology, or morals. Human beings differ from the rest of the animals in their capacity for demonstrating enormous differences among individuals. Geniuses are exceptional in every society. Whenever these exceptional individuals, who have extraordinary powers of mind, aesthetic sensibility, or will and initiative, appear in society, they advance it from the standpoints of science and technology, morals, politics, or arms.

According to this theory, most human beings lack initiative and are followers, consumers of others' thought and industry. But

always, in virtually every society, there is a minority of innovative, inventive, progressive, and productive persons. They push history forward to a new stage. Carlyle, the English philosopher and author of *On Heroes*, which begins with a discussion of the Most Noble Prophet, entertains such a theory. In Carlyle's view, among every people, there are one or more historical personages who display the whole history of that people. More correctly speaking, the history of any people displays the character and genius of one or more heroes. For instance, the history of Islam displays the character of the Most Noble Prophet; the recent history of France displays the character of Napoleon and a few others; and the last sixty years of Soviet history display the character of Lenin.

ECONOMIC THEORY

According to the economic theory, economics is the motive factor in history. All the social and historical phases of a people or nation, including its cultural, religious, political, military, and social phases, display the mode of production and the production relations of the society. Change and transformation in the economic basis of the society uproot it and drive it onward. The heroes are nothing but manifestations of the society's economic, political, and social needs. These needs result from the transformation of the tools of production. Karl Marx, Marxists in general, and occasionally some non-Marxists support this theory. It may be the most widespread theory of our time.

DIVINITY THEORY

According to the divinity theory, what occurs on earth is a celestial phenomenon descended in accordance with far-reaching wisdom. The transformation and evolution of history exhibit a sagely will, a far-reaching wisdom. Therefore, what drives history onward and transforms it is God's will. History is the stage for the play of the holy will of God. Jacques Bénigne Bossuet, the bishop and historian who tutored Louis XV, supported this theory.

CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES

In my view, this whole approach is wrong and has come about through a kind of confusion of subjects. Most of these theories bear

no relation to the motive cause of history we are seeking to discover. For instance, the race theory is anthropological. Thus, we can ask whether human races stand at the same level of inherited capacity. If they do, they all participate in historical movement to the same extent, at least potentially. If they do not, only some races have, or can have, a share in driving history onward. Accordingly, the question is properly posed, but the secret of the philosophy of history remains unknown. Suppose we accept that only one race accomplishes the transformation and evolution of history; from the standpoint of solving the problem, we might as well have said that all human beings have a rôle in this process. The problem remains unsolved because it finally remains unclear why the life of man or of a race of men has transformed and evolved but animals have not. Where does this secret lie hidden? That the motive factor for history is constituted by one race or by all does not disclose the secret of its movement.

The same may be said of the geographical theory. This theory relates to a question of anthropology in suggesting that environments influence human beings' intellectual, aesthetic, and physical growth. Some environments keep people at a bestial or quasi-bestial level; others heighten their distinction from the beasts. According to this theory, history moves only among the people of certain climes and localities. In others, it remains fixed and stereotyped, like the life of the beasts. But the basic question remains: The honeybee, a typical social animal, lacks a historical movement in all climes and localities. What is the primary factor differentiating these two animal species, one of which remains invariable while the other keeps traversing stage after stage?

Yet further from the point is the divinity theory. Does history alone exhibit the divine will? All the universe, from start to finish, including all causes, occasions, and impediments, exhibits the divine will. The divine will bears the same relation to all the causes in the universe. Just as man's transforming and evolving life exhibits the divine will, so does the honeybee's fixed and stereotyped life. The question becomes, according to what system did the divine will create human life? What secret that the honeybee and other animals lack did it implant in it to make it transform and evolve?

The economic theory of history also lacks a grounding in principles and method; that is, it is not propounded in a way reflecting

sound principles. It is propounded in a way meant only to clarify the essential identity of history, to show that it is material and economic, while showing that all the other aspects of history are only accidents for this historical substance. It shows that, if a change appears in society's economic foundation, changes will necessarily appear in all aspects of society. But these are all "ifs." The central question remains: Assuming that economics is the infrastructure of society, if the infrastructure changes, all society changes. But why, under the impact of what factor or factors, does the infrastructure change, to be followed by all the superstructures? In other words, for economics to be the infrastructure is not sufficient for it to have movement or to be movement. If, instead of presenting economics (in their view, society's infrastructure) as history's motive force and thinking history's materiality sufficient to explain its movement, the adherents of this theory were to go into the question of the internal contradiction of society (that is, the contradiction between infrastructure and superstructure) and if they were to say that history's motive factor is the contradiction between infrastructure and superstructure or between the two aspects of the infrastructure (the tools of production and the relations of production), the point would have been rightly propounded. When this point (of economics being the motive force of history) was originally propounded, its authors meant that internal contradictions are the basic causes of all movements and that the internal contradiction between the tools of production and the relations of production is the motive force in history. But I am speaking of rightly propounding the point, not of what those making it really had in mind.

The hero theory, right or wrong, pertains directly to the philosophy of history, that is, to the question of the motive factor in history. So now we have two theories on the motive force of history. One is the hero theory, which regards history as the creation of individuals. This theory holds that nearly the whole of society lacks initiative and the power to progress. Insofar as this class includes all the members of society, never does the slightest transformation occur in it. But when a minority with a God-given genius appears in society, they innovate, plan, resolve, resist, and draw the common people along with them. Thus, they bring about a transformation. The character of these geniuses is wholly the effect of natural pro-

cesses and exceptional hereditary factors. Social conditions and society's material needs play no rôle in creating these personages. The other is the theory of the contradiction between the infrastructure and the superstructure of society, the correct interpretation of the theory of economic motivation, as I have shown.

A third theory is the theory of the primordial nature. Man has qualities according to which his social life evolves. One is that of preserving and accumulating experiences. What man acquires through experience he retains and uses as the basis for processing further experiences. Another of these qualities is the capacity for verbal learning. Man assimilates others' experiences and learning orally and, at a higher stage, through writing. One generation's experiences survive for the next through speech and writing; thus, experience accumulates. The Qur'an accordingly grants a special importance to the gift of speech and writing: "The Merciful: taught the Qur'an, created man, taught him speech" (55:1-4). "Read! In the name of your Lord who created: created man from a clot. Read! and your Lord is most bountiful. Who taught fuse of the pen" (96:1-4). A third quality with which man is provided is the power of reason and innovation. Through this mysterious power, man gains the ability to create and so becomes a manifestation of the divine creative power. A fourth quality is an essential propensity and innate love for innovation. That is, not only has man this capacity to innovate and to create, which would lead him to do so when faced with necessity, but a desire to innovate and to create has been placed within him.

The capacity to retain experiences, plus the capacity to transmit them to others, plus the power and essential desire to innovate and to create add up to a force that keeps propelling man onward. These capacities do not exist in the other animals: not the capacity to preserve experiences, not the capacity to create, which is proper to the faculty of reason, not the urge to innovate, and not the capacity to transmit learning. 99 Thus, the animal stays put and man advances.

THE ROLE OF PERSONALITY IN HISTORY

Some maintain that history is a war between genius and the ordinary level. That is, ordinary, average people are always partial to the state they have grown accustomed to, but the genius seeks to transform

the extant situation into a higher one. Carlyle maintains that history begins with geniuses and heroes. This theory is actually based on two

assumptions.


The first is that society lacks nature and character. The synthesis of society from individuals is not a real synthesis. Individuals all exist independently; no collective spirit, no real compound with character, nature, and special laws of its own arises from their interaction. There are thus only individuals with their individual psychical makeups. The individuals of a human society are as independent in their relations as the trees of a forest. Social phenomena are no more than the aggregate of particular individual phenomena. Accordingly, accidents and coincidences, products of the encounter of particular causes, govern society more than do general and universal causes.

The second assumption is that human beings are created various and discrepant. Although they are all cultural beings, members of the species called in the language of philosophy "the rational animal," almost all of them lack innovativeness and creativity and only consume culture and civilization without creating it. They differ from the animals in that the animals cannot even consume culture. The spirit of this majority is one of imitation, followership, and hero worship. However, a tiny minority of human beings consists of heroes and geniuses. They are above the ordinary, average level. They are independent in thought, innovative, and strong willed. They stand apart from the majority. If geniuses and heroes in science, philosophy, aesthetics, politics, social life, morals, arts, and technology had never appeared, humanity would never have advanced.

In my view, both these assumptions are defective. I have already established in the section on society that society has a character and a nature, laws and norms, of its own and that it functions according to these universal norms, which are essentially progressive and evolutionary. As to the second assumption, however undeniably human individuals have been created various, the view that only heroes and geniuses have creative power and everyone else is a consumer of culture and civilization is mistaken. This capacity to create and to innovate exists to some degree in all human beings. Accordingly, most individuals can have a share in creation, origination, and innovation, even if it pales before that of the genius.

The point opposite this theory that holds that personalities bring about history is another theory that holds the very converse, that history brings about personalities. That is, the objective needs of society create personalities. This saying is attributed to Montesquieu: Great figures and important events are indications and consequences of broader and more protracted currents. This one is attributed to Hegel: Great men are not the creators of history; they are midwives. Great men are signs, not agents. According to the logic of those who, like Durkheim, think in terms of collectivities and believe that human beings lack character in their essence, taking all their character from society, individuals and their characters are nothing but manifestations of the collective spirit. To use Mahmud Shabistari's term, they are the "lattice of the lamp niche" of the collective spirit. 100

Those who, like Marx, not only conceive of man's sociology as consisting in his social work and as prior to his social consciousness—that is, of the consciousness of individuals as a manifestation of the material needs of society—but also hold that people's characters are the manifestations of the material and economic needs of society





♦ NOTES





- 1. See Murtaza Mutahhari, The World-View of Tauhid.
- 2. See Tafsir Al-Mizan, vol. 4, p. 102.
- 3. See, for instance, the *sura* Baqara, verse 79: "Then woe to those who write the Book with their own hands, and then say: 'This is from God,' to traffic with it for a miserable price!—woe to them for what their hands do write; and for the gain they make thereby" (2:79). See also the *sura* Al-i 'Imran, verse 112: "Ignominy shall be their portion wherever they are found, except [where they grasp] a rope from God and a rope from the people. They have incurred the wrath of God, and humiliation and wretchedness are laid upon them. This is because they rejected the signs of God, and wrongfully murdered the prophets. This is because they rebelled and transgressed beyond bounds" (3:112).
- 4. Raymond Aron, *Main Currents in Sociological Thought*, vol. 1 (New York, Anchor Books, 1968), p. 109. [The latter saying seems not to appear in the English edition. *Trans.*]
- 5. Tafsir al-Mizan, vol. 4, p. 112.
- 6. Aron, Main Currents, p. 14.
- 7. Ibid., p. 15.
- 8. That is, these are active participles that retain their verbal force. Trans.
- 9. Tafir al-Mizan, vol. 4, p. 106.
- 10. Ibid., pp. 132-133.
- 11. Ibid., p. 14.
- 12. Aron, *Main Currents*, p. 100, referring to the views of Oswald Spengler.
- 13. Islamic sciences are traditionally said to be of two kinds: noetic, or rational ('aqli) and narrative (naqli). The former are broadly philosophical; the latter are more concerned with religious tradition and those subjects that impinge directly upon it, such as grammar. Trans.
- 14. Aron, Main Currents, pp. 102-103.
- 15. Luqman: a figure who has been described as "the Aesop of the Arabs"

(Philip K. Hitti, *History of the Arabs* [New York, 1970], p. 401). He is mentioned in the Qur'an, 31:12. *Trans*.

16. The degree to which this skepticism can be carried is illustrated in the following anecdote from Anatole France, Crainquebille, Putois, Riquet, and Other Profitable Tales (New York, 1915), pp. 25-26. Trans.

One day, when [Sir Walter] a prisoner in the Tower of London, was working, as was his wont, at the second part of his "History of the World," there was a scuffle under his window. He went and looked at the brawlers; and when he returned to his work, he thought he had observed them very carefully. But on the morrow, having related the incident to one of his friends who had witnessed the affair and even taken part in it, he was contradicted by his friend on every point. Reflecting, therefore, that if he were mistaken as to events which passed beneath his very eyes, how much greater must be the difficulty of ascertaining the truth concerning events far distant, he threw the manuscript of his history into the fire.

- 17. Edward Hallett Carr, What Is History? (New York, 1963), p. 4.
- F. Engels, Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science [Anti-Dühring] (New York, n.d.), p. 130; French edition cited in André Piettre, Marx et Marxisme (Paris, 1962), p. 205.
- 19. Piettre, Marx et Marxisme, pp. 30-31.
- Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire ch. 64. Winston Churchill, The World Crisis: The Aftermath (London, 1929), p. 386.
 Leon Trotsky, My Life (London, 1930), p. 425. All as cited in Carr, What Is History?, pp. 128-129.
- 21. Carr, What Is History?, p. 130.
- 22. Aron, Main Currents, p. 15.
- 23. L. Feuerbach, "Lettre à Ruge, 1843." As cited by Piettre, Marx et Marxisme, p. 31.
- 24. K. Marx, Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right' (Cambridge, 1970), p. 137. French edition cited by Piettre, Marx et Marxisme, pp. 31-32.
- 25. For further discussion of such questions, I recommend Kazimzada Iranshahr, *Tadavi-yi Ruhi* ("Spiritual Healing").
- 26. See Usul-i Falsafa, vols. 1-2.
- 27. [The only plausible source for this quotation would seem to be H. Levy, A Philosophy for a Modern Man (London, 1938), where assertions vaguely reminiscent of the one appearing here are made on pp. 95 and 228. Trans.]
- 28. Avicenna has discussed this point beautifully in the eighth "mode" [namat] of his Isharat.

- 29. See my Qiyam va Inqilab-i Mahdi az Didgah-i Falsafa-yi Tarikh ("The Uprising and Revolution of the Mahdi from the Vantage of the Philosophy of History"), Mashhad, 1354 Sh./1975.
- 30. This definition is offered for philosophy in respect to its object and end: "Man's becoming a rational world, corresponding to the objective world."
- 31. K. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (New York, 1964), p. 145. French edition cited in Piettre, Marx et Marxisme, p. 33.
- 32. F. Engels, Dialectics of Nature (New York, 1940), p. 279. French edition cited in Piettre, Marx et Marxisme, p. 33.
- 33. G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind (London, 1931), p. 349.
- 34. J. Goethe, Faust, pt. 1 (New York, 1976), p. 1237; Piettre, Marx et Marxisme, p. 32.
- 35. I have treated these questions at length in my Risala-yi Shinakht (Treatise on Knowledge").
- 36. No page reference to Ruyan is given. The page in an unspecified edition of Plekhanov is 42. For a statement this could be an attempt to render, see George Plekhanov, Fundamental Problems of Marxism (New York, 1969), p. 51. Trans.
- 37. P. Ruyan, *Matirialism-i Tarikhi*. Again, this has only the most tenuous relationship to Plekhanov's arguments. *Trans*.
- 38. For further elucidation of this topic of the primordial nature, see *Usul-i Falsafa*, especially the fifth discourse, "Paydayish-i Kisrat dar Idrakat" ("The Appearance of Plurality in Perceptions"). See also *Tafir al-Mizan* (Persian translation), vol. 16, p. 190, the discussion of the "Receipt of the Covenant"; vol. 31, p. 303, the discussion of the meaning of the primordiality of religion, and the various other brief discussions scattered throughout this noble work of exegesis.
- K. Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (New York, 1970), pp. 20-21, French edition cited in Piettre, Marx et Marxisme, p. 200. See also Aron, Main Currents, pp. 154-160, as well as Anvar Khamei, Le Révisionnisme de Marx à Mao-Tsé-Toung (Paris, 1976), pp. 177-186
- K. Marx and F. Engels, Études philosophiques (Paris, 1935), pp. 139– 140. As cited in Piettre, Marx et Marxisme, p. 201.
- 41. Piettre, Marx et Marxisme, pp. 26-27.
- 42. K. Marx, Capital, vol. 3, p. 9; as cited in V.I. Lenin, Marx, Engels (Paris, 1935), p. 21; as cited in Piettre, Marx et Marxisme, p. 202.
- 43. Marx, A Contribution, p. 20. French edition cited in Piettre, Marx et Marxisme, p. 26.
- 44. K. Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy (Moscow, 1962), p. 109. French edition cited in Piettre, Marx et Marxisme, p. 27.

- 45. See P. Nikitin, Fundamentals of Political Economy, 2nd ed. (Moscow 1962), and P. Ruyan, Matirialism-i Tarikhi, the section on production.
- 46. See Khamei, Le Révisionnisme, pp. 271-272.
- 47. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, p. 145. French edition cited in Piettre, Marx et Marxisme, p. 33. K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Works, (New York, 1968), p. 182. French edition cited in Khamei, Le Revisionnisme, p. 177. K. Marx and F. Engles, The German Ideology (New York, 1947), pp. 6-7. French edition cited in Khamei, Le Revisionnisme, p. 194.
- 48. Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology*, p. 18. French edition cited in Khamei, *Le Révisionnisme*, p. 194.
- 49. F. Engels, *Dialectics of Nature* (New York, 1940), p. 279. French edition cited in Piettre, *Marx et Marxisme*, p. 33.
- 50. Hegel, *The Phenomenology*, p. 349. French edition cited in Piettre, *Marx et Marxisme*, p. 32.
- 51. See my Qiyam va Inqilab-i Mahdi as Didgah-i Falsafa-yi Tarikh.
- 52. K. Marx, Ocurres, vol. 2 (Paris, 1963), p. 919. As cited in Khamei, Le Révisionnisme, p. 258.
- 53. Marx and Engels, Selected Works, p. 183. French edition cited in Khamei, Le Révisionnisme, pp. 179-180.
- 54. G. Gurvitch, ed., La Physiologie sociale: Oeuvres choisies de Saint-Simon (Paris, 1965), p. 11. As cited in Khamei, Le Révisionnisme, p. 211.
- 55. P. J. Proudhon, Ocurres complètes, vol. 2 (Paris, n.d.), p. 46. As cited in Khamei, Le Révisionnisme, p. 230.
- 56. Khamei, Le Révisionnisme, p. 213. What is meant by the polarization of the base and the form of society or by the polarization of productive forces and social relations is their assuming two contradictory and discordant positions.
- 57. Marx, Capital, pp. 13-15. That is, industry and technique, and as follows the social superstructure of the industrial nations, progress on a determinate and inexorable course. Societies are on a "one track" course. Present-day advanced societies are in every respect a model for countries that have yet to reach this stage. These countries cannot evolve except by the road that traverses the stages the industrial nations are now traversing.
- 58. Ibid., pp. 23-24. French edition cited in Khamei, *Le Révisionnisme*, p. 260. Marx is quoting the Russian economist, I. Kaufmann, on his own ideas [*Trans.*]
- 59. Khamei, *Le Révisionnisme*, p. 397. A "real class" is a group of persons who have a shared economic life and shared suffering. A "virtual class" consists of groups following differing ways of life who yet follow the same ideology.

- 60. Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p. 39.
- K. Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme (New York, 1966), p. 11.
 Marx and Engels, Selected Works, p. 44; Khamei, Le Révisionnisme, pp. 399-400.
- 62. Khamei, Le Révisionnisme, p. 410, from Marx, Capital. [Khamei gives no page reference for this quotation. Trans.].
- 63. Marx and Engels, Selected Works, p. 43. French edition cited by Khamei, Le Révisionnisme, p. 410.
- 64. See Khamei, Le Révisionnisme, pp. 354-355, where Marx and Engels are quoted in contradiction of this theory [from the standard anthology Sur la religion, pp. 50, 51, and 57]. See Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p. 41, regarding "the form of universality." Ibid., pp. 39-40; Khamei, Le Révisionnisme, p. 361.
- 65. Marx and Engels, Selected Works, p. 60; Khamei, Le Révisionnisme, pp. 367-368.
- K. Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (New York, 1963), p. 36. Marx and Engels, Selected Works, p. 44; Khamei, Le Révisionnisme, p. 391.
- 67. The author of this book in French as well as its translator into Persian is Dr. Anvar Khamei, who has brought an admirable wealth of research to bear and has analyzed these questions with an evident competence. He himself adhered to this school and propagated this theory for years.
- 68. No source is given, and it is unclear that this is intended as a direct quotation, but see Engel's very similar statement on pp. 85-86. Trans.
- 69. Here the late martyred professor has left seven lines blank in the manuscript for a quotation from what is very probably the Tarikh-i Jahan-i Bastan ("History of the Ancient World"). We searched for this work in the professor's library, in hope that we could identify the quotation through his notes in the margin and the context of the passage, so that we could add it here. Unfortunately, the first volume of this four-volume work, which the professor certainly had made use of, was not in the library. Accordingly, we have left out the quotation. Publishers of the Persian edition.
- 70. Khamci, Le Révisionnisme, p. 256.
- 71. Just as Khamei has pointed out, Engels, in using the phrase "production and reproduction of real life" in place of the phrase "material and economic production," that is, in using a phrase that, as he explained in *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State*, comprehends not only production of the means of livelihood but also production of human beings, implicitly suggests that economics is not the sole determining factor. He also maintains a rôle for the factors of sex and

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family, and this too is a kind of deviation from historical materialism. Marx and Engels, Études philosophiques, p. 128. As cited in Khamei, Le Révisionnisme, p. 324. As cited in Piettre, Marx et Marxisme, p. 202. This is a case of the apology being worse than the crime, in truth a kind of pertinacity, or at least a sacrifice of truth to expediency.

- 72. Marx and Engels, Études philosophiques, p. 152.
- 73. Khamei, Le Révisionnisme, pp. 252-253.
- 74. Mao Tsc-Tung, Four Essays on Philosophy (Peking, 1966), pp. 14, 58-59.
- 75. Marx, A Contribution to the Critique, p. 21. French edition cited in Piettre, Marx et Marxisme, p. 200.
- 76. "Lettre de Marx à Engels du 12 septembre 1863." As cited in Khamei, Le Révisionnisme, p. 422. Oeuvres choisies, p. 234 [sie]. As cited in Khamei, Le Révisionnisme, p. 422. [This is problematic because the standard Oeuvres choisies usually cited by Khamei and corresponding to the Selected Works used in this translation is a two-volume edition, and nothing exactly corresponding to this statement can be found in Selected Works, but some similar comments about the French peasantry appear on p. 172. Trans.] F. Engels, La révolution et la contre-révolution en Allemagne (Paris, 1935), p. 19f. As cited in Khamei, Le Révisionnisme, p. 72. French edition cited in Khamei, Le Révisionnisme, p. 400.
- 77. Khamei, Le Révisionnisme, p. 269.
- 78. Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology*, p. 72. French edition cited in Khamei, *Le Révisionnisme*, p. 201.
- 79. G. Schmoller, *Principes de l'économie politique*, vol. 1 (Paris, 1905), p. 232. As cited in Khamei, *Le Révisionnisme*, p. 276.
- 80. Aron, Main Currents, p. 93.
- 81. The Qur'an does not itself apply this last term to these people but ascribes its use to their enemies.
- 82. For original terms in Arabic not represented here, see p. 21. Trans.
- 83. See also 18:28 [?], concerning the adherents of the Most Noble Prophet; 11:27 and 26:111, concerning Noah's adherents; 10:83, concerning Moses's adherents; 7:88-90, concerning Shu'ayb's adherents; and 7:75-76, concerning Salih's adherents.
- 84. This is meant to represent the crypto-Marxist interpretation. See p. 108. Trans.
- 85. Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p. 39.
- 86. In a footnote, at "the chosen prophets," reference is made to 62:2 ("It is He Who has sent amongst the *ummiyin* a messenger...") and to 2:128-129, which suggests that the prophets are from among the *ummas*, and that the *ummas* are the deprived masses. I consider this reasoning later.

In a footnote at "arise from among the oppressed," reference is made to 28:75 ("And We shall draw from each people [umma] a witness [shahid] ..."). It is supposed that this verse says that those martyred and killed in the way of God always arise from among the ummas, that is, the masses. I discuss this verse later. These gentlemen, without suggesting that "we are fobbing off Marx's historical materialism," present their designs as a "reflection of the Qur'anic conception."

- 87. Sec 66:11.
- 88. Sce 4:97, 14:21, 34:31-37, and 40:47-50.
- 89. See the third volume in this series, Muqaddima'i bar Jahan Bini-yi Islami: Valry va Nubuvvat, pp. 37-43.
- 90. See Murtaza Mutahhari, Fundamentals of Islamic Thought, (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1985), pp. 93-94. Trans.
- 91. See Piettre, Marx et Marxisme, p. 31.
- 92. Verses quoted from the Masnavi. Trans..
- 93. Presumably never written. Trans.
- 94. Some contemporary Muslim so-called "intellectuals," in the course of the numerous exegeses they have written on most of the suras of the Qur'an, have denied categorically that so much as a single verse of the Qur'an has been revealed concerning the "Return" [Resurrection]. Wherever the term dunya (this world) occurs in the Qur'an, they say it means "the more base system of life," that is, the system of discrimination and exploitation; and wherever the term akhira (the hereafter) occurs, they say it means "the higher system," the system in which there is no trace of discrimination, exploitation, or inequality, the system from which private ownership has been eradicated. If this is the meaning of the hereafter, then clearly the Qur'an pronounced the death of religion a thousand years in advance of the materialist schools.
- 95. Marx, Critique of Hegel's Philosophy, pp. 141-142. French edition cited in Piettre, Marx et Marxisme, pp. 28-29. The Marxist theory that says that the exercise of force by the exploited class is moral because it is evolutionary and has an effective rôle in progress, but the exercise of force by the exploiter class is immoral because it is the agent of standstill is flawed because, according to this school, the factor of the exploiter class's pressure has as much a rôle in evolution as does the revolutionary response of the exploited class. Therefore, the act of exploitation is no less moral than the act of being exploited. The difference between these two forces lies in their respective alignments, one turned to the past, the other to the future, not in their having or not having a rôle in evolution. Being turned to the past or to the future

cannot be a criterion for morality versus immorality because this would entail making "intention" and mental state a criterion, which, according to Marxism, is a form of idealism.

- 96. See 11:116, 21:13, and 23:33, 64.
- 97. See Maurice Maeterlinck, *The Life of the Bee* (New York, 1901), pp. 363-412. Maeterlinck argues that bees do have a cultural evolution within the species level. *Trans*.
- 98. See Carr, What Is History?, pp. 144-176; Will Durant, The Pleasures of Philosophy (New York, 1953), pp. 239-257; and Will and Ariel Durant, The Lessons of History (New York, 1968), pp. 95-102.
- 99. In some animals, these capacities exist on the level of everyday activity, not on that of abstract knowledge. Such capacities are said to exist in the ant and as such are referred to in the Noble Qur'an: "One of the ants said, 'O ants! Enter your dwellings lest Solomon and his hosts crush you under foot without knowing it" (27:18).

[The only species besides our own described in the Qur'an as the recipient of a form of divine revelation, the honeybee, is also the only species besides our own for which an elaborate, purely symbolic system of communications has been described by ethologists. See Karl von Frisch, *The Dance Language and Orientation of Bees* (Cambridge, Mass., 1967) and related works by this author.

[For an overview of mental experience and communication in animals, see Donald R. Griffin, *The Question of Animal Awareness: Evolutionary Continuity of Mental Experience* (New York, 1981). For consideration of transmitted learning and culture in animals, see J.T. Bonner, *The Evolution of Culture in Animals* (Princeton, N.J., 1980). *Trans.*]

100. The phrase is from his Gulshan-i Raz:

When through the individuation process, reality grew individuated,

You expressed this event by saying, "I."
You and I are accidents of the essence of being,
We are the lattice-work of the lamp-niche of being.

See Muhammad Lahiji, Mafatih al-I'jaz fi Sharh-i Gulshan-i Raz ("The Keys to the Miraculous in Explication of the Rose Garden of the Mystery") (Tehran, 1337/1958), pp. 220-221 and 737. Trans.

101. The late martyred professor's manuscript ends here. Clearly, he planned to include many other points, but he had no chance to complete the work before realizing his long-standing aspiration for "martyrdom in God's way." Perhaps, through use of the professor's scattered notes, we shall succeed in reconstructing the full discussion for inclusion in future editions. Publishers of the Persian edition.



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